Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 11th Cir. (2015)

Case: 14-12357
Date Filed: 03/23/2015
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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12357
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-02136-WMA
BLACK WARRIOR RIVERKEEPER, INC.,
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
LT. GENERAL THOMAS P. BOSTICK,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
COL. JON CHYTKA,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile District,
Defendants - Appellees,
ALABAMA COAL ASSOCIATION,
MS&R EQUIPMENT CO., INC.,
REED MINERALS, INC., et al.,
Intervenors - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 23, 2015)
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Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and TOTENBERG, * District Judge.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
In this complex environmental case, plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper
and Defenders of Wildlife appeal from the district courts grant of final summary
judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal
Association and several mining companies, which intervened in the proceedings
below. 1 Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP
21), a general permit that allows surface coal mining operations to discharge
dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper essentially argues that
the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than
minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act.
The district court first determined that Riverkeeper has standing to sue in
federal court because its members suffered injury as a result of the Corps decision
to enact NWP 21. We agree that Riverkeeper has standing, and so affirm the
district courts decision on this point. The district court also held that
Riverkeepers lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
*
Honorable Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
1
For simplicitys sake, we will use Riverkeeper to refer to both plaintiff organizations, the
Corps for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Intervenors for the Alabama Coal
Association and mining companies.
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After thorough review, however, we conclude that the Intervenors have shown
neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from
Riverkeepers alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit,
its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare
its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors modest showing of
harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the
potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. We,
therefore, hold that the district court abused its considerable discretion in barring
Riverkeepers suit.
As for the merits of Riverkeepers environmental claims, the district court
concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps determinations that NWP
21 would have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment,
pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and no significant impact on the environment,
pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor
capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument in this Court, the Corps
admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by
the projects authorized under Nationwide Permit 21. In the face of this new and
potentially significant change in the facts, we ordered the parties to provide
supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps error. The Corps then
conceded that the district courts decision must be reversed and the matter
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remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate

assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. We agree.
On remand, the Corps shall reconsider its conclusion that the environmental
impacts of NWP 21 are minimal in light of all of the relevant data, including the
Corps recalculated figure for the acreage of waters affected by NWP 21. We
expect that it will take the Corps no longer than one year to do so, and, therefore,
remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand the matter to the
Corps, and to determine whether any further relief may be required.
I.
This case involves several complex statutory and regulatory schemes
designed, in substantial measure, to ensure that the federal government conducts a
thorough assessment of the environmental impacts of its actions. Thus, under
404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Corps may issue permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. 1344
(2012). These permits can take the form of either individual permits, 1344(a), or
general permits, which authorize certain categories of discharges on a state,
regional, or nationwide basis, 1344(e). Before issuing a general permit, however,
the Corps must provide public notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Id. The
Corps also must determine that the activities authorized by the permit are similar
in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed
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separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment. Id. In determining whether the environmental effects of a general
permit will be minimal, the Corps must consider a range of factors relating to the
impact of discharges on aquatic ecosystems and the humans who use them, and
must then document the environmental effects of the activities authorized by the
permit in a decision document. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2014).
The Corps is also obligated to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA, in turn, requires an Environmental Impact
Statement for any major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, which can include nationwide permits issued by the Corps.
42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (2012); 33 C.F.R. 330.5(b)(3) (2014). The agency first
prepares an Environmental Assessment, which is essentially a preliminary account
of the environmental effects of a proposed action. See 40 C.F.R. 1501.4,
1508.9. If the Environmental Assessment suggests that the effects of the action are
likely to be significant, the agency must issue the more detailed Environmental
Impact Statement. See id. 1501.4(c). Otherwise, it issues a Finding of No
Significant Impact. Id. 1501.4(e).
This case involves a challenge to Nationwide Permit 21, a general permit
issued by the Corps. It authorizes [d]ischarges of dredged or fill material into
waters of the United States associated with surface coal mining and reclamation
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operations. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,274 (Feb.

