Jones v. Grant, 10th Cir. (2001)
Jones v. Grant, 10th Cir. (2001)
MAR 1 2001
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LESLIE-LE-ROY: JONES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
VICTORY J. GRANT, Metropolitan Court
Judge; JERRY GALVIN, Chief of Police, City of
Albuquerque; JEFF ROMERO, District Attorney,
Bernalillo County; B.A. CHAVEZ, Chief Clerk,
Metropolitan Court; J. CASAUS, Clerk,
Metropolitan Court; GORDON EDEN, Director,
Motor Vehicle Division, New Mexico Taxation
and Revenue; BRIAN C. WICKETTS, Police
Officer, City of Albuquerque; PATRICIA A.
MADRID, Attorney General for the State of New
Mexico,
No. 00-2314
(D. N.M.)
(D.Ct. No. CIV-00-814-LH)
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, McKAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Leslie Leroy Jones, appearing pro se, appeals the district courts
decision denying his petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. We deny Mr. Jones request for a certificate of
appealability and dismiss his appeal.
In his 2254 petition, Mr. Jones sought relief from a state agencys
administrative suspension of his New Mexico drivers license and from warrants
issued after his failure to appear for hearings in the City of Albuquerque
Metropolitan Court. Although Mr. Jones was not incarcerated, he contended he
was in constructive custody for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. In
addition, Mr. Jones complained that the Metropolitan Court Clerk had refused to
instruct the proper state authority to reinstate his license and instead told him he
should just plead guilty and pay the fines, costs and warrant fees if he wanted to
get his drivers license back.
The district court sua sponte denied Mr. Jones petition for lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction after determining Mr. Jones was not in custody as required
under 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). Thereafter, Mr. Jones filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the district court denied.
945, 947 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with
the district courts conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant
Mr. Jones habeas relief. As the district court correctly pointed out, suspension or
revocation of his drivers license does not render Mr. Jones in custody for the
purposes of 2254. See Lillios v. New Hampshire, 788 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir.
1986) (per curiam); Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96-97 (7th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
Moreover, we agree that an arrest warrant for refusal to pay a fine does not
amount to custody within the meaning of 2254. See Spring v. Caldwell, 692
F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1982). Because 28 U.S.C. 2254(a) requires the
petitioner to be in custody, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Mr. Jones petition and therefore, it could not consider the merits of Mr.
Jones claims therein.
As to Mr. Jones other contentions on appeal, they simply lack merit. First,
nothing in the record suggests the district court somehow committed fraud
because it failed to analyze his case on its merits, provide him a copy of an
unpublished opinion, or find that he is in custody. Second, the Supreme Court
decisions cited by Mr. Jones either do not support his position or are
distinguishable on their facts. Lastly, the district court did not err by failing to
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construe Mr. Jones petition as a 1983 complaint. A review of the record shows
Mr. Jones is not seeking civil damages against any state officials, but rather is
claiming suspension of his drivers license was improper, as evidenced by his
request for reinstatement of his suspended drivers licence. Even if Mr. Jones
sought declaratory relief and money damages against certain city and state
officials, the Supreme Court has held a claim is not cognizable under 1983 if it
implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 648 (1997).
In order for this court to grant a certificate of appealability, Mr. Jones must
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional rights as required
under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2) and Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85
(2000). Mr. Jones fails to make the requisite showing.
For these and substantially the same reasons articulated in the district
courts June 28, 2000 Memorandum Opinion and Order of Dismissal, we deny Mr.
Jones request for a certificate of appealability and DISMISS his appeal.