United States v. Bobbert S. Cook, 166 F.3d 1222, 10th Cir. (1999)
United States v. Bobbert S. Cook, 166 F.3d 1222, 10th Cir. (1999)
3d 1222
1999 CJ C.A.R. 394
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
LUCERO.
Appellant Bobbert S. Cook appeals pro se the district court's denial of his 28
U.S.C. 2255 motion to modify, vacate or set aside his sentence, and the
district court's sua sponte denial of his certificate of appealability.
Mr. Cook was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Brian Walker when it was
stopped by Kansas State Trooper Richard Jimerson. A subsequent search of the
vehicle by Trooper Jimerson uncovered 38 kilos of cocaine. Walker entered a
conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 121
months imprisonment. Cook decided to go to trial. While in pretrial detention,
Cook arranged with the assistance of his cellmate James Stark, a government
informant, to hire one "Daniel Ortega," an undercover government agent, to kill
Trooper Jimerson. A jury found Cook guilty of possession of cocaine with
Cook presents eleven grounds for relief. 1 We have reviewed the record on
appeal and conclude that Cook has failed to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.
We begin with Cook's claims that concern his conviction. Challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, appellant makes two identical
Appellant also alleges a number of errors in the sentencing process and in the
sentence that he received. His claim that the sentencing court did not realize
that it had the authority to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines
(ground eight) is meritless, and was previously considered by this court. See
Walker, 1996 WL 731631, at * 7-8. As noted there, the district court
specifically declined to depart when sentencing Cook, and we therefore have no
jurisdiction to review the district court's discretionary refusal to depart
downward. See id. at * 8 (citing United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500,
1529 (10th Cir.1995)).
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In addition, appellant claims that he was not given an opportunity to address the
sentencing court on the issue of mitigation (ground nine). Even if we reject the
district court's finding that appellant's lengthy statement prior to sentencing was
insufficient denial of allocution in sentencing is not a "fundamental defect" that
would result in the complete miscarriage of justice necessary for a showing
under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468,
7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962).
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Challenging the sentence itself, appellant claims that he was the victim of
"double counting" because he received two sentence enhancements for his
attempt to retaliate against a police officer (ground seven). The sentencing
court, following the Sentencing Guidelines, assigned Cook enhancements for
Trooper Jimerson's status as an "official victim," U.S.S.G. 3A1.2, and for
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Finally, as to Cook's two other claims, that he was forced to proceed to trial on
two valid indictments after jeopardy had attached to both of them (ground two),
and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his
constitutional rights (ground eleven), we also concur with the district court's
justification for rejecting these claims.
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