21, 2012). Surface coal mining involves the discharge of dredged or fill material
in a variety of ways. To reach underground coal seams, surface mining operations
must dig through and remove a mixture of soil, rock, and coal residue commonly
referred to as overburden, which is replaced once the coal has been extracted.
Excess overburden must be deposited somewhere else -- occasionally filling or
burying streams, or in the form of a much larger valley fill, which is exactly
what it sounds like. In other cases, the coal seam runs underneath the stream itself,
and the operation will mine through the stream. Mining operations also generate
and discharge material when they create sediment ponds and build roads,
processing plants, and other mining infrastructure. As a result of the mining
process, drainage from the mining site, which contains substantial amounts of
sediment, salt, and metals, can seep into and contaminate larger waterways. This
runoff may continue for decades after the mine has closed. The discharge of
dredged or fill material, therefore, may have consequences for water quality and
the health of aquatic ecosystems throughout the entire watershed.
The Corps has long struggled to ensure that the environmental impacts of
surface mining operations are minimal. Nationwide Permit 21 was first issued in
1982, see Interim Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers,
47 Fed. Reg. 31,794, 31,833 (July 22, 1982), and has subsequently been amended
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and reissued multiple times. The 2007 version did not place any limits on the
length of streams that could be filled by authorized activities. See Reissuance of
Nationwide Permits, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092, 11,184 (Mar. 12, 2007). The Corps
eventually became concerned that activities authorized by NWP 21 were resulting
in greater environmental impacts than anticipated, and it suspended NWP 21 in six
states in the Appalachian Region in 2010: Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. Suspension of Nationwide Permit 21, 75
Fed. Reg. 34,711, 34,712 (June 18, 2010). The Corps did not suspend NWP 21 in
Alabama, although the Environmental Protection Agency subsequently stated in a
letter to the Corps that the same concerns and science that brought about the six
state suspension appl[y] to the coal fields of Alabama. The 2007 NWP 21 expired
on March 18, 2012. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 72 Fed. Reg. at 11,092.
In 2012, the Corps adopted a new course intended, in part, to address[] the
concern that led to [its] previous suspension of NWP 21 in the six Appalachian
states. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. at 10,205. As a result,
the 2012 version of NWP 21, which authorized stream-filling operations for an
additional five years, consisted largely of two new provisions. First, paragraph (a),
which functions as a grandfathering provision, allows for the reauthorization of
operations which were previously authorized under the 2007 NWP 21, subject to
verification by a district engineer that they will continue to cause only minimal
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adverse effects. Id. at 10,274. As for new operations, however, paragraph (b) adds
several specific limits on stream-filling activity, including a requirement that
discharges must not cause the loss of greater than 1/2-acre of non-tidal waters of
the United States, including the loss of no more than 300 linear feet of stream bed.
Id. Permitted activities also may not involve the construction of valley fills. Id.
The new limits provided by paragraph (b) do not apply to grandfathered
reauthorizations under paragraph (a).
Along with the revised permit, the Corps issued a NWP 21 Decision
Document explaining the rationale behind its revisions, which included the Corps
Clean Water Act and National Environmental Policy Act analyses. Specifically,
the Corps concluded, as required by the CWA, that activities authorized by NWP
21 would not have more than minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment. It also concluded, pursuant to NEPA, that NWP 21 would not
significantly affect the environment, and that an Environmental Impact Statement
would therefore not be required. Under paragraph (a) of the 2012 NWP 21, fortyone projects have been reauthorized within the Black Warrior River watershed; the
first reauthorization was granted in May 2012, while the last was granted in either
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March or April 2013.2 The grandfathered portions of these projects authorize the
filling of approximately twenty-seven miles of stream.
The plaintiffs in this case, Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of
Wildlife, strongly disagree with the Corps environmental impact analysis.
Riverkeeper and Defenders are environmentalist groups whose members use
waters of the Black Warrior River watershed that flow downstream from mining
sites authorized to discharge material under NWP 21. According to Riverkeeper,
these projects have had a profound effect on the quality of the waters within the
Black Warrior River watershed. Riverkeepers members have observed, for
example, that waters downstream from mining sites are discolored and clouded
with sediment and silt. Impaired water quality, they claim, has decrease[d] [their]
aesthetic and recreational enjoyment, reduce[d] their opportunities to observe
wildlife, and cause[d] them concern about ingesting the water and fish caught in
the water. To take just one example, Riverkeeper alleges that several coal mines
permitted under NWP 21(a) ultimately drain into the Locust Fork of the Black
Warrior River, releasing sedimentation, solids, and chemical compounds.
Riverkeeper fears that what it calls the resulting dirty or polluted water will deter
2
According to the district court, the final reverification was issued by the Corps in April 2013.
However, the document cited by the district court does not list a reverification in April 2013; it
instead lists one in April 2009, which is likely an error since this was well before the 2012 NWP
21 was even enacted and contradicts the date (December 27, 2012) listed on the reverification
letter for the mine in question. The difference, ultimately, does not affect our analysis.
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its members and others from using the river for recreation -- the Locust Fork is one
of the most popular whitewater paddling locations in the state -- as well as harm
local wildlife.
In order to block the forty-one reauthorizations granted pursuant to NWP
21(a) and therefore avert further claimed environmental damage, Riverkeeper filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on
November 25, 2013 against the Corps and several Corps officials. The gravamen
of Riverkeepers lawsuit is that it was contradictory for the Corps to impose
stream-fill limits on new operations, but, at the same time, decline to apply those
very same limits to operations authorized by the 2007 NWP 21 and subsequently
reauthorized by the 2012 version. To put it slightly differently, Riverkeepers
argument is that the Corps could not rationally have found that these new limits
were necessary to avoid significant environmental impacts, and then conclude
regardless that the impacts of grandfathered projects would be minimal.
Specifically, Riverkeepers complaint raised four counts: (1) that paragraph
(a) of NWP 21, in effect, amounts to an unlawful ten-year permit term; (2) that the
Corps cumulative effects analysis under the CWA was arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 (2012); (3) that the
Corps issuance of reauthorizations in the Black Warrior River watershed pursuant
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to NWP 21 was arbitrary and capricious; and (4) that the Corps Finding of No
Significant Impact under NEPA was arbitrary and capricious.
Eight days later, Riverkeeper moved for a preliminary injunction to suspend
all reauthorizations in the Black Warrior River watershed. On December 23, 2013,
the Alabama Coal Association and several mining companies 3 moved to intervene,
citing the harm that Riverkeepers requested injunction would cause to their
mining operations. Their motion to intervene was granted without objection from
Riverkeeper. At a February 2014 hearing on Riverkeepers motion for a
preliminary injunction, the district court refused to hear any argument on the merits
because Riverkeeper could not post a $300,000 bond. The district court denied
Riverkeepers motion on February 18. Riverkeeper then moved for summary
judgment on February 20. At a hearing on March 3, Riverkeeper voluntarily
dismissed Count 3 of its complaint, claiming that it was no longer directly
challenging the forty-one reauthorizations. On April 2, the Corps filed its crossmotion for summary judgment, addressing the merits; a week later, the Intervenors
filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, addressing the merits
as well as standing and laches.
The mining companies are MS&R Equipment Co., Inc., Reed Minerals, Inc., Twin Pines, LLC,
and Walter Minerals, Inc.
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Ultimately, the district court concluded that Riverkeeper had standing, but
that its claims were barred by the doctrine of laches, and, in any event, that its
claims failed on the merits. The district court rejected the Intervenors argument
that Riverkeeper lacks standing to challenge a permit under 404, because
Riverkeepers injuries, which result from diminished downstream water quality,
were cognizable under 404 and traceable to NWP 21. The district court did,
however, decide that Riverkeepers delay in filing suit was inexcusable, and that
the Intervenors suffered prejudice because they acted in reliance on
reauthorizations granted under NWP 21. Finally, the district court concluded that
the Corps did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that NWP 21 would
have no more than minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.
Riverkeeper timely appealed to this Court. 4
II.
We turn first, as we must, to the Intervenors argument that Riverkeeper
lacks standing to sue in federal court, and conclude that Riverkeeper does indeed
have standing. We review issues of standing de novo. Swann v. Secy of State,
668 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012). Standing is a jurisdictional inquiry, and a
4
Riverkeeper has not challenged the district courts judgment on Count 1 that the grandfather
provision of NWP 21(a) does not violate Section 404(e) by extending the term of NWP 21 past
five years. Riverkeeper challenges the courts judgments on Counts 2 and 4 of its complaint,
solely on the ground that the district court failed to consider the Corps alleged differential
treatment error, as well as the courts judgment that the action is barred by laches.
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party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing that he has
standing to sue. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Dixie Cnty., Fla., 690
F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). It is by now hornbook law that plaintiffs must satisfy three
requirements to have standing under Article III of the Constitution: (1) injury-infact; (2) a causal connection between the asserted injury-in-fact and the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328
(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001)).
When, as in this case, a plaintiffs injury arises from the governments allegedly
unlawful regulation of a third party, much more is needed. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
562. The plaintiff must show that choices will be made by both the regulator and
the regulated party in such manner as to produce causation and permit
redressability of injury. Id. Lastly, a plaintiff who brings suit under the APA
must establish that its injury-in-fact falls within the zone of interests sought to
be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his
complaint. Lujan v. Natl Wildlife Fedn, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
In addition to showing that their members have standing, Riverkeeper and
Defenders must demonstrate organizational standing. An organization has
standing to bring an action on its members behalf if (a) its members would
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otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organizations purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in
the lawsuit. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Inc., 690 F.3d at 1248 (quoting
Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Commn, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). The
Intervenors do not challenge the organizational standing of Riverkeeper and
Defenders, and in any event, such a challenge would be meritless, as these
organizations plainly have standing to assert the claims of their members. The
relevant question, then, is whether their members have standing.
Riverkeepers suit is grounded on a procedural challenge to the Corps
decision to issue Nationwide Permit 21. That is, Riverkeeper argues that the Corps
arbitrarily and capriciously determined that NWP 21 would result in minimal
environmental impacts. On this basis alone, Riverkeeper cannot claim
constitutional standing. [D]eprivation of a procedural right without some
concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation -- a procedural right in vacuo -is insufficient to create Article III standing. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555
U.S. 488, 496 (2009). To establish standing, then, Riverkeeper must show that the
Corps failure to adequately consider environmental harms injured Riverkeeper in
some palpable way.
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As we see it, and as the district court properly concluded, Riverkeeper has
clearly shown an injury-in-fact within the ambit of the Clean Water Act and the
National Environmental Policy Act. We have held that an individual plaintiff may
show injury-in-fact by attesting that he uses, or would use more frequently, an
area affected by the alleged violations and that his aesthetic or recreational
interests in the area have been harmed. Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430
F.3d 1337, 1344 (11th Cir. 2005); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000). Voluminous record evidence
indicates that Riverkeepers members have suffered harm to their aesthetic and
recreational interests. Riverkeepers members attest that they use waters
downstream from mining sites for recreational and other purposes; that those
waters are visibly polluted; that the pollution of those waters decreases their
enjoyment of them; and that pollution has impaired habitats for wildlife they like to
observe and study. Riverkeepers members also claim that they have been exposed
to threats to their health by drinking water from and using affected areas. All of
these injuries fall within the zone of interests contemplated by the CWA and
NEPA, since they allegedly stem from environmental harm.
Nor do we think any serious argument can be made against Riverkeepers
standing on the grounds of causation or redressability. We agree that a plaintiff
need not prove that their injury can be traced to specific molecules of pollution
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emitted by the alleged polluter. It is enough that a plaintiff show that a defendant
discharges a pollutant that causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged in
the specific geographic area of concern. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston
Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 161 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992)). Riverkeeper has
alleged that its members use areas downstream from the forty-one stream-filling
operations grandfathered under the 2012 NWP 21. The Corps also indicated in its
NWP 21 Decision Document that activities authorized by NWP 21 could, in fact,
lead to the very aesthetic, recreational, and other environmental injuries alleged by
Riverkeeper -- the Corps merely concluded that those harms would be minor.
Likewise, vacatur of NWP 21 would redress these injuries; surface mining
operations would be required either to comply with paragraph (b)s stream-fill
limits or obtain individual permits from the Corps. Indeed, the Intervenors have
not shown that Riverkeeper has failed to meet any of these traditional components
(injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability) of the standing inquiry.
The Intervenors instead present a novel argument -- which, to the best of our
knowledge, has not been accepted by any court -- that these injuries are wholly
untraceable to the Corps decision to issue a permit under 404. They explain that
they engage in surface mining activities that actually require permits under both
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402 5 and 404 of the Clean Water Act. All surface drainage from a mining site
must first pass through a sediment pond before being discharged into downstream
waters. The subsequent discharge from the sediment pond must be authorized by a
permit under 402, which independently imposes effluent limits on the
concentration of pollutants. The Intervenors argument thus draws a sharp
distinction between 402 permits, which take downstream water quality into
consideration, and 404 permits, which are principally concerned with minimizing
the actual physical loss of waters of the United States. The Intervenors claim that
the proper course for Riverkeeper is to bring a different lawsuit: one which either
asserts that surface mining operations in the Black Warrior River watershed have
violated their 402 permits, or that the terms of those permits should be tightened.
What Riverkeeper cannot do, according to the Intervenors, is file suit to challenge
the Corps 404 permitting decision.
Section 402 authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to issue a permit for the release of any
pollutant, except for the dredged or fill material covered by 404. 33 U.S.C. 1342 (2012); see
also 1342(a)(1) (granting authority [e]xcept as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this
title, the latter of which deals with dredged or fill material). It also allows states to apply to the
EPA for the right to administer their own permit programs under 402, which then supplant the
EPAs permitting system if approved. 33 U.S.C. 1342(b). Section 402 permitting decisions
are governed by standards provided in 403 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1343.
Alabama has been granted authority to administer its own permit program, Ala. Admin. Code
r. 335-6-6-.01 (2014), and does so through the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management. Alabama law also provides that all surface drainage must pass through a sediment
pond and comply with state and federal water quality standards. Ala. Admin. Code. r. 880-X10C-.13 (2014).
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We find this argument, which operates on a cramped understanding of the

