United States v. Harold Frederick Krueger, 141 F.3d 1186, 10th Cir. (1998)
United States v. Harold Frederick Krueger, 141 F.3d 1186, 10th Cir. (1998)
3d 1186
98 CJ C.A.R. 1585
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Harold Frederick Krueger appeals from the district court's order denying his
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
2255. Appellant was convicted and sentenced on counts of conspiracy, mail
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. 1291 and 2553. Because appellant's 2255 motion was filed after the
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the
certificate of appealability provision created by that act is applicable to his
case. Cf. United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363, 1364 n. 2 (10th Cir.1997),
cert. denied, No. 97-8055, 1998 WL 86544 (U.S. Mar.30, 1998). The district
court denied appellant a certificate of appealability. Therefore, appellant must
Appellant's third and fourth arguments assert that certain evidence presented at
trial was false. He alleges as false witness Mark Lippert's testimony regarding
the dates of execution and notarization of a lease document. The district court
ruled that because the lease itself was admitted as evidence at trial, the issue
about the dates of execution and notarization was not falsely presented to the
jury. Appellant argues that the lease document could not correct Lippert's
allegedly false testimony, and contends that this evidence "was very material to
destroying Appellant's veracity with the Jury." Appellant's Br. at 7. He also
contends that the trial court erred in omitting testimony from Jane Hardin which
would have demonstrated the existence of Barry Kent. The district court
rejected this contention, noting that the matter was "fully explored" at trial,
District Court Order at 3, and that evidence was presented on both sides.
Appellant responds that omitting this evidence allowed the government to
impeach his credibility and served as a basis for a sentencing enhancement.
Because we agree with the court that evidence was admitted at trial from which
the jury could have believed appellant's version of the facts on both of these
points, and because credibility is the unique province of the jury, see United
States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 1392, 1399 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
118 S.Ct. 1109, 140 L.Ed.2d 162 (1998), these arguments do not demonstrate
error of constitutional magnitude.
Appellant's fifth point contends that the government's response to his 2255
motion did not address all of his arguments and, therefore, the district court
should have considered those matters admitted under Rule 8(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Our review of the government's response, however,
indicates that the government addressed each of appellant's arguments,
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3