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United States v. Stephen W. Wilson, (N.d.okla.), 156 F.3d 1245, 10th Cir. (1998)
United States v. Stephen W. Wilson, (N.d.okla.), 156 F.3d 1245, 10th Cir. (1998)
United States v. Stephen W. Wilson, (N.d.okla.), 156 F.3d 1245, 10th Cir. (1998)
3d 1245
98 CJ C.A.R. 4314
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without
oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant.1 He contends that the warrant was obtained
through the use of an affidavit which contained false and misleading statements.
Defendant argues that the court erred in concluding that the warrant contained
probable cause to search after several false and misleading statements were
redacted from the affidavit. See Appellant's Br. at 1. Defendant also appeals the
district court's refusal to apply U.S. Sentencing Guideline [U.S.S.G.] 5C1.2 to
his sentence even though the presentence report indicated that Defendant met
the criteria for this adjustment. See R., Vol. II at 12-13.
We review the district court's determination that a defendant is not eligible for a
sentence reduction pursuant to section 5C1.2 for clear error. See United States
v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 784 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. AcostaOlivas, 71 F.3d 375, 378 n. 3 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d
119, 124 (6th Cir.1996). " 'We believe that the district court's determination
that a defendant is not eligible for the reduction permitted by sec[tion] 5C1.2
ought to be governed by the clearly erroneous standard. The court's
determination ... will often depend on credibility determinations that cannot be
replicated with the same accuracy on appeal.' " Acosta-Olivas, 71 F.3d at 378
n. 3 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 69 F.3d 136, 144 (7th Cir.1995)). The
district court's decision in this case was based on Defendant's credibility. See
R., Vol. I, Doc. 65 at 5 ("The Court finds the defendant did not provide truthful
information concerning the offense to the Government before the time of the
sentencing hearing."). The court's determination that Defendant was not
volunteering the complete truth about his acts is supported by evidence in the
record. See id., Vol. I, Doc. 63 at Ex. B (Defendant's statement avowing that all
of the marijuana found was intended for personal use for himself, his brother,
and his father; and that the false documentation found in his possession was to
obtain rental property); Vol. VIII at 7 (Defendant stipulates to quantity of 800
plants). We hold that the decision to refuse Defendant this adjustment to his
sentence was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. White, 119 F.3d 70, 74
(1st Cir.1997); United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 432 (4th Cir.1997); Adu,
82 F.3d at 124-25.
"We must review [a] magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue [a] search
warrant with 'great deference.' " United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508
(10th Cir.1988) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
Defendant contends that after the false statements were redacted from the
affidavit supporting the warrant and the affidavit's omissions of fact were
corrected there was insufficient evidence of probable cause to issue the warrant.
If a defendant establishes that false statements included in an affidavit
supporting a search warrant were made knowingly or with reckless disregard
for the truth, and that the false statement was necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the evidence seized during the resultant search must be
excluded to the same extent that exclusion is warranted when probable cause is
lacking on the face of the affidavit. See United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d
1371, 1376 (10th Cir.1997) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56,
98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). Additionally, this court has held "that
the standards of 'deliberate falsehood' and 'reckless disregard' set forth in Franks
apply 'to material omissions, as well as affirmative falsehoods.' " Kennedy, 131
F.3d at 1376 (quoting Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 582 (10th Cir.1990)).
However, to be granted a motion to suppress pursuant to the holding in Franks,
the defendant must prove that the affidavit at issue "cannot support a finding of
probable cause without the allegedly false information." United States v.
Valencia, 24 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.1994); see United States v. Morehead,
959 F.2d 1489, 1498 (10th Cir.1992); Stewart, 915 F.2d at 582.
We agree with the district court that the corrected affidavit was sufficient for
the magistrate judge to find probable cause to issue a search warrant. See R.,
Vol. I, Doc. 38 at 2-10. The affiant's statement that during an aerial flyover he
viewed marijuana plants on land where Defendant resided and the other
statements in the affidavit that Defendant exhibited behavior consistent with
those involved in the production of marijuana established a fair probability that
a crime was being committed and support a finding of probable cause. See
United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that
Defendant's claim that the warrant was issued without probable cause because
it failed to state that his common-law wife was the owner of the real property to
be searched is not valid. The district court noted that attachments to the warrant
included the county records noting the owner of the property. See R., Vol. I,
Doc. 38 at 7; see also id., Doc. 7 at Ex. 1. Therefore, any "omission" of this
information in the affidavit supporting the warrant or the warrant itself is
immaterial because the issuing magistrate judge had that information at the
time that he signed the warrant.2
10
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
We also note that the warrant satisfied Oklahoma law. See 22 Okla. Stat.
1223; Bauwens v. State, 657 P.2d 176, 178 (Okla.Crim.App.1983); Doyle v.
State, 320 P.2d 727, 729 (Okla.Crim.App.1958); Cook v. State, 75 Okla.Crim.
402, 132 P.2d 349, 350-51 (Okla.Crim.App.1942)