404 permitting process, to be unconvincing. Congress plainly mandated that the
Corps consider downstream water quality when issuing a 404 permit. Section
404 itself instructs the Corps to develop guidelines based upon criteria
comparable to the criteria established by 403 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
1344(b), which notably include the effect of disposal of pollutants on human
health or welfare . . . [and] marine life as well as the effect of disposal, [sic] of
pollutants on esthetic, recreation[al], and economic values, 33 U.S.C.
1343(c)(1). In response to this congressional mandate, the Corps and the EPA
jointly promulgated the 404(b)(1) Guidelines, which place the very same
emphasis on human health or welfare, the stability of aquatic ecosystems, and
recreational, aesthetic, and economic values. 40 C.F.R. 230.10. The
Intervenors do not argue that the Corps lacks the authority to consider downstream
water quality, a proposition we would be hard-pressed to accept since we must
defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute defining its jurisdiction.
See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1870-71 (2013). Rather, the
Intervenors suggest that it would be improper for the Corps to do so where the
regulated activity is already covered by a 402 permit. But they cite to no
authority, judicial or otherwise, in support of this claim. 6 They merely cite to a
6
Other courts have rejected the Intervenors view of the Corps regulatory authority. In El
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statement by an engineer that the 402 permit is the exclusive vehicle for
regulating downstream water quality. This statement simply cannot bear the
weight of the Intervenors argument on standing.
The Intervenors also fail to explain how the distinction between 404
permits and 402 permits affects injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability -- the
core elements of standing. The scope of the Corps regulatory authority has no
bearing on whether Riverkeepers members have suffered injury. And, as we see
it, Riverkeepers alleged injuries are included within the zone of interests of 404
and its implementing regulations, which expressly consider downstream water
quality. The zone-of-interests test is not meant to be especially demanding.
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Assn, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Similarly, the distinction
drawn by the Intervenors between 402 and 404 implicates neither causation nor
redressability. At most, the Intervenors have shown that Riverkeepers injuries
arguably stem from two failures of regulation -- a failure by the Corps under 404,
Dorado Chemical Co. v. U.S. EPA, the Eighth Circuit concluded that nothing in the text of the
Clean Water Act indicates that the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit
program must be the exclusive means for protecting downstream waters. 763 F.3d 950, 959
(8th Cir. 2014). Similarly, in Mingo Logan Coal Company, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, a district court
rejected the Intervenors argument that an agency acting under 404 lacks authority to consider
downstream water quality whenever the regulated activity is also covered under 402. No. 10
0541 (ABJ), 2014 WL 4828883, at *19-20 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014). The facts of Mingo Logan
bear strong similarity to those here, as it too dealt with discharges from mining sites that pass
through 402-regulated sediment basins. Id. at *19. While neither of these cases dictate our
result, we find them persuasive; they underscore the lack of support for the Intervenors claim
that the existence of a 402 permit somehow strips the Corps of authority to consider
downstream water quality under 404 as well.
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and a failure by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management under

