Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
Filed: Patrick Fisher
TENTH CIRCUIT
SEP 22 2004
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DEAN H. CHRISTENSEN,
v.
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 04-4020
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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that Plaintiffs fourth claim failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. Although Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the district court,
he now appeals pro se. We review de novo a district courts dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, and we accept findings of fact pertaining to jurisdiction unless
clearly erroneous. See Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
We assume the truth of the factual allegations in Plaintiffs complaint. See
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). In 1993 a
grand jury was convened to investigate Plaintiffs operation of oil wells and
payment of royalties. Several DOI employees knowingly gave false testimony
that he had not paid certain royalties. In 1996 two DOI employees released their
testimony to the IRS, which filed a $500,000 claim against Plaintiff. Plaintiff
subsequently refuted this testimony, and the IRS claim was reduced to zero.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a tort action against the DOI employees in Utah
state court. The United States was substituted as a defendant and the action
removed to federal court. The federal court dismissed the complaint, directing
Plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies through the DOI. See 28 U.S.C.
2675(a) (under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claimant must exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court). After his claims
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were denied on October 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. His
complaint alleged federal question jurisdiction based on (1) disclosure of grand
jury testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e); (2)
knowing disclosure of false information to a federal bankruptcy court and grand
jury under 16 U.S.C. 1623; (3) filing a false claim with a bankruptcy court
under 18 U.S.C. 152; and (4) disclosure of information in violation of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a.
Plaintiff conceded in the district court that the first three claims were
barred by sovereign immunity, but argued that the Privacy Act claim waived
sovereign immunity with respect to the other three claims. The district court did
not address the argument because it found the Privacy Act claim to be barred by
the statute of limitations. In response to Plaintiffs argument that the limitations
period should have been tolled while he pursued administrative remedies, the
court found that the matter pursued administratively involved different claims
and does not create any basis for tolling the Privacy Act statute of limitations.
R. Doc. 15 at 6.
II.
DISCUSSION
The Privacy Act bars a federal agency from disclosing records unless
certain conditions are met. See 5 U.S.C. 552a(b). An action arising under the
Privacy Act may be brought within two years from the date on which the cause
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Privacy Act claims in federal court while Plaintiffs administrative claims were
pending.
III.
CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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