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United States v. David Brian Cerullo, 69 F.3d 548, 10th Cir. (1995)
United States v. David Brian Cerullo, 69 F.3d 548, 10th Cir. (1995)
3d 548
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Cerullo seeks review of the district court's denial of his motion to correct
his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. Mr. Cerullo did not take a direct
appeal from his guilty plea. After thoroughly examining the parties' briefs and
the record in this case, we affirm the decision of the district court.
In October of 1991, Mr. Cerullo was charged with eight drug-related counts in
an indictment filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi. Mr. Cerullo thereafter retained counsel in Mississippi, who
advised him to consider entering a negotiated plea in his home state of
Colorado pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 20.2
On the date originally scheduled for entry of his guilty plea, the Assistant
On the date originally scheduled for entry of his guilty plea, the Assistant
Public Defender assigned to Mr. Cerullo's case moved to withdraw. After a
hearing on the motion, it became apparent that Mr. Cerullo was not satisfied
with the course the plea negotiations had taken. He had apparently continued
consulting with his attorney in Mississippi outside the presence of his appointed
counsel, and was getting what he described as "different stories from different
people." Rec. vol. II, at 7. Mr. Cerullo's appointed counsel stated to the court
that as a result of Mr. Cerullo's conversations with the attorney in Mississippi,
she felt that his confidence in her had waned.
Also at this hearing, the prosecutor stated that the offer extended by the
government was "the rock-bottom best offer." Id. at 11. Mr. Cerullo
nevertheless expressed concerns that he was not getting the best possible plea
agreement:
[THE DEFENDANT:] I don't really know what to do, Your Honor. I am not-you know, my feeling was that, okay, I've broken the law. And it's certainly
very difficult for me to travel to Mississippi. And from what I hear, they would
not look favorably upon me down there. I might lose at trial and get a very
severe sentence.
You know, based on those things, I was also assured that if I did this, that the
people in Mississippi would more or less allow Colorado to go ahead with their
own conscience. And what I feel is that Mississippi has torpedoed the
negotiations between [the public defender and the prosecutor]. If you wanted to
ask me exactly what I thought happened, I think that's what happened.
Id. at 8.
10
The district court thereafter explained Mr. Cerullo's alternatives to him and
explained that he could not continue to be indecisive about his plea. Mr.
Cerullo told the court that he believed he could work out a plea rather than
having the case sent back to Mississippi. He also reiterated his concerns about
the negotiations:
11
THE DEFENDANT: Sir, I would do my best. I just found that--I just heard this
[offer] last week. And really, I was a bit shocked. You know, maybe it's my
own personal problem. But, you know, I understand that I've broken the law
and that I should be punished. I'm just a bit upset with the harshness.
12
Id. at 16-17. The district court then granted the public defender's motion to
withdraw, and appointed new counsel for Mr. Cerullo.
13
Over two months later, the district court held a hearing to determine whether to
accept Mr. Cerullo's conditional plea under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C). Under
the proposal, the government agreed to drop seven counts of the indictment in
return for Mr. Cerullo's plea of guilty to one count of Aiding and Abetting the
Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 18
U.S.C. 2. The agreement was conditioned upon the imposition of a sentence of
51 months imprisonment. The district court thoroughly inquired into the
defendant's understanding of the nature of the agreement and the nature of
entering a guilty plea and fully complied with the requirements of
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c). The court was also careful to ensure that Mr. Cerullo
entered into the agreement voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
consequences. The court accepted Mr. Cerullo's guilty plea at that time.
14
At his sentencing hearing later that month, Mr. Cerullo expressed some concern
that due to recent changes in the sentencing guidelines he may have been
entitled to an additional downward adjustment in his offense level. The
prosecutor noted, however, that a 51 month term of imprisonment would have
been within the applicable range under either level, and that the government's
conditional offer was contingent on Mr. Cerullo receiving the 51 month
sentence--not on a particular guidelines level. The court then offered Mr.
Cerullo the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. Cerullo decided to
proceed with his guilty plea instead and stated: "I just was hoping that the
system would see me as a person who didn't deserve to go to prison for years."
Rec. vol. IV, at 15. The court thereafter sentenced Mr. Cerullo to 51 months
imprisonment.
15
In his motion before the district court to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
2255, Mr. Cerullo argued that the district court should have reduced his
sentence in light of the previously-mentioned amendments to the sentencing
guidelines. He also argued that his attorney's failure to obtain a reduction in the
proposed sentence in light of the amendments to the sentencing guidelines
violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Mr.
Cerullo raises these issues on appeal, and also takes issue with the district
court's disposition of his 2255 motion. Specifically, he alleges that the district
court should have held a hearing on his claims, that the district court did not
properly address all of the issues raised in his motion, that the district court did
not consider the entire record, and that the government's response to his motion
was insufficient.
16
We initially note that a defendant who voluntarily enters a plea of guilty waives
all nonjurisdictional defenses. United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1525-26
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 856 (1990). We therefore agree with the
district court that Mr. Cerullo may not now claim that he was entitled to a
downward adjustment in his offense level after having voluntarily entered his
guilty plea with the knowledge that the court would in turn impose a 51 month
term of imprisonment. We therefore turn to the merits of Mr. Cerullo's
ineffective assistance claim.
17
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), the Supreme Court delineated the
standard for proving that ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an
involuntary plea: "Where ... a defendant is represented by counsel during the
plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of
the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' " Id. at 56 (quoting
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). The prosecutor in this case
specifically advised Mr. Cerullo that the 51 month sentence was the
government's "rock-bottom best offer." The prosecutor also made clear that this
offer was irrespective of any potential downward adjustment under the
sentencing guidelines because the 51 month sentence fell well within the range
available to the court under either level. It is clear from this record that Mr.
Cerullo's attorney reasonably believed that the 51 month sentence was the best
offer available to him. This court therefore believes that Mr. Cerullo's attorney's
advice fell well within the range of required competence. In light of this record,
the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.3
18
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order. 151 F.R.D. 470 (10th Cir.1993)
This attorney apparently told Mr. Cerullo that he would get "better treatment"
in Colorado and that the Mississippi court was "going to think that he was some
rich hobnobber from Aspen, Colorado, like all the Hollywood types that live
Mr. Cerullo's other arguments regarding the disposition of his motion by the
district court have been thoroughly reviewed by this court and are without merit