402. But that does not mean that Riverkeeper only has standing to challenge one
failure and not the other. Vacating NWP 21 would redress Riverkeepers injuries,
whether or not some other administrative action might also redress those injuries.
The only two cases to have considered the Intervenors standing argument
have rejected it. In the first, Kentucky Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Midkiff, a district court
addressed the issues of causation and redressability, and determined that the
industry intervenors attempt to limit Plaintiffs members interests to the point of
discharge fails to recognize how the discharge of dredged or fill materials impacts
downstream waterways. 800 F. Supp. 2d 846, 862 (E.D. Ky. 2011), revd on
other grounds and remanded sub nom. Ky. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rowlette, 714 F.3d
402 (6th Cir. 2013). In the second, Kentuckians for Commonwealth v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, another district court rejected a mining companys argument
that because Plaintiffs complain about injuries caused by downstream water
quality impacts, their injuries fall under the zone of interests protected by a 402
[National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit and not a 404 fill
permit. 963 F. Supp. 2d 670, 681 (W.D. Ky. 2013), affd sub nom. Kentuckians
for the Commonwealth v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir.
2014). It determined that the zone-of-interests test should not be construed so
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narrowly and that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged injuries stemming from the
permitted fill operations. Id. at 681.
However, even if we were to hold that Riverkeeper lacks standing to sue
under the Clean Water Act (and we do not), we do not see how the Intervenors
argument affects Riverkeepers standing to sue under the National Environmental
Policy Act. The Corps is required to determine whether the issuance of a
nationwide permit is a major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C); 33 C.F.R. 330.5(b)(3). This
analysis turns on, among other things, (i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action, [and] (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). This
broad language includes diminution in downstream water quality caused by
activities authorized under NWP 21, whether or not 404 of the CWA does. But,
as we have explained, downstream water quality is relevant under both 404 of the
CWA and NEPA. Thus, we conclude that Riverkeeper has standing to pursue both
its CWA and NEPA claims, and, therefore, affirm the district courts decision on
this point.
III.
We turn next to whether Riverkeepers suit is barred by laches. Laches is a
defense sounding in equity that serves to bar suit by a plaintiff whose unexcused
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delay, if the suit were allowed, would be prejudicial to the defendant. Russell v.
Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940); see Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d
474, 478 (5th Cir. 1980) ([E]quitable remedies are not available if granting the
remedy would be inequitable to the defendant because of the plaintiffs long
delay.). 7 We review a district courts laches determination under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology
Enters., Intl, 533 F.3d 1287, 1319 n.38 (11th Cir. 2008). To establish a laches
defense, [t]he defendant must show a delay in asserting a right or claim, that the
delay was not excusable and that there was undue prejudice to the party against
whom the claim is asserted. Ecology Ctr. of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860,
867 (5th Cir. 1975). Applying these standards, the district court found
Riverkeepers delay of 9-10 months to be unexcused and, in fact, inexcusable.
The district court also determined that the coal industry suffered prejudice in the
form of expenditures made in reliance on reauthorizations granted under
Nationwide Permit 21. Accordingly, the district court held that laches barred
Riverkeepers suit.
After thorough review of the record, we are constrained to conclude, as a
matter of law, that the district courts decision on laches was an abuse of
7
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
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discretion. 8 At the outset, we observe that the district courts discretion is not
unbounded. Discretion means that the court has a range of choice, and that its
decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not
influenced by any mistake of law. Ameritas Variable Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 411
F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). We do not
lightly conclude that the district court abused its discretion, but must review the
record carefully to determine whether its application of laches can reasonably be
sustained.
As we see it, the district courts primary mistake lies not in its calculation of
how long Riverkeeper delayed in bringing this complex suit, but in its conclusion
that Riverkeeper failed to show any excuse for that delay. We agree that
Riverkeeper could only have brought suit once the first reverification was issued
by the Corps. Riverkeeper challenges a procedural flaw in the promulgation of
Nationwide Permit 21, and its cause of action therefore accrued on February 21,
2012, when NWP 21 was reissued. See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala,
177 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1999); Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 10,184. But, as weve noted, deprivation of a mere procedural right,
8
Because we hold that the district court abused its discretion in applying the laches factors, we
need not and do not decide whether the Supreme Courts recent decision in Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), bars the application of laches to this case. Nor do
we decide whether to join our sister circuits in suggesting that laches must be invoked sparingly
in environmental cases. Pres. Coal., Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1982).
23
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without injury, does not suffice to create standing -- a point the Intervenors
themselves stress with respect to the standing analysis in this case. See Summers,
555 U.S. at 496. Similarly, we have held that where an agencys scheme requires
further site-specific actions to implement that scheme, a plaintiffs injury is not
ripe until such actions have been proposed. Wilderness Socy v. Alcock, 83 F.3d
386, 391 (11th Cir. 1996). Until the Corps actually began to issue reauthorizations,
it was unclear when or how Riverkeeper would be injured, and this factual
underpinning is vital to a full-fledged judicial review of NWP 21. Id. at 390-91.
Since Riverkeeper likely lacked standing until those reauthorizations were
issued, Riverkeeper could not have brought suit until, at the earliest, May 2012,
when the Corps granted the first reauthorization. Riverkeeper cannot be faulted for
failing to bring suit before then, because [p]laintiffs cannot sleep on rights until
such rights come into existence. Clark v. Volpe, 342 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (E.D.
La.), affd, 461 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). But it was also reasonable
for Riverkeeper to wait until February 2013, when the deadline for seeking
reauthorizations passed and a substantial number of reauthorizations had been
granted, so that it could discover the full extent of operations reauthorized by NWP
21. This shortens the period of delay to some nine or ten months, as the district
court found.
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The district court, however, abused its discretion when it gave no weight to
Riverkeepers need to evaluate, investigate, and prepare its claims for litigation.
Before the district court, Riverkeeper explained that it needed time to file FOIA
requests and analyze the documents it had received from the Corps. The district
courts opinion makes no mention of these concerns, which strike us as plainly
legitimate. In failing to address these potential excuses for delay, the district court
overlooked relevant circuit precedent. In Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, in binding precedent, the former Fifth Circuit weighed
whether the plaintiffs lack of knowledge provided an excuse for their delay in
filing suit to challenge a real estate development project. 549 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.
1977). The Court observed that the plaintiffs were entitled to presume that the
public officials responsible for approving the [development] project would act in
accordance with the law. Id. at 1027-28. It concluded that the plaintiffs could not
rely on their alleged lack of knowledge given the publicity of the development,
as well as the public notice of the developers permit application, and therefore
held that laches applied. Id. at 1028. Similarly, in another case involving the
Corps, the former Fifth Circuit said that the government must show that those
whom it seeks to bar by invoking laches were or should have been aware of the
questionable nature of the governmental activity. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., 614 F.2d
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at 479. We read these cases to indicate that a plaintiffs lack of knowledge or need
to investigate further can serve as reason for delay.
Riverkeeper has provided sufficient reason for its minimal delay in bringing
this lawsuit. The Corps is not obliged to provide public notice of authorizations
granted under a general permit, see 33 C.F.R. 330.5(d)(3), nor is there any
suggestion in the record that notice was provided. Generally, Riverkeeper could
not have discovered that filling operations had begun pursuant to those grants
without intruding upon private property. As we see it, it was patently reasonable
for Riverkeeper to wait and then file FOIA requests to ascertain the scope of the
reauthorizations granted under NWP 21(a) after the deadline for seeking
reauthorization passed in February 2013. Afterward, Riverkeeper needed time to
review the fruits of its FOIA requests and prepare a case. If we were to hold that a
plaintiffs reasonable need to fully investigate its claims does not excuse delay, we
would create a powerful and perverse incentive for plaintiffs to file premature and
even frivolous suits to avoid the invocation of laches. Indeed, the Intervenors
argument suggests that a plaintiff challenging a mining permit should file lawsuits
immediately as the permits are issued, without thoroughly examining the agencys
records, the permits and other information before asserting a failure to comply with
the requirements of NEPA or the CWA. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army
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Corps of Engrs, No. CIV.A. 3:05-0784, 2006 WL 2228991, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.

