G. Kevin Jones v. Manual Lujan, Secretary of The Interior, 936 F.2d 583, 10th Cir. (1991)
G. Kevin Jones v. Manual Lujan, Secretary of The Interior, 936 F.2d 583, 10th Cir. (1991)
2d 583
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished
opinions and orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
G. Kevin JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Manual LUJAN, Secretary of the Interior, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-4173.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff G. Kevin Jones filed a Title VII complaint against his employer, the
United States Department of the Interior, alleging handicap discrimination.
While the suit was pending in the district court, the Department of the Interior
Inspector General (the IG) initiated an investigation of alleged violations of
department regulations by plaintiff.1 The parties negotiated and entered into a
stipulated settlement of the pending Title VII suit (the Settlement Agreement),
and the district court accepted the settlement and dismissed the case. Rec. vol.
I, doc. 108. The Settlement Agreement addressed the IG's investigation, which
plaintiff alleged was initiated in retaliation for his discrimination suit.
When a trial court looks to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the
parties to a contract, we review that determination, as a question of fact, under a
clearly erroneous standard. See EDO Corp. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 911 F.2d
1447, 1455 n. 9 (10th Cir.1990). When the district court bases its interpretation
solely on the contract language, however, our review is not so limited. See
Valley Nat'l Bank v. Abdnor, 918 F.2d 128, 130 (10th Cir.1990).
Where the parties intended a result that was not in their power to accomplish, a
settlement agreement may not be enforceable. See Gull Laboratories, Inc. v.
Diagnostic Technology, Inc., 695 F.Supp. 1151, 1153 (D.Utah 1988). However,
a party to a contract that is impossible to fully perform may nonetheless be held
to that contract if he agreed to assume the risk of the impossibility. See
generally 18 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1972A (3d ed. 1978).
There is some indication in this record that plaintiff was aware of the problem
concerning the IG before the settlement agreement was executed. See, e.g.,
(Transcript of Hearing at 5).
10
Plaintiff also appeals the district court's denial of his request for attorney's fees
and costs. In light of our conclusion that the Settlement Agreement may not be
enforced against the Inspector General, we affirm the district court's denial of
plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs associated with bringing this
motion.
11
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
AFFIRMED as to plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs, and the case is
REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th
Cir.R. 36.3
1