Republic of The Philippines Manila en Banc
Republic of The Philippines Manila en Banc
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28,
MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
II
G.R. No. 104654
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private
respondents citizenship.
In his comment to the States appeal of the decision
granting him Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654,
private respondent alleges that the precarious political
atmosphere in the country during Martial Law compelled
him to seek political asylum in the United States, and
eventually to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only
available remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship
through repatriation and direct act of Congress. However,
he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were
the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath
of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only
after 30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the
Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from
the date of his receipt of the copy of the decision (Republic
v. Court of First Instance of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision
granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be
executory until after two years from its promulgation in
order to be able to observe if: (1) the applicant has left the
country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession; (3) the
applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of government promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiancet
o the Republic and executed an Affidavit ofRenunciation of
his foreign citizenship, which states:
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which is the jurisprudential spring of theprinciple that a
second-placer cannot be proclaimed asthe winner in an
election contest. This doctrine must bere-examined and its
soundness once again put to thetest to address the everrecurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an
ineligible candidate cannot beproclaimed as the winner in
the elections.
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified andtha
t Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed inhis
stead. An ineligible candidate who receives thehighest
number of votes is a wrongful winner. By expresslegal
mandate, he could not even have been a candidatein the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material timeor any
other intervening circumstances, his ineligibilitymight not
have been passed upon prior to election
date.Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to
holdhimself out to the electorate as a legitimate and
dulyqualified candidate. However, notwithstanding
theoutcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a
candidateremains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only
pertain tohis qualifications as a candidate but necessarily
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that a voidCOC cannot produce any legal effect.
That the disqualified candidate has already beenproclaime
d and has assumed office is of no moment.The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantiveground that existed
prior to the filing of the certificate ofcandidacy voids not
only the COC but also theproclamation.