Aug. 3, 2006).
Once Riverkeepers need to properly prepare for litigation is accounted for,
the length of Riverkeepers delay drops to a few months at worst. This is too
slender a reed on which to base a laches defense. Our cases applying laches in
complex environmental litigation have generally involved a delay amounting to
several years, without any reasonable excuse. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., 614
F.2d at 479 (five to nine years); Save Our Wetlands, Inc., 549 F.2d at 1027-28
(nineteen months to two and a half years); see also Jicarilla Apache Tribe v.
Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1338 (10th Cir. 1982) (more than three years). 9 Here, a
period of several months, during which Riverkeeper was actively engaged in
preparing its lawsuit, cannot constitute inexcusable delay.
Finally, we observe that Riverkeepers delay falls well within the six-year
statute of limitations that applies to actions against the government. 28 U.S.C.
The only cases provided by the Intervenors involving shorter delays are readily distinguished.
For instance, in Allens Creek/Corbetts Glen Preservation Group, Inc. v. West, the plaintiffs were
indisputably well-informed about the wetlands project at issue, yet only filed suit after the
existing wetlands had already been filled and construction was 95% complete, nearly eight
months later. 2 F. Appx 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2001). And in Friends of Magurrewock, Inc. v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, which relied substantially on the district court decision in Allens
Creek, the issue of delay arose in the context of a preliminary injunction, rather than a laches
defense. 498 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378 (D. Me. 2007). Moreover, the plaintiff in that case, unlike
Riverkeeper, could not present any excuse for its delay, and the record [was] silent as to why it
did not act earlier. Id. at 379.
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2401(a) (2012); see, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d
1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (The Act prescribes no statute of
limitations, so the general six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United
States applies.); Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 1997) (It
appears . . . beyond question that the six-year statute of limitations of section
2401(a) applies to actions brought pursuant to the APA.). As we have held in the
context of copyright infringement, there is a strong presumption that a plaintiffs
suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run. Peter Letterese
& Assocs., Inc., 533 F.3d at 1320.10 We do not mean to suggest that laches should
be determined merely by a reference to and a mechanical application of the statute
of limitations. Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951) (per curiam).
But, coupled with Riverkeepers need to investigate its claims, the fact that
Riverkeepers delay was a scant few months leads us to conclude that its delay was
reasonable.
Inexcusable delay and prejudice are both necessary elements of the defense
of laches, so our conclusion that Riverkeepers delay was reasonable is sufficient
10
The Supreme Courts holding in Petrella, 134 S. Ct. 1962, does not disturb this proposition.
Petrella held only that when a copyright infringement suit seeks the legal relief of damages, and
falls within the applicable statute of limitations, it is not barred by laches. Id. at 1974. In other
words, such a lawsuit is not merely presumptively timely -- it is timely per se. The Court also
indicated that the plaintiffs delay could still, in extraordinary circumstances, limit their
potential equitable relief. Id. at 1977-79. Here, Riverkeeper seeks equitable relief, but its suit is
not barred by laches because its delay was altogether reasonable.
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to dispose of this issue. See, e.g., Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d
1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984) (declining to discuss prejudice because of the lack of
inexcusable delay). The Intervenors, however, have also failed to establish
prejudice. In evaluating prejudice, we balance the equities, weighing both the
harm to the Intervenors as well as the environmental benefits that might result if
Riverkeeper is allowed to pursue its claims. Save Our Wetlands, Inc., 549 F.2d at
1028. Any harm demonstrated by the Intervenors must stem specifically from
Riverkeepers delay in bringing suit, rather than from the consequences of an
adverse decision on the merits, for prejudice does not arise merely because one
loses what otherwise he would have kept. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Heckler,
758 F.2d 1052, 1058 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Bohart, 743 F.2d 313, 327 (5th
Cir. 1984)). In other words, the Intervenors must establish that they were made
significantly worse off because Riverkeeper did not bring suit as soon as it had the
opportunity to do so. The paradigmatic example of prejudice is when a defendant
has expended substantial sums of money or completed a significant amount of
construction by the time the plaintiff decides to file suit. Save Our Wetlands, Inc.
549 F.2d at 1028-29; see also William Murray Tabb, Reconsidering the
Application of Laches in Environmental Litigation, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 377,
393 (1990) ([C]ourts have typically restricted their investigations to whether
substantial resources have been committed and construction has commenced.).
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The district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the bare and
insubstantial allegations of prejudice presented by the Intervenors outweighed the
environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. We do not dispute that
the Intervenors might be hurt by vacatur of NWP 21, but that is a different inquiry
altogether from whether they have been hurt by Riverkeepers delay. The district
court rested its analysis on several affidavits from coal company executives which
state that the Intervenors relied on their reauthorizations to purchase mining
equipment, hire mine workers, enter into various contracts, make sales
commitments to customers . . . [and] continue[] or initiate[] mine development and
acquire[] land. But this showing was deficient in several respects. First of all,
these affidavits, which were offered in support of the Intervenors motion to
intervene, are presented at a very high order of abstraction, and do not differentiate
between the harm that would result if Riverkeeper ultimately prevails on the
merits, and the harm that resulted from Riverkeepers delay. To take one example,
the affidavit from George Barber, president of the Alabama Coal Association, says
that [i]f the injunction that plaintiffs have requested is issued, [the
Intervenors] . . . will be severely prejudiced. Even assuming that these affidavits
could speak to the harm caused by Riverkeepers delay, they would not say very
much. They do not specify the financial hit the companies will take as a result of
delay, nor do they provide any further detail about the steps they took during the
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time Riverkeeper neglected to file suit. Notably, in our cases that have barred suit
on the basis of laches, we have generally required much more specific and concrete
figures for how much money has been spent on a project and how much of the
project has been completed. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., 614 F.2d at 480;
Save Our Wetlands, Inc., 549 F.2d at 1028-29.
The district court also failed to credit the environmental benefits that might
result from allowing Riverkeepers lawsuit to proceed. Riverkeeper identifies over
twenty-seven miles of streams that would be filled by the forty-one grandfathered
projects. The district court attributed little weight to this factor for two reasons.
First, if Riverkeeper prevails, the Intervenors mining operations would proceed
under a new general permit or individual permits. But Riverkeeper would likewise
be able to challenge these new schemes in the event the Corps failed to conduct a
sufficient analysis of their environmental impact. Second, the district court noted
that Riverkeepers argument on laches assumes the truth of its argument on the
merits. The environmental benefits of vacating NWP 21 are only significant if
Riverkeeper is correct that the Corps erroneously concluded that the impacts of
NWP 21 would be minimal. Our cases applying laches, however, have tended to
take plaintiffs reasonable allegations at face value in determining environmental
benefits. Thus, for example, in Ecology Center of Louisiana, Inc., we credited the
plaintiffs allegations that a highway project would cause irreparable injuries to
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some of the most productive ecosystems on earth in calculating prejudice. 515

