United States v. Escobar-Venzor, 10th Cir. (1997)
United States v. Escobar-Venzor, 10th Cir. (1997)
TENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 10 1997
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
No. 97-2061
(D.C. No. CR-95-658-HB)
MANUEL ESCOBAR-VENZOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Manuel Escobar-Venzor pled guilty to a charge of possession with intent to
distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
appeals his sentence, urging this court to find error in the district courts denial of
downward adjustments pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 3B1.2 and 3E1.1(b).
Defendant argued to the district judge that he was a man devoid of any similar
criminal history, who is both naive and unsophisticated. R., Vol. I, Pleading 67 at 5. He
argued this despite two prior drug-transporting arrests and his previous work as a
confidential informant for law enforcement drug operations. Under these circumstances,
the trial court did not commit clear error when it negated Defendants claim that others
were primarily involved and refused to grant him a U.S.S.G. 3B1.2 minor participant
adjustment. See United States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 1994)
(Appellants assertion that she was a minor or minimal participant is not enough to
overcome the clearly erroneous standard. The court could simply choose not to believe
her.); United States v. Arredondo-Santos, 911 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing
to adopt a per se rule that allowed a downward adjustment for courier status, stating
[c]ouriers are indispensable to any drug-dealing network).
Defendant also contends that he was entitled to an additional downward
adjustment point under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). His conduct does not qualify him for the
additional one-level decrease under either of the two methods articulated in U.S.S.G.
3E1.1(b). Section 3E1.1(b)(1) provides the adjustment for timely providing complete
information to the government concerning [Defendants] own involvement in the
offense. In this case, the government had to unearth Defendants drug-trafficking
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history from its records and from his immigration file. R., Vol. III at 7-8. There is
sufficient foundation for the courts determination that Defendant did not timely provide
complete information, and such foundation prohibits our reversal under the clear error
standard.
We also cannot see clear error in the trial courts refusal to grant the deduction
pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b)(2) for timely notifying authorities of his intention to
plead guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting
the court to allocate its resources efficiently. Defendants trial was originally set for
February 12, 1996, but Defendant filed and was granted nine motions to continue trial
between January 18 and September 30 of 1996. Appellees Brief at 1-2. In anticipation
of trial, the government filed Requested Jury Instructions and Notice of Intent to Use
Evidence of Other Crimes or Bad Acts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Id.
at 7. On September 4, 1996, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment, which was
denied on September 23, 1996. Id.; R., Vol. II, Pleading 47. Jury selection and trial were
set for November 13, 1996, and on November 4 the government filed its proposed voir
dire. Appellees Brief at 7. Defendant did not enter a guilty plea until November 7,
1996. Appellants Brief at 2. We cannot say the trial court was clearly
erroneous in determining Defendant did not qualify for the additional deduction under
U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b)(2).
For the foregoing reasons, the trial courts judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge