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United States v. Bud Pratt Williams, 11th Cir. (2011)
United States v. Bud Pratt Williams, 11th Cir. (2011)
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 21, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BUD PRATT WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(January 21, 2011)
Bud Pratt Williams appeals his convictions for (1) conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846, (2) possessing with the
intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and
18 U.S.C. 2, and (3) attempting to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. 2. Williams raises several issues on
appeal, which we address in turn.
I.
Williams first asserts evidence of (1) phone calls placed by him from prison;
and (2) a cutting agent (cut)1 found in his car after his arrest were improperly
admitted into evidence at trial.2 We normally review a district courts evidentiary
rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2005). When a party challenges an evidentiary ruling for the first time on
appeal, we review for plain error only. Id.
Williams also challenges the admission of a firearm. When the district court admitted
the handgun into evidence, it expressly asked Williams if he wished to object, and Williams
expressly declined. Thus, we will not review admission of the firearm, even for plain error. See
United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that under the invitederror doctrine, where a party stipulates to the admission of evidence, he is precluded from
objecting to the same evidence on appeal).
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that the defendant was dealing drugs). Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing this evidence at trial.
Further, Williams cites to no binding law from the Supreme Court or this
Court indicating the admission of the phone calls for impeachment purposes was
in error under this Courts three-part test regarding admission of other
wrongdoing. As no controlling precedent supports Williams alleged error, there
is no plain error. See United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 948 (11th Cir.
2006) (An error is plain if it is obvious and clear under current law.).
II.
Williams next contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conspiracy conviction. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,
drawing all reasonable inferences in the governments favor. See United States v.
Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2006).
To support a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. 846, the Government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the
defendant had knowledge of it, and (3) he voluntarily joined it. United States v.
Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2005). A conspiracy to distribute
drugs may be inferred when the evidence shows a continuing relationship that
results in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs to [a] purchaser. Id at 1292.
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evidence not before the jury. The Governments mention to the public record
during closing argument was not improper, as the Government provided testimony
as to what was included in the public record. Furthermore, the record indicates
other evidence referred to by the Government was also before the jury. As such,
the Government did not improperly vouch for Jonass credibility by referring to
these items. See Sims, 719 F.2d at 377.
Williamss argument that the Government may have improperly denied not
promising to help Jonas with his deportation also is without merit. Other than the
fact that Jonas remains in jail, nothing in the record indicates a deal existed
between Jonas and the Government. Regardless, the Government presented ample
evidence of Williamss guilt besides Jonass testimony. As such, Williams cannot
meet his burden under the plain error standard of review.
IV.
Lastly, Williams argues the court abused its discretion by dismissing his pro
se motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. We review the
denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995). Likewise, we review a district
courts denial of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. United States
v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1443 (11th Cir. 1996).
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