F.2d at 868-69 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is there any suggestion in
the record that a significant percentage of streams has already been filled, which
would mitigate Riverkeepers claimed environmental benefits. See id. at 869.
We cannot say on this record that Riverkeepers delay was unreasonable, or
that the Intervenors have suffered significant prejudice as a result of that delay.
We find, therefore, that the district court abused its discretion in barring
Riverkeepers suit on the basis of laches.
IV.
Thus, we are obliged to address the merits question at the center of this case:
whether the Corps Clean Water Act and National Environmental Policy Act
determinations were arbitrary and capricious. The district court held that they were
not, because the Corps conducted a holistic review of Nationwide Permit 21s
environmental impacts and reasonably concluded that they would be minimal. On
appeal, Riverkeeper challenges a single error in the Corps reasoning, which it
calls the differential treatment error. Riverkeeper argues that it was arbitrary and
capricious for the Corps to conclude, on the one hand, that the new stream-fill
limits contained in paragraph (b) of NWP 21 are necessary to avoid significant
environmental effects, but on the other, to decline to apply them to projects
reauthorized pursuant to paragraph (a). The core question in this appeal, then, is
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whether the Corps could reasonably conclude that NWP 21, taken as a whole,
would have minimal effects.
We review the district courts decision to grant summary judgment to the
Corps and the Intervenors on the merits de novo, while applying the appropriate
standard of review to the agencys decision. Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dept
of Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1114 (11th Cir. 2013). Under the Administrative
Procedure Act, we must hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. 706. In determining whether
the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously, we ask whether the agency
examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its
action. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Importantly, a court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency. Id. While we should uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agencys path may reasonably be discerned, Bowman Transp., Inc. v.
Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974), [w]e may not supply a
reasoned basis for the agencys action that the agency itself has not given, State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Likewise, we review an agencys Finding of No Significant
Impact and decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, pursuant
to NEPA, under the same arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Hill v. Boy, 144 F.3d
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1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1998). Our task ultimately, then, is to ensure that the
agency took a hard look at the environmental consequences of the proposed
action. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir.
2002).
The problem we now face, however, is that we cant evaluate whether the
Corps CWA and NEPA determinations were arbitrary and capricious on this
record. As we have recounted, the Corps admitted on the eve of oral argument that
it underestimated the number of acres of waters that may be impacted by NWP 21.
Specifically, the Corps stated that it did not take into account that activities reverified under paragraph (a) could impact more than a half-acre of waters of the
United States. Nevertheless, the Corps hinted that the underestimate might not
affect its determination that the environmental effects of NWP 21 would be
minimal. In its supplemental briefing, the Corps also suggested that various
features of the 2012 NWP 21, such as its requirements for individual reverification
and compensatory mitigation, might indicate that the Corps error was harmless.
Even though NWP 21 will affect more waters in the aggregate than the Corps
anticipated, these two requirements could function to ensure that the impacts of
any one project will be matched with sufficient compensatory mitigation to render
the overall effect on the environment minimal.
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Our dissenting colleague objects to the Corps reasoning on the grounds that
the Corps miscalculation shows that it failed to consider the actual impact of
paragraph (a) reauthorizations. She also observes that the Corps subsequently
admitted that its factual projections were an integral component of its cumulative
impact analysis. As we see it, the Corps may well conclude on remand that its
factual projections were indeed so erroneous that individual reverification and
compensatory mitigation cannot ensure that the cumulative adverse effect of NWP
21 on the environment will be minimal. Or, as the Corps suggests, it may be able
readily to cure [this] defect in its explanation, and reaffirm its original decision.
Heartland Regl Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 566 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The
Corps analysis, after all, was based on a holistic account of all of the terms and
requirements stipulated in NWP 21, including compensatory mitigation and
individual reverification. The fact that the Corps underestimated the acreage of
waters that would be impacted by paragraph (a) does not necessarily undermine the
other aspects of the Corps analysis.11 The long and short of it is that we cant tell
11
The dissent also suggests that the Corps failed to take a hard look at the environmental
consequences of NWP 21, in violation of NEPA. NEPA, however, does not mandate
perfection in preparing the documentation it requires. Druid Hills Civic Assn, Inc. v. Fed.
Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700, 712 (11th Cir. 1985). On remand, the Corps should consider
whether its Finding of No Significant Impact is sustainable in light of the terms of NWP 21,
regardless of its miscalculation.
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on this limited record, and we think it wiser to leave the matter to the district court
to analyze in the first instance.
In light of the Corps admission, we are confident that the Corps has
committed an error in its review, but we are unable to discern whether that error
truly is significant.12 The bottom line is that we cannot now say that the Corps
ultimate conclusion -- that NWP 21 will have minimal effects -- was unlawful.
We, therefore, believe that the proper course is to remand the matter to the district
court with instructions to remand to the Corps for a full reconsideration of its
CWA and NEPA determinations. On remand, the Corps should determine both the
effect of its underestimate of the acreage of impacted waters on its earlier analysis,
as well as whether it stands by its overall determination that the effects of activities
authorized by NWP 21 will be cumulatively insignificant.
We are not compelled to, nor will we, vacate NWP 21 at this time and in the
face of this incomplete record. Whether a court may remand a matter to an agency
without vacating the agencys action is a question of first impression in our circuit.
12
We decline to address the alleged differential treatment error, except to note that the Corps
miscalculation of environmental impacts bears on this point as well. Thus, for example, the
Corps asserts that each grandfathered project will be individually reverified to have no more than
minimal cumulative impacts and will be required to engage in compensatory mitigation to offset
any impacts that result. The Corps contends that these requirements compensate for the lack of
specific stream-fill limits in paragraph (a). As weve explained, the efficacy of individual
reverification and compensatory mitigation may well turn on a more comprehensive and accurate
accounting of the effects of NWP 21. It would be premature for us to render a decision on this
issue without a sense of how the Corps miscalculation may bear on its overall analysis.
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We agree, as have most other courts, that the . . . remedy of remand without
vacatur is within a reviewing courts equity powers under the APA. Sierra Club
v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1369 (11th Cir. 2008) (Kravitch, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Plainly, the federal courts possess broad discretion to
fashion an equitable remedy. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329
(1944) (The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.); Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364, 373 (1939) ([W]hile the court must act within
the bounds of the statute and without intruding upon the administrative province, it
may adjust its relief to the exigencies of the case in accordance with the equitable
principles governing judicial action.). Undeniably, vacatur is equitable relief.
See Alabama v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 674 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th
Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The decision whether to vacate agency action falls within
our broad equitable discretion.
Indeed, our sister circuits that have considered this question have concluded
that remand without vacatur is permitted under the APA. See, e.g., Cal. Cmtys.
Against Toxics v. U.S. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Natl
Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Secy of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Cent. Me. Power Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 34, 48 (1st Cir.
2001); Cent. & S. W. Servs., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 220 F.3d 683, 692 (5th Cir. 2000);
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Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commn, 988 F.2d 146, 150 (D.C.
Cir. 1993). While we do not dispute that vacatur . . . is the ordinary APA
remedy, Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1369 (Kravitch, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), neither can we conclude that it is the only one. In
circumstances like these, where it is not at all clear that the agencys error
incurably tainted the agencys decisionmaking process, the remedy of remand
without vacatur is surely appropriate. We need not, and do not, decide whether
remand without vacatur is permissible when the agency has erred to such an extent
as to indicate that its ultimate decision was unlawful.
In deciding whether an agencys action should be remanded without vacatur,
a court must balance the equities. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has developed an instructive test for determining
when a court should remand without vacating the agencys action. That test
considers the seriousness of the orders deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt
whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an interim
change that may itself be changed. Allied-Signal, Inc., 988 F.2d at 150-51
(quotation omitted); see also Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1369
(Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ([I]t is appropriate to
consider the balance of equities and the public interest, along with the magnitude
of the agencys errors and the likelihood that they can be cured.). Among the
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equities to be balanced in this case are both the disruptive consequences to the
mining industry, as well as the potential environmental damage that might continue
unabated while the Corps revisits its determinations. We reject Riverkeepers
argument that the potential disruption to the mining industry is irrelevant. Here,
vacatur could suspend a substantial amount of surface mining in the state of
Alabama, all for an error that may well turn out to be inconsequential. Cf. Cal.
Cmtys. Against Toxics, 688 F.3d at 994 (declining to vacate an EPA emissions
rule where vacatur would be economically disastrous). While we do not
conclude that vacatur would, in fact, be disruptive -- nor determine whether the
Corps error was slight -- such consequences are clearly relevant to a courts
equitable balancing calculus.
However, we hesitate to balance these equities in the first instance, and
without any guidance from the district court. The parties supplemental briefing
provides this Court with only the roughest sketch of the extent and implications of
the Corps error. Indeed, the Corps has suggested that the precise amount of
waters of the United States that will be impacted could be immaterial to the Corps
reasoning, which rests, at least in part, on the use of individual reverification and
compensatory mitigation. In addition, evaluating the potentially disruptive
consequences of vacatur may require additional fact-finding, particularly with
respect to the costs to the coal industry and the environmental harm of stream39
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filling, that as an appellate court we are not generally equipped to conduct, let
alone on this largely barren record. See, e.g., Green v. Zant, 715 F.2d 551, 559
(11th Cir. 1983) (Fact finding is the basic responsibility of the district courts,
rather than the appellate courts.). Specifically, we do not know whether the
mining companies will be able to obtain individual permits in an expeditious
fashion or whether their mining operations can be redesigned to meet the new
stream-fill limits in paragraph (b). We cannot discern the effect of a temporary
suspension on their mining operations, measured, for example, in layoffs, lost
wages, and unfulfilled contracts. Nor do we know whether the other terms of
NWP 21, including compensatory mitigation, will suffice to ensure limited impacts
on the Black Warrior River watershed, or whether these impacts can be reversed or
mitigated if NWP 21 is later nullified. Without these essential facts and others, we
cannot determine whether the equities weigh in favor of vacating NWP 21.
The suggestion has been made that, at the very least, the district court should
suspend all reauthorizations for projects where filling activities have not yet begun.
After all, the dissent observes, the Intervenors have only offered evidence as to
some of the reauthorizations granted pursuant to NWP 21(a). But this is precisely
the point. We dont know, for example, whether the other projects are scheduled
to commence operations in the near future, or whether theyve already hired
employees and executed contracts on the assumption that operations will soon
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commence. Our colleague may be right that NWP 21 can be suspended as to these
operations without devastating consequences to the mining industry. She also may
be wrong. It is the district court, however, that is best-suited to make these finegrained and fact-intensive determinations. As weve explained, we take no
position on whether the district court should suspend or vacate NWP 21, in whole
or in part. Instead of deciding that difficult question on an incomplete record, we
leave it to the sound discretion of the district court in the first instance.
We, therefore, reverse the district courts ruling on the merits and remand
with the following instructions. The district court shall remand the matter to the
Corps for a thorough reevaluation of the Corps CWA and NEPA determinations
in light of all of the relevant data, including the Corps recalculated figure for the
acreage of waters affected by NWP 21. The district court may also determine
whether any further relief, including vacatur, is required in light of the Corps
admitted error. Lastly, we are mindful of the need for the Corps to reach a
decision as soon as is reasonably practicable. Our view is that one year should be
sufficient for the Corps to fully reconsider the reasoning espoused in its 2012 NWP
21 Decision Document. Cf. In re: MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644
F.3d 1160, 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (imposing a one-year time frame
[g]iven the importance of [the] case, the length of time it ha[d] been bouncing
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around the federal courts, and the amount of resources the parties and the courts
ha[d] already expended).
V.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court correctly determined that
Riverkeeper has standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act, but that
the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Riverkeepers suit was
barred by laches. Finally, we reverse the district courts judgment on the merits, in
light of the Corps belated admission of error, and remand for reconsideration of
the Corps new CWA and NEPA determinations.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with

