July 28 2016 succession

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a revocation
clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein
petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. It was
admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the oppositors alleged
that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939
will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,containing a clause
revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot
produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately destroyed the original
1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will executed in 1939. The earlier will can
still be probated under the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels
or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.

Diaz v. De Leon Digest

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922
Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the law.
After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to
tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the
incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will
RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions
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he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the
hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed
hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.

Casiano

v.

CA

158 SCRA 451

FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano
and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did
not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of their aunts estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the parties Aldina, Constancio,
Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate. The agreement provided for
the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement
agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.
3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a
document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento), dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the
last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going
through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the
clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and
Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by
virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to
other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion
Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in the same court which approved
the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the
will which was denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and
advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the
matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had been revoked by the burning
thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.

The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless
the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the
physicaldestruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the
express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must
be

the

will

itself.

Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The
intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the
will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
Adrianas maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express directionof Adriana. And then, the burning was
not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the
place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed
Adrianas will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told
her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told
him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise,
the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The
oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased
executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second
will.
2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second will presented
was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy,
one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was
actually cancelled by the testator.
3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will
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RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot
be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the
presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his
death.

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd
marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his
natural daughter.
2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding
initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had
the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land
invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because
his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with
RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and
testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential
and indispensable to its efficacy.
Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory.

In Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, etc. v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006, (Callejo, J), there was a complaint for unlawful
detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere
tolerance. In their defense, they alleged that they have a better right because they inherited it from their father, showing a Last Will and
Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the
CA reversed on the ground that the will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.
In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to ownership. One party claiming that there was
conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence, claiming a better right of possession following the law on succession.
In upholding the CAs ruling the SC

Held: The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession without having been probated, the said
last will and testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will.
In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall
govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of
wills on petitioner of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his
death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: a will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court.
Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal,
vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased
person whose testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the
will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy. (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Pao, 163 Phil. 81 (1976);
Roberts v. Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984)).
Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the basis of any claim of any right of
possession. The defendants have a better right of possession based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner in favor of the
children, the defendants herein. (Heirs of Rolando Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006).

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It
was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was
procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will
invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner
which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
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circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain
provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the
nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily
look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage
at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel
Facts:
1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He
died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to
his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses
Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his
protege.
2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the
recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate,
another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a
result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the grounds
of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral
fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament
[No. 38050. September 22, 1933]
In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN, petitioner and appellee, vs. ENGRACIA MANAHAN,
opponent and appellant.
1.WILL; PROBATE OF WILL.The appellant was not entitled to notification of the order admitting the will to probate,
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her
allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the decedent's sister, did not confer upon her the right to be

notified in view of the fact that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir.
Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.
2.ID. ; ID. ; AUTHENTICATION AND PROBATE.In the phraseology of the procedural law there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in
this case. All the law requires is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the essential external
formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the
eyes of the law.
3.ID. ; ID. ; CONCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DECREE OF PROBATE.The decree admitting a will to probate is
conclusive -with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of a fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
4.ID. ; ID. ; PROCEEDINGS "!N REM".The proceedings followed in a testamentary case being in rem, the decree
admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against the appellant, in accordance with section 306 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
5.ID. ; ID. ; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.The appellant could not appeal from the trial court's order denying her motion
for reconsideration and a new trial in view of the fact that said order was interlocutory in character.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Lesaca, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
J. Fernando Rodrigo for appellant.
Heraclio H. del Pilar for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the appellant herein, Engracia Manahan, from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan dated July 1, 1932, in the matter of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, special proceedings No. 4162,
denying her motion for reconsideration and new trial filed on May 11, 1932.
The facts in the case are as follows:
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the
deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece
of the testatrix, was named the executrix in saidwill. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed
and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The
will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of
P1,000, and likewise appointed the committee on claims and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings
followed the usual course. One year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant
herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition
to the petition and, after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court entered its order of denial on July 1, 1932.
Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise appealed from the judgment admitting
the will to probate.
In this instance, the appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as committed by the trial court. Instead of discussing
them one by one, we believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to the following: (1) That she was an interested
party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of
the will; (2) that the court, in its order of September 22, 1930, did not really probate the will but limited itself to
decreeing its authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.
The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the
probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having
filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof.
Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir.
Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in question, which
is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly
executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference between
the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this
case. All the law requires is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the essential external
formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the
eyes of the law.
The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has been authenticated and
admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate
is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by
law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding (sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure;
Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco
vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., 676; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli,
40 Phil., 105; Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil.,
119).
But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully maintaining the present action and
it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting
the will to probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions of 'section 306 of the
said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:
"SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT.* * *.
"1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of
the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular
person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima
facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; * * *."
On the other hand, we are at a loss to understand how it was possible for the herein appellant to appeal from the order
of the trial court denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial, which is interlocutory in character. In view of
this erroneous interpretation, she' succeeded in appealing indirectly from the order admitting the will to probate which
was entered one year and seven months ago.
Before closing, we wish to state that it is not timely to discuss herein the validity and sufficiency of the execution of the
will in question. As we have already said, this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After due hearing,
the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus
promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.
Wherefore, the appeal taken herein is hereby dismissed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed. [Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448(1933)]

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

Facts:
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they gave two (2) parcels of land to
manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due to the failure
of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.

3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law. While the Court of Appeals
reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the
due execution of the will. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of probate becomes final in
accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is
conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of
joint wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.)
The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals but which did not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole
world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include the disposition of the share of
his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of
the will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is
considered a separate will of each testator.

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:
1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll have been declared by
the former as her legally adopted children.
2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the
nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed.
3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia
and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, hence the latter were
strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was
possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence.
Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does not affect the
validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will set aide the institution if certain
factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur;
1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts
are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically
his whole estate as in this case.

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