Sales Cases Part 2
Sales Cases Part 2
Pacson
G.R. 161318
Facts: Spouses Nabus owned a property
in Benguet which they mortaged to PNB
to secure a loan of P30,000.
On 1977, petitioners executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale for a part of the said lot
in favor of Pacson, for the consideration
of P170,000.
Bugarin v. Lesaca
G.R. L-15385
Facts: Lesaca sold to Bugarin two parcels
of land for P5,000. The parties then
executed a Deed of Sale for the lots.
After the sale, plaintiff tried to take
possession of the lots, but was prevented
by Deloso, who claimed to be the owner
thereof.
Bugarin then wrote to Lesaca, asking the
latter to exchange to lot sold with
another of the same class or return the
purchase price plus other expenses she
incurred.
Issue: Whether there was delivery of the
lot sold to the vendee
Held: No, there was not. Articles 1461
and 1462 of the old Civil Code provide:
ART. 1461. The vendor is bound to
deliver and warrant the thing which
is the subject-matter of the sale.
ART. 1462. The thing sold shall be
deemed delivered when the
vendee is placed in the control and
possession thereof.
If the sale should be made by
means of a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the subject-matter of
the contract unless the contrary
appears or is clearly to be inferred
from such instrument.
There is nothing in the contract that the
vendor intended not to deliver the land in
question right away. The intention can be
inferred in the contract when it stipulated
that vendee takes actual possession
Held:
August 10,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO &
MA.
LUISA
MAGPAYO
AND
PHILIPPINE
BANK
OF
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
Issues:
WON the Magpayos had the
right to mortgage the property?
PUNO, J.:\
Ruling:
Yes, the property was no
longer considered owned by petitioner's
parents. The mortgage to PBCom by the
Magpayo
spouses
is
valid
notwithstanding
that
the
transfer
certificate of title over the property was
issued to them after the mortgage
contract was entered into. Registration
the
No,
possession
and
ownership are distinct legal concepts.
Ownership
exists
when
a
thing
pertaining to one person is completely
subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the
rights of others. It confers certain rights
to the owner, one of which is the right to
dispose of the thing by way of sale. On
the other hand, possession is defined as
the holding of a thing or the enjoyment
of a right. Literally, to possess means to
actually and physically occupy a thing
with or without right. Possession may be
had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a
holder."A possessor in the concept of an
owner may be the owner himself or one
who claims to be so." On the other hand,
"one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right
which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong."
DIGESTS:
1. POWER COMMERCIAL V. CA
(June 20, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner asbestos manufacturer Power
Commercial and industrial corporation
bought the property of spouses Reynaldo
and Angelita Quiambao located in Makati
City.
Since there are lessees occupying the
subject land, part of the deed of sale is a
warranty of respondents that will defend
its title and peaceful possession in favor
of the petitioners.
The property is mortgage to PNP and as
such, petitioners filed a request to
assume responsibility of the mortgage.
Because of petitioners failure to produce
the required papers, their petition was
denied.
Petitioners allege that the contract
should be rescinded because of failure of
delivery.
ISSUE:
WON the contract is recissible due to
breach of contract.
HELD:
There is no breach of contact in this case
since there is no provision in the contract
that imposes the obligation to the
respondents to eject the people
occupying the property.
There was also a constructive delivery
because the deed of sale was made in a
public document. The contention of the
petitioners that there could be no
constructive delivery because the
respondents is not in possession of the
property is of no merit. What matters in a
constructive delivery is control and not
possession. Control was placed in the
hands of the petitioners that is why they
were able to file an ejectment case. Prior
Iringan vs CA
ALFONSO L. IRINGAN, petitioner, Vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO
PALAO,
Represented by his Attorney-in-fact,
FELISA P. DELOS SANTOS, respondents
G.R. NO. 129107 September 26, 2001
FACTS:
On march 22, 1985, Antonio Palao sold a
piece of land to Alfonso Iringan: Lot No.
992 located at the Poblacion of
Tuguegarao with Transfer Certificate No.
t-5790. Both parties executed a Deed of
Sale on the same date with a purchase
price of P 295, 000, payable as follows:
HELD:
Katigbak vs CA
. G.R. No. L-16480
January
31, 1962
ARTEMIO KATIGBAK, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL
EVANGELISTA and V. K. LUNDBERG,
respondents.