instructions.
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TOTENBERG, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with much of the Majoritys opinion, including its determinations
that Plaintiffs-Appellants have Article III standing to sue the Army Corps of
Engineers and that the District Court erred in barring this suit on the equitable
basis of laches. To that extent, I concur in the Majority opinion. But I respectfully
dissent from the Majoritys decision to remand without vacatur based on its
determination that we cannot say that the Corps ultimate conclusion that
NWP 21 will have minimal effects was unlawful. I think the significance of
the Corps error is plainly discernible from counsels argument and the statutory
and regulatory requirements governing the issuance of nationwide permits. 1
The underestimation of the actual impacts to the waters of the United States
is central to the issue of whether the Corps minimal impacts determination was
arbitrary, capricious . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(A). The Corps issuance of NWP 21 based on its admitted failure to
fully take into account the potential impacts of the activities authorized by NWP
21(a) [the grandfather provision in dispute on this appeal] when concluding that
the impacts of NWP 21 would be minimal violated 404 of the Clean Water Act
Oral argument on this issue was particularly revealing, more so than the supplemental briefing
filed by the Corps, which glossed over the import and magnitude of the error as potentially
harmless.
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(CWA). 2 See 33 U.S.C. 1344. Under 404 of the CWA, the Army Corps is
authorized to issue a general permit only if the regulated activities are similar in
nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed
separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment. 33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1); accord 40 C.F.R. 230.7(a). The 404(b)
Guidelines require the Corps to predict cumulative effects by evaluating the
number of individual discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the
United States expected to be authorized by the general permit until it expires. See
The Corps decision based on this error also violates the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) which require[s] that agencies take a hard look at environmental consequences.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In determining an agencys compliance with NEPA, reviewing courts must
ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its
actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natl Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 9798 (1983); see also Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350. The NEPA
regulations require that environmental assessments consider the environmental impacts of the
proposed action and alternatives, including cumulative impact. See 40 C.F.R. 1508.71508.9(b). While it is true that the Court may not know the exact scope of the Corps error, it is
crystal clear that the Corps failed to include reauthorized projects in its impacts analysis as
required by 40 C.F.R. 1508.7. The Court therefore has a duty to set aside the Corps action
when it evades its NEPA obligation to adequately consider[] and disclose[] the environmental
impact of its actions. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 98. Because the Corps failed to
comply with the NEPA regulations requirements, I would vacate the Corps reauthorization of
NWP 21 as arbitrary and capricious pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). See Ala. Envtl. Council v.
Admr, U.S.E.P.A., 711 F.3d 1277, 1292 (11th Cir. 2013) (setting aside Environmental
Protection Agencys action because it was not conducted according to the statutory procedures
set forth in the Clean Air Act); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn of the U.S. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009) discussed infra.
44
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40 C.F.R. 230.7(b)(3); see also 77 Fed. Reg. 10,206. The minimal impacts
analysis must be completed before any General permit is issued. 40 C.F.R.
230.7(b). Under the CWA, the issuance of a nationwide permit hinges on the
reviewing agencys finding that a proposal has only a minimal cumulative adverse
effect on the environment. Ky. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rowlette, 714 F.3d 402, 412
(6th Cir. 2013) (citing 33 U.S.C. 1344(e)(1) and 40 C.F.R. 230.7(a)(3)). Thus,
the issuance of a nationwide permit under 404 based on a faulty and unsupported
minimal impacts analysis violates 404 of the CWA.
The Corps argued in response to Plaintiffs-Appellants permit challenge
below and on appeal that its minimal impacts analysis determined that
grandfathered authorizations under paragraph (a) would not have more than
minimal cumulative effects by examining the impacts from those authorizations
along with the rest of the activities covered by the 2012 NWP 21, i.e. activities
authorized under the new restrictions in paragraph (b). In light of the error
discovered on the eve of oral argument, the Corps has now abandoned that
argument as justification for its permit decision.
Counsel for the Corps explained at oral argument the basis for the error and
how it occurred here. As counsel explained, the original proposal for the
reissuance of NWP 21 included only the numerical fill limits imposed in paragraph
(b) with no grandfather provision, i.e. paragraph (a). The Corps performed a
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survey of its districts to estimate potential impacts under NWP 21 based solely on
the authorization of new projects under paragraph (b) and came up with 305
activities resulting in 130 acres. After the grandfather provision in paragraph (a)
was added late in the regulatory permit process, 3 the Corps went back to estimate
the number of potential authorizations under paragraph (a) estimated as 70
projects but failed to update its prior estimates on the use of the permit based on
the original acreage survey. The error described by the Corps in its letter as an
underestimation of the total number of acres that may be impacted by NWP 21
is not merely a math error. The scope of the mistake is much broader. By failing
to take into account that individual activities reauthorized under paragraph (a) each
could impact more than a half-acre of waters of the United States because they are
not subject to paragraph (b)s numerical fill limits, the Corps failed to consider the
actual impact of reauthorizations issued under paragraph (a)s grandfather
provision in its minimal impacts analysis. As a result, all reauthorizations issued
under paragraph (a) should be suspended.
The Corps own assertions illustrate why the issuance of NWP 21 based on
its faulty minimal impacts analysis is arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. At oral
argument, the Corps asserted that the nature of the Corps determination of
3
The Corps did not include the grandfather provision until after a December 2011 meeting
between the Office of Management and Budget and the National Mining Association, after the
public comment period on NWP 21 had closed in April 2011.
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minimal impacts is not reliant on the amount of fill placed in waters of the United
States because the determination relies on the individual verification process and
the use of compensatory mitigation. The Corps argument runs counter to 404(e)
of the CWA and the 404(b) Guidelines, which require the Corps to consider in its
minimal impacts analysis an evaluation of the number of individual discharges of
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States expected to be authorized
by the general permit until it expires. See 40 C.F.R. 230.7(b)(3). Yet even
reliance on compensatory mitigation as a key component of its minimal impacts
analysis demonstrates why the required analysis must take into account the actual
acreage impacts. As the Corps explained, the basis for its compensatory mitigation
requirement in NWP 21 is to offset impacts to waters by requiring one acre of
mitigation for every acre filled. 4 The Corps argument is also belied by the very
terms of the general permit which imposes the new -acre and 300 linear foot fill
limits as necessary to ensure that NWP[21] authorizes only those activities that
have minimal individual and cumulative adverse effects on the aquatic
4
The efficacy of mitigation, however, is not based solely on consideration of the number of acres
impacted by permitted activities. The 2008 Compensatory Mitigation Rule, in effect since June
9, 2008, provides that for impacts authorized under 404, compensatory mitigation is not
considered until after all appropriate and practicable steps have been taken to first avoid and then
minimize adverse impacts to the aquatic ecosystem pursuant to the CWA 404(b) Guidelines.
43 Fed. Reg. 19,594; see 40 C.F.R. 230.91 et seq. The fundamental objective of
compensatory mitigation is to offset environmental losses resulting from unavoidable impacts to
waters of the United States authorized by [Army Corps] permits. 40 C.F.R. 230.93(a)(1).
The determination of the necessary compensatory mitigation is based on a host of different
factors. See 40 C.F.R. 230.93.
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environment. As the Corps explained in the Decision Document, [t]he new

