Download as pdf
Download as pdf
You are on page 1of 6

F I L E D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

United States Court of Appeals


Tenth Circuit

TENTH CIRCUIT

FEB 18 2005

PATRICK FISHER
Clerk

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,


Plaintiff - Appellee,

No. 04-1345

v.

(D. Colorado)

MIGUEL ANGEL BRICENOROSADO,

(D.C. No. 03-CR-553-D)

Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore submitted without oral argument.

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
*

Miguel Briceno-Rosado (Briceno-Rosado) pleaded guilty to illegal


reentry into the United States by a previously deported alien, in violation of 8
U.S.C. 1326. He appeals his seventy-seven-month sentence. We REMAND for
resentencing.
On November 17, 2003, Briceno-Rosado was charged in a one-count
indictment alleging that he was found in the United States on September 15, 2003,
without first gaining the permission of the Attorney General, after being
previously deported for an aggravated felony conviction.

Briceno-Rosado

entered into a plea agreement with the government admitting the conduct charged
in the indictment. In return, the government agreed to recommend a three-level
decrease in his offense level, based on his acceptance of responsibility, and
agreed to recommend a sentence at the bottom of the range mandated by the
United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual (Guidelines).

The Presentence Report (PSR) concluded that the defendants offense


level was 21 and that his criminal history category was IV. The PSR
recommended a sentence of seventy-seven months, the bottom of the applicable
Guidelines range. Briceno-Rosado did not challenge the findings in the PSR at
sentencing.

Briceno-Rosado was previously convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse


with a minor.
1

-2-

Prior to sentencing, however, the defendant filed a motion asking the


district court to declare the Guidelines unconstitutional in light of
Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).

Blakely v.

At Briceno-Rosados initial sentencing

hearing on July 12, 2004, the district court determined that more analysis of the
question was needed and ordered supplemental briefing. On August 2, 2004, the
district judge issued a written order denying the defendants motion and
concluding that Blakely was not implicated because sentencing Briceno-Rosado
did not require him to engage in judicial fact-finding. On August 20, 2004, the
defendant was sentenced to seventy-seven months in prison, followed by three
years of supervised release. He now appeals, again arguing that the Guidelines
are unconstitutional in their entirety, thereby necessitating resentencing.

When Briceno-Rosado raised Blakely both to the district court and to this
court, the Supreme Court had not yet issued United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005). However, raising Blakely is sufficient to raise an argument under
Booker. Accordingly, he has preserved an argument under both cases before the
district court and before us, and we hereinafter refer to both cases. We granted
both parties permission to file supplemental briefs on the effect of Booker,
although the government elected not to file one.
2

Specifically, Briceno-Rosado contends that (1) Blakely applies to the


Guidelines; (2) the unconstitutional provisions of the Guidelines cannot be
severed; and (3) the activities of the Sentencing Commission in defining new
crimes through enhancements violate non-delegation and separation-of-powers
principles. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), of course, applied
Blakely to the Guidelines. Briceno-Rosados remaining arguments, however, are
now foreclosed by Booker. Id. at 756 (provisions of the federal sentencing statute
that make Guidelines mandatory severed and excised); id. at 754-55 (holding that
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), which upheld the delegation of
(continued...)
3

-3-

In Blakely , the Supreme Court reiterated the holding of

Apprendi v. New

Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Blakely , 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting

Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490). In applying this

holding to Washington states determinate sentencing scheme,

Blakely clarified

that the statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
additional findings.

without any

Id. at 2537. Recently, Booker applied Blakely to the federal

sentencing guidelines, rendering them advisory rather than mandatory.

Booker

held that the Sixth Amendment requires that [a]ny fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Booker , 125 S. Ct. at

756. Because Briceno-Rosado admitted all relevant sentencing facts, no Sixth


Amendment violation occurred in this case.
That does not end our inquiry, however. In

Booker , the Supreme Court also

imposed a global remedy for the Sixth Amendment difficulties with the

(...continued)
authority to the Sentencing Commission, was still valid).
3

-4-

Sentencing Guidelines, invalidating their mandatory application and instead


requiring district courts to consult them in an advisory fashion.

United States v.

Labastida-Segura , No. 04-1311, __ F.3d __, 2005 WL 273315, at *1 (10th Cir.


Feb. 4, 2005). In Labastida-Segura , which is nearly identical to this case, we held
that we must apply this remedial holding to the defendants sentence even though
no Sixth Amendment violation was involved.

Id. at *2. We also determined that

while sentencing errors are harmless in some circumstances, the district courts
error of sentencing Labastida-Segura while believing the Guidelines were
mandatory was not harmless:
Here, where it was already at the bottom of the guidelines range, to
say that the district court would have imposed the same sentence
given the new legal landscape (even after consulting the Sentencing
Guidelines in an advisory capacity) places us in the zone of
speculation and conjecturewe simply do no know what the district
court would have done after hearing from the parties. Though an
appellate court may judge whether a district court exercised its
discretion (and whether it abused that discretion), it cannot exercise
the district courts discretion.
Id. Like Labastida-Segura, Briceno-Rosado was sentenced at the bottom of the
sentencing range, and we likewise have no way to determine if the district judge
would have imposed the seventy-seven-month sentence in light of

-5-

Booker . In

fact, we discern no material difference between this case and

Labastida-Segura . 4

Accordingly, we REMAND this case for resentencing.


ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge

The government has submitted a letter indicating its agreement that, in


light of Labastida-Segura, this case must be remanded.
4

-6-

You might also like