Facts:
This case arose from an agreed
purchase and sale of a Double
Drum Carco Tractor Winch. Artemio
Katigbak upon reading an
advertisement for the sale of the
winch placed by V. K. Lundberg,
owner and operator of the
International Tractor and
Equipment Co., Ltd., went to see
Lundberg and inspected the
equipment with price of
P12,000.00. Katigbak was referred
to the owner, Daniel Evangelista
and both agreed that Katigbak was
to purchase the winch for
P12,000.00, payable at P5,000.00
upon delivery and the balance of
P7,000.00 within 60 days. The
condition of the sale was that the
winch would be delivered in good
condition. Katigbak was apprised
that the winch needed some
repairs, which could be done in the
shop of Lundberg. It was then
stipulated that the amount
necessary for the repairs will be
advanced by Katigbak but
deductible from the initial payment
of P5,000.00. The repairs were
undertaken and the total of
Carumba vs CA
31 SCRA 558
February 18, 1970
Facts:
Spouses Amado Canuto and
Nemesia Ibasco sold an unregistered
parcel of land to spouses Amado
Carumba and Benita Canuto. The deed of
sale was never registered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds, and the Notary,
Mr. Vicente Malaya, was not then an
authorized notary public in the place.
On January 21, 1957, a complaint
was filed by Santiago Balbuena against
Amado Canuto and Nemesia Ibasco for a
BERNARDO
VALDEVIESO, petitioner, vs.
CANDELARIO DAMALERIO AND
AUREA C. DAMALERIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 133303. February 17, 2005
Facts
Note: take note of the dates.
On 05 December 1995, Petitioner
(Bernardo Valdevioso) bought from
Spouses Lorenzo and Elenita Uy a
parcel of land consisting of 10000
Sq. meters located in Tambler,
General Santos
Andaya vs Manansala
ARISTON ANDAYA, ET AL., plaintiffsappellees,
vs.
DR. MELENCIO MANANSALA, defendantappellant
G.R. No. L-14714
FACTS
In 1934, Isidro Fenis sold a parcel of Land
to Eustaquia Llanes with right to
repurchase within a period of 5 years.
After expiration of said period, and
without redeeming the property, Fenis
sould the property to Maria Viloria, who
HELD
1 No, vendor is not liable for
warranty against eviction. The
vendors liability against eviction is
waivable and maybe renounced by
vendee. (Art. 1548, NCC) In the
case at bar, while there was a
stipulation regarding warranty
against eviction, it was only pro
forma and, therefore Manansala
cannot be bound by it. Andaya et
al. bought the property from
Viloria, then same property was
bought again from Manansala so
that Manansala can register his
prior deed of sale. The property in
question was also a subject of
litigation since Llanes instituted a
civil case to quiet the title by virtue
of an earlier sale from the original
owner. Through the final judgment,
Andaya was evicted from said land.
Since there was no appeal, it was
inferred that the warranty was
renounced and he knew he
consequences.
2 The remedy of rescission
contemplates that the one
demanding it is able to return
whatever he has received under
the contract, and when this cannot
be done, rescission cannot be
carried out (Art. 1385, NCC). It is
for this reason that the law on sales
does not make rescission a remedy
Facts:
On the 29th of April, 1905, the plaintiffs
in this action sold to Antonio Ventenilla,
since deceased, a parcel of land for the
sum of P350, expressly reserving a right
to repurchase under and in accordance
with the terms of the deed of sale.
The written contract contained the
following stipulation:
We also set forth that one of the
promises we have made to Don Antonio
is that we will repurchase this land at the
same price; neither of us make any
stipulation as to interest on the money or
the products of the land, but in the
month of March of any year, if we
repurchase.
The vendors offered to repurchase in the
month of March, 1913, but this offer was
declined on the ground that the right to
repurchase had prescribed: a contention
which is renewed by the defendant in this
action, who is the widow of original
vendee, deriving title through him.
The court below was of opinion that the
right to repurchase expired at the end of
four years from the date of the contract,
relying in support of this ruling on the
provisions of article 1508 of the Civil
Code, which are as follows:
The right mentioned in the
preceding article (right to
repurchase), in the absence of an
express agreement, shall last four
years counted from the date of the
contract.