acreage and linear foot limits will ensure that this NWP contributes no more than
minimal individual and cumulative adverse effects to the aquatic environment, by
limiting the amount of waters of the United States that can be filled by each NWP
21 activity.
In response to Plaintiffs-Appellants arguments that the Court should
consider its differential treatment argument, the Corps in its supplemental briefing
asserts that whether fill activities authorized under paragraph (a) will have a
minimal cumulative impact given the required compensatory mitigation is a
question that necessarily turns on the underlying facts regarding the number of
projects each paragraph will authorize and that the projected impacts under the
two paragraphs must be combined and analyzed cumulatively to determine the full
impact of the permit. The Corps describes these factual projections as an integral
component of the cumulative impacts analysis. The Corps error and subsequent
argument illustrate that the minimal impacts analysis was based entirely on the
projected impacts of authorizations issued under paragraph (b)s new fill
limitations and failed to account for impacts from projects reauthorized under
paragraph (a) that are not subject to any fill limits.
The Corps issuance of the permit under these circumstances is the precise
type of agency action subject to the Administrative Procedures Acts (APA)
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arbitrary and capricious standard. See 5 U.S.C.A. 706(2)(A) (compelling the

reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law). An agency action is arbitrary and
capricious:
where the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Ala.Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250,
1254 (11th Cir. 2007)). The Corps entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, the impacts of reauthorizations under the grandfather provision
in its cumulative impacts analysis. Id. The Corps offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency by underestimating
or in reality not individually assessing the impacts to waters of the United
States in its minimal impacts analysis. Id. Agency decisions should be set aside
under the APAs arbitrary and capricious standard for substantial procedural or
substantive reasons as mandated by statute. N. Buckhead Civic Assn v. Skinner,
903 F.2d 1533, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
49
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Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). As no actual
impact analysis was performed by the Corps prior to its authorization of projects
pursuant to the grandfather provision in NWP 21(a), this Court should suspend the
41 reauthorizations issued by the Corps under NWP 21(a) at least until the Corps
actually performs the required analysis.5
Contrary to the Intervenors doomsday assertions, suspension or vacatur of
NWP 21 would not result in the halting of all mining operations in the Black
Warrior River watershed. NWP 21 is not a mining permit; it is a permit
authorizing certain stream filling activities in association with mining operations.
Intervenors can operate and conduct stream filling activities associated with their
mining operations under the new restrictions in NWP 21(b) or they can seek
individual permits under 404 as contemplated and recognized by the Corps
Decision Document. The Corps expressly acknowledge[d] that reissuing NWP 21
with a -acre limit, a 300 linear foot limit for the loss of stream bed, and not
authorizing discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States
to construct valley fills, will result in more surface coal mining activities requiring
Clean Water Act Section 404 individual permits. Otherwise, allowing projects to
5
The Corps request for remand to the agency without vacatur so that it can perform the analysis
that was required of it prior to the issuance of the general permit presents a cart before the
horse problem. In its issuance of NWP 21, the Corps assumed there were no more than
minimal cumulative or individual impacts without consideration of an essential component of the
data analysis, and now argues we should presume no environmental harm after nearly three years
of authorized filling activities allowed by dint of the agencys clear error.
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proceed pursuant to reauthorizations issued under paragraph (a) violates the very
substance of 404(e) of the CWA. 6
At a minimum, the District Court on remand should suspend all
authorizations for those projects for which no filling activities have yet to begin.
In the proceedings before the district court below, Intervenors offered specific
evidence as to mining operations at only 22 out of the 41 mines authorized under
NWP 21(a) in the Black Warrior River watershed. As pointed out in PlaintiffsAppellants underlying briefs and confirmed by counsel for Intervenors at oral
argument, a good number of the mines reauthorized under NWP 21(a) are either
idle or have not yet begun filling activities in the permitted area. Thus, no viable
argument can be made that vacatur would have disruptive effects on mines that are
either not operating or have not yet begun filling activities pursuant to their
reauthorizations.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.
It is noteworthy that many of the cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit (involving environmental administrative challenges) that decline to grant
vacatur after engaging in a balancing of the equities arise in contexts where the agencys
enforcement of environmental protections pending remand is consistent with the statutory goals
at issue as opposed to the circumstances presented in this case where filling activities will be
allowed to continue. See North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Ne.
Md. Waste Disposal Auth. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
51

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Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 11th Cir. (2015)

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Case: 14-12357

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remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate

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operations. Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 77 Fed. Reg. 10,184, 10,274 (Feb.

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We find this argument, which operates on a cramped understanding of the

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and a failure by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management under

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Corps of Engrs, No. CIV.A. 3:05-0784, 2006 WL 2228991, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.

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some of the most productive ecosystems on earth in calculating prejudice. 515

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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with

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TOTENBERG, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

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environment. As the Corps explained in the Decision Document, [t]he new

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arbitrary and capricious standard. See 5 U.S.C.A. 706(2)(A) (compelling the

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