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Jerome Walker v. John L. Weldon, Warden, 744 F.2d 775, 11th Cir. (1984)
Jerome Walker v. John L. Weldon, Warden, 744 F.2d 775, 11th Cir. (1984)
2d 775
appellant. The only issue presented to the district court was appellant's
contention that his retrial after a mistrial had been declared deprived him
of his right to be protected against double jeopardy. The district court
referred the petition to a magistrate. The magistrate appropriately
concluded that no evidentiary hearing was necessary and proceeded to
address the merits of the petition for habeas corpus based upon the state
court record. The magistrate recommended that relief be denied. The
recommendation was accepted by the district court and the petition for
habeas corpus was denied. The district court, however, issued a certificate
of probable cause and authorized appellant to proceed in forma pauperis.
After examining the record and considering the appropriate authorities,
we agree with the trial judge, the Court of Appeals of Georgia and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and
affirm the denial of habeas corpus.
A grand jury for Fulton County, Georgia indicted Walker for the offense
of burglary. Walker's jury trial commenced on December 3, 1979.
Walker's trial jury was selected and sworn at 12:10 p.m. on December 3,
1979. Court was recessed for lunch and reconvened at 1:10 p.m. The
presentation of the evidence was completed at 4:00 p.m. on December 3rd
and the jury was excused until 9:30 a.m. the following morning. Closing
arguments were completed, the court's instructions to the jury were
completed, and the case was submitted to the jury for its deliberation at
11:00 a.m. on December 4th.
The first of four notes was received by the court after the jury had been in
deliberation for about an hour. This note was to the effect that the jury
was deadlocked. At 12:00 noon on December 4th the court called the jury
to the courtroom and recessed for lunch. At approximately 5:20 p.m. on
December 4th the court received still another note from the jury reporting
that it was deadlocked. The note received by the court at 5:20 p.m. on
December 4th was signed by all twelve jurors and the court was advised
that the jury was "hopelessly deadlocked." After receiving four notes from
the jury, each of which reported deadlocked and particularly after
receiving a note signed by all twelve jurors, the jury was brought into the
courtroom and given an Allen charge.2
The transcripts of the state proceedings reflect the following chronology.
After deliberating approximately an hour on December 4th, the foreman of
the jury sent the judge a note which read, "We are deadlocked at 6-6.
Have you a suggestion?" After a lunch break the court recharged the jury
on reasonable doubt and related principles; the jury resumed its
deliberations at approximately 1:25 p.m. At 2:05 p.m. the foreman sent the
court a second note: "We are hopelessly deadlocked at 7-5." At 3:10 p.m.
the foreman sent the court a third note: "Judge Holt: We are absolutely
deadlocked at 9-3 for acquittal. All have agreed they would not yield their
convictions no matter how much time is spent in discussion." An hour
later at 4:05 p.m. the foreman delivered to the trial judge the last of four
notes: "Judge Holt: we are absolutely and hopelessly deadlocked. A
unanimous decision is an impossibility." This note was signed by all
twelve jurors. It was at this time that the trial judge gave the Allen charge
to the jury and sent them back for further deliberations. After a short time,
the court adjourned the jury for the night. The following morning, after
the jury had deliberated for approximately an hour and twenty minutes,
the trial court advised counsel that he intended to call the jury back to the
courtroom and if they had not reached a verdict, declare a mistrial on his
own motion. After deliberating for approximately an hour and a half on
December 5th, the jury was returned to the courtroom. In response to the
court's inquiry as to whether the jury had been able to reach a verdict, the
foreman replied: "Your Honor, we have reached an absolute impasse."
The court then inquired if it was the same as it was yesterday and the
foreman replied in the affirmative and added, "We are unable to reach a
conclusion." The court then stated, "I will now declare a mistrial."
Prior to the commencement of the second trial which resulted in
appellant's conviction, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the second prosecution would twice put the appellant in
jeopardy. The denial of appellant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy
grounds is the issue now presented in this habeas action.
The law in this case was established in 1829 in the opinion authored by
Mr. Justice Story speaking for the court in United States v. Perez, 9
Wheat, 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165:
The prisoner, Joseph Perez, was put upon trial for a capital offense, and
the jury, being unable to agree, were discharged by the court from giving
any verdict upon the indictment, without the consent of the prisoner, or of
the attorney for the United States. The prisoner's counsel, thereupon,
claimed his discharge as of right, under these circumstances; and this
forms the point upon which the judges were divided. The question
therefore, arises, whether the discharge of the jury by the court from
giving any verdict upon the indictment, with which they were charged,
without the consent of the prisoner, is a bar to any future trial for the same
offense. If it be, then he is entitled to be discharged from custody; if not,
then he ought to be held in imprisonment until such time trial can be had.
We are of opinion that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial.
The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put
upon his defense. We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has
invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from
giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act,
or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to
exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all
the circumstances which would render it proper to interfere. To be sure,
the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases
especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any
chances of life, in favor of the prisoner. But, after all, they have the right
to order the discharge; and the security which the public have for the
faithful, sound and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests in this,
as in other cases, upon the responsibility of the judges, under their oaths of
office. We are aware that there is some diversity of opinion and practice
on this subject, in the American courts; but, after weighing the question
with due deliberation, we are of opinion that such a discharge constitutes
no bar to further proceeding and gives no right of exemption to the
prisoner from being again put upon trial. A certificate is to be directed to
the circuit court in conformity to this opinion.
This simple straight forward explanation of the reason for permitting a
second trial after a jury has been discharged because of their inability to
reach a unanimous verdict has not been improved upon in the intervening
years. Scholars, lawyers and judges have analyzed, reexamined and
interpreted the language of Perez, supra, but no statement of the principle
involved has ever been made with more clarity and more understanding
than the quoted portion of Mr. Justice Story's opinion.
The broad spectrum of a second trial following the declaration of a
mistrial by the trial judge was examined by the Supreme Court in Arizona
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). In
discussing the situations in which a second trial is scheduled following the
declaration of a mistrial and with reference to a mistrial declared after the
trial court had determined that the jury was unable to reach a verdict, the
Court said (434 U.S. 509, 98 S.Ct. 832):
At the other extreme is the mistrial premised upon the trial judge's belief
that the jury is unable to reach a verdict, long considered the classic basis
for a proper mistrial. The argument that a jury's inability to agree
establishes reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, and therefore
The deliberation of the jury in the case before this court consumed more time
than the actual trial of the case. On four occasions the jury reported to the court
through its foreman that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. On the last
written note to the court the conclusion of all twelve jurors was to the effect
that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and could not reach a verdict. The
exercise of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the jury was
genuinely deadlocked should not be disturbed by a reviewing court, either on
direct appeal or in a collateral attack.
3
The decision of the district court to deny the petition for habeas corpus filed by
the appellant is therefore due to be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
Honorable Clarence W. Allgood, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District
of Alabama, sitting by designation
The text of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, "Nor
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb."
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)