In case of stipulation, the period of
redemption shall not exceed ten years.
Issue:
Whether the provision of Article 1508 of
the Civil Code applies, where there is an
expressed stipulation in the contract.
Held:
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27084 December 31, 1927
MEDEL V. FRANCISCO
51 PHIL 367; G.R. No. L-
27891
Baluyot vs Venegas
Facts: Crisanto Baluyot sold land Eulogio
E. Venegas executed on July 24, 1951
which contained a provision for
repurchase that stipulated Any time
after the expiration of the period of theft
(10) years to be computed from October
1, 1951 the Vendor, his heirs or
successors-in-interest has the option and
priority to purchase the a fore described
parcel of land for the same consideration
of P4, 000.
EN BANC
1959.]
Issues:
1. Whether or not, the transaction
was a pacto de retro sale or a
mortgage?
2. Whether or not, the counting of
such 30-day period started from
June 24, 1955, when this Supreme
Court upheld by appellate court's
decision or on July 15, 1955, after
the day the resolution of June 24
became final.
3. Whether or not, Perez, et. al. have
the right to repurchase the
property.
Held:
1. Yes. Art. 1606 of the New Civil Code
has been construed to mean that
after the courts have decided by a
final or executory judgment that
the contract is a pacto de retro and
not a mortgage, the vendor (whose
claim as mortgagor has definitely
been rejected) may still have the
privilege of repurchasing within 30
days.
If the Quezon court of first instance
had declared the contract to be a
pacto de retro, the 30-day period
would begin from the promulgation
of the judgment there, because
such judgment was "final"
(appealable) not interlocutory. If
such were the correct view, Art.
1606 would place the vendors in
the difficult position of having to
decide either to appeal within 30
days or to repurchase. The framers
of the Code could not have had
such intention. They could not have
meant to give the vendor the
privilege to repurchase in
exchange for his right to bring the
matter before a higher court. The
litigant who alleged he was a mere
mortgagor might not agree to the
court's finding that he was a
vendor, and might insist that he
was a mere mortgagor before a
higher court. Until that tribunal
decides against him, he is not duty
bound to consider himself a vendor.
2. Manresa believes and holds that
final judgment in these articles
imply a judgment that has become
final and executory.2 And
"sentencia firme" in Spanish (that
is the word in Arts. 1475 and 1480
of the Civil Code3 refer to binding,
On
March
1967
VERROYA
constituted a mortgage on both
lots in favor of Anita Nolasco and
Rosario Dalina.
The
NATIVIDADS
contended
that they purchased the lots in
GOOD FAITH notwithstanding
the adverse claims. Said titles
were not shown to them by
VERROYA at the time of the sale.
(really? You wont check the title
when buying a property?) And that
they paid good and valuable
consideration.
The
Mortgagees
filed
counterclaim for damages.
GARDNERS
actual
and
exemplary
damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the
judgement but in December of 1979, the
court reversed after a series of motion for
reconsideration etc etc, in so far as the
NATIVIDADS are concerned, declaring the
sale to them as valid and the titles issued
thereto. The GARDNERS sought to have
the resolution set aside for lack of
jurisdiction but the court denied it hence
the petition.
Issue: Did the CA err in reversing its
resolution that the sale and title of the
lots to Natividad were valid; that they
purchased the lot in good faith and for
value?
Ruling: Yes. All 5 transferees were NULL
AND VOID for having been SIMULATED
AND FICTITIOUS.
The First Transfer in favor of the
SANTOSES
was
"indubitably
established" to have been without
consideration and is, therefore,
void and inexistent. That sale
was executed merely as a
means of protection to the
SANTOSES for their promised
cash
advances
to
the
GARDNERS in one year in the sum
of P93,000.00. Added to this is
the admission against his own
interest by Ariosto SANTOS
that the GARDNERS did not
receive
from
him
any
consideration, 15 thereby
corroborating the declarations of
the GARDNERS. The Subdivision
Joint Venture Agreement (Exhibit
"D")
and
the
Supplemental
Agreement (Exhibit "E") eloquently
express that the true and real
nature of the agreement between
the GARDNERS and the SANTOSES
was for a subdivision and not a sale
transaction.
The
fact
that
the
GARDNERS
remained
in
actual
possession,
cultivation and occupation of the