Prudential Vs Reyes
Prudential Vs Reyes
2) Upon this point, the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an
employee on the charge of loss of confidence and that it is sufficient that there is some basis for such
loss of confidence, is not absolute. The right of an employer to dismiss employees on the ground that
it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just cause. For
loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for an employees dismissal, it must be substantial and
not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the employees
separation from work (Labor vs. NLRC, 248 SCRA 183).
After painstakingly examining the testimonies of Ms. Joven and respondents other witnesses this
Office finds the evidence still wanting in proof of complainants guilt.
There are other factors that constrain this Office to doubt even more the legality of complainants
dismissal based on the first ground stated in the letter of dismissal. The non-release of the dollar
checks was reported to top management sometime on 15 November 1989 when complainant,
accompanied by Supervisor Dante Castor and Analiza Castillo, reported the matter to Vice President
Santos. And yet, it was only on 08 March 1991, after a lapse of sixteen (16) months from the time the
non-release of the checks was reported to the Vice President, that complainant was issued a
memorandum directing her to submit an explanation. And it took the bank another four (4) months
before it dismissed complainant.
The delayed action taken by respondent against complainant lends credence to the assertion of the
latter that her dismissal was a mere retaliation to the criminal complaints she filed against the banks
top officials.
3) Jurisprudence is clear on the amount of backwages recoverable in cases of illegal
dismissal. Employees illegally dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on March 21,
1989 are entitled to backwages up to three (3) years without deduction or qualification, while those
illegally dismissed after are granted full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
monetary equivalent from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of
their actual reinstatement.[20] Considering that private respondent was terminated on July 19, 1991,
she is entitled to full backwages from the time her actual compensation was withheld from her (which,
as a rule, is from the time of her illegal dismissal) up to the finality of this judgment (instead of
reinstatement) considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible as correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals on account of the strained relations brought about by the litigation in this
case. Since reinstatement is no longer viable, she is also entitled to separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service. [21] Lastly, since private respondent was compelled to file an
action for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter, she is likewise entitled to attorneys fees [22] at the rate
above-mentioned. There is no room to argue, as the Bank does here, that its liability should be
mitigated on account of its good faith and that private respondent is not entirely blameless. There is
no showing that private respondent is partly at fault or that the Bank acted in good faith in terminating
an employee of twenty-eight years. In any event, Article 279 of Republic Act No. 6715 [23] clearly and
plainly provides for full backwages to illegally dismissed employees.