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Todosio Casias and Dorothy Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 10th Cir. (1976)
Todosio Casias and Dorothy Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 10th Cir. (1976)
2d 1339
Appellants brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S. 1346(b), 2671 et seq., to recover damages resulting
from the alleged medical malpractice of the Veterans Administration Hospital
in Denver, Colorado. The trial court entered judgment against appellants on the
ground the administrative claim was not filed within the two years allowed by
28 U.S.C. 2401(b) and therefore the court was without jurisdiction. 1
3 tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
A
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues .
. . . (Emphasis added.)
4
The fundamental question in this appeal is when the claim accrued so that the
time for filing started to run. In medical malpractice actions the claim accrues
"when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the alleged malpractice." Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147
(8th Cir. 1975); Portis v. United States, 483 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1973); Ashley v.
United States, 413 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1969). With this rule in mind we will set
out the facts.
5
The trial court found appellant should have discovered the acts constituting
malpractice in December, 1969. The administrative claim was not filed until
July 24, 1972. The trial court based its conclusion on the following facts, which
are fully supported in the evidence.
(1) Appellant experienced pain in his left foot immediately upon receiving the
injections. He complained to the nurse who replied that he had not received an
injection in the foot.
(3) During a subsequent examination on December 12, 1969, appellant told Dr.
Pressly he believed his condition was the result of the injections. Dr. Pressly
said he agreed.
10
(4) On December 16, 1969, appellant was readmitted to the V.A. hospital
where doctors pursued various treatment procedures, including a "sympathetic
block" and a "lumbar sympathectomy." When these failed, appellant was
scheduled for a rather radical procedure known as a "cordotomy," but it was
never performed because appellant was apparently considered by doctors to be
mentally unready for it.
11
12
From this evidence it is clear that well before the crucial date appellant knew
he was injured and knew the act which caused the injury. The trial court also
found that these consequences were so "unusual and unexpected" that a
reasonable person would have been alerted that there may have been negligent
treatment. Brown v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965); Ciccarone v.
United States, 350 F.Supp. 554 (E.D.Pa.1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 253 (3d Cir.
1973). Unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous,3 the time started
running on appellant's claim and expired before he filed it.
13
Appellant's contention that the trial court erred is based primarily on Jordan v.
United States, 503 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1974). That case held that even though a
plaintiff has knowledge that would otherwise require an investigation, he may
be excused from that duty by a doctor's "credible explanation" of the cause of
his injury. Appellant contends he was given such an explanation by Dr. Pressly
who told him he had "sciatic neuritis." Appellant says he thought this was like
arthritis or rheumatism and therefore did not assume it could be the result of
malpractice.
14
The trial court fairly considered this rule in viewing the evidence and found as
a matter of fact that no such explanation was given in this case. The doctor's
term "sciatic neuritis" was only his name for appellant's condition, not an
explanation of its cause. There was nothing in the doctor's statement that could
be considered misleading as to the cause of appellant's condition. In fact, the
doctor agreed with him that injections were probably the cause.
15
16
Appellant makes some argument that he could not discover the cause of the
injury sooner because of preexisting injuries to the same leg. We can find no
indication that this issue was presented to the trial court; it was barely hinted at
in appellant's opening brief and finally was emphasized only in his reply brief.
We hold the issue has not been properly preserved for appellate review. See, e.
g., Operating Engineers, Local 953 v. Central Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 501 F.2d 902
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. den'd, 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 397.
17
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in refusing to consider appellant's
mental condition during his treatment as a possible basis for tolling the statute
of limitations. We hold the trial court was correct. Insanity, such as constitutes a
legal disability in most states, does not toll the statute of limitations under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239 (3d Cir.
1970); Williams v. United States, 228 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1944), cert. den'd, 351
U.S. 986, 76 S.Ct. 1054, 100 L.Ed. 1499, rehearing den'd, 352 U.S. 860, 77
S.Ct. 26, 1 L.Ed.2d 71; Jackson v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 586
(E.D.S.C.1964).
18
19
AFFIRMED.
This action was commenced by both Todosio Casias and his wife, Dorothy
Casias, for their separate injuries. For convenience, in the remainder of this
opinion we will refer solely to Todosio Casias in the singular as appellant. All
that is said, however, applies to both appellants
The alleged trial court errors are issues of fact and are governed by the clearly
erroneous rule. Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1975)