Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States v. Alga Hope, JR., 901 F.2d 1013, 11th Cir. (1990)
United States v. Alga Hope, JR., 901 F.2d 1013, 11th Cir. (1990)
2d 1013
A jury empaneled in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida convicted Alga Hope, Jr., of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 by
conspiring to commit an offense against the United States.1 Hope appeals his
conviction on various grounds. We affirm.
FACTS
2
HUD outlining its development plans and requesting federal grant funds.2
Upon its approval of the county's proposal, HUD made the funds available to
Dade County via a line of credit with the United States Treasury Department.
3
EDCO operated in the Miami community, and it was to EDCO that interested
individuals and organizations applied for the federal funds. When EDCO
identified and approved an "eligible recipient," it sought the approved amount
from Dade County. In theory, Dade County then would request that sum from
the Treasury Department, and upon receipt of the funds, Dade County would
disburse the money to EDCO for ultimate delivery to the approved recipient.
However, the Treasury Department required that all funds "drawn down" in this
manner be disbursed within three days or be returned to the department. To
avoid the wasteful receipt and return of funds due to unforeseeable delays,
Dade County chose to distribute funds requested by EDCO from its general
account, and after doing so, to request the appropriate reimbursement from the
Treasury Department.
In early 1984, EDCO approved a $38,000.00 loan to Essie Redmond for The
Learning Development Center ("The Learning Center"), a day care facility in
Liberty City.3 EDCO prepared and submitted the loan package and a check
request to Dade County, which in April of 1984 issued a $38,000.00 county
check4 jointly payable to EDCO and The Learning Center. After issuing the
check, Dade County completed the appropriate paperwork and was reimbursed
by the Treasury Department pursuant to the line of credit arranged by HUD.
This check was issued to the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County,
Florida, and it was deposited in the county's account.
The check issued by Dade County to EDCO and The Learning Center never
was endorsed by Redmond or any other agent of the Center. Instead, the check,
bearing the stamped endorsement of EDCO, was deposited on May 4, 1984,
into EDCO's revolving loan account at Tropical Federal Savings and Loan
Association ("Tropical").5 The Learning Center received only $5,000.00. The
remaining $33,000.00 was applied toward a $101,000.00 certificate of deposit
purchased by EDCO on June 7, 1984, from Tropical. On the same day, EDCO
used the certificate of deposit to collateralize a $101,000.00 line of credit at the
same institution.
In the middle of July, EDCO received a bank statement from Tropical reflecting
a $38,453.23 withdrawal from EDCO's account. Hope met with EDCO
employees Darryl Gorham (vice president for administration and operations),
Persephone Taylor (supervisor of administration and finance) and Cassandra
Smith (chief accountant), and he expressed concern that the auditors6 would
discover his diversion of this $38,000.00 earmarked for The Learning Center
and his application of a portion of those funds towards the purchase of
certificates of deposit and the establishment of the lines of credit. Hope asked
Smith to restructure the bank statement from Tropical to eliminate the
withdrawal. Smith did not complete the task.
On July 27, 1984, Hope and EDCO employee Gorham went to the Trust Bank
where they met Marin. The three men retired to an office in the bank building
where Marin solicited a loan for his corporation, ATJ Industries, Inc. Despite
Gorham's objections about the absence of appropriate loan documents, Hope
sent for EDCO's checkbook, and upon its arrival, he wrote a $30,000.00 check
payable to ATJ Industries.7 The check was drawn upon EDCO's Trust Bank
account.8
A short time later, Smith and Taylor discovered that a check had been written
on EDCO's account without the appropriate documentation. Smith sought
documentation from Gorham, who referred her to Hope. Both Smith and
Gorham repeatedly attempted to procure the proper proof from Hope to support
this check, which turned out to be the $30,000.00 paid to ATJ Industries. On or
about August 11th, Jackie Simmer, a secretary for attorney William Calvo,
prepared documents for a loan to ATJ Industries at the request of Marin. Hope
appeared at EDCO with these documents some time later, and he instructed
Taylor, a notary public, to notarize the signatures of Hope and Marin, who was
not present, and to backdate the notarization to July 27, 1984, the date of the
check. Taylor complied with this direction. The loan documents identified
100,000 shares of penny stock in the Candy Mountain Gold Mine as dubious
security for the loan to ATJ Industries.
10
Eventually, EDCO's lines of credit at Trust Bank and Tropical came due.
EDCO was unable to pay, and the certificates of deposit were forfeited. A
federal grand jury indicted Hope in two counts of a three count indictment on
November 20, 1986. In the count primarily concerned with this appeal, Hope
and Marin were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 by conspiring to
embezzle, steal, purloin and convert to their own use over $100.00 in United
States funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
DISCUSSION
11
The main thrust of Hope's appeal is that in light of Tanner v. United States,9
and United States v. Hope ("Hope I ")10 the indictment here does not properly
charge a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. Section 371 describes two different
offenses: (1) a conspiracy to defraud the United States; and (2) a conspiracy to
commit any offense against the United States. See Hope I, 861 F.2d at 1578;
United States v. Haga, 821 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1987); see also Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966) (two clauses in
section 371 are alternative clauses). "The Supreme Court in Tanner explained
that the conspiracies criminalized by section 371 are defined by the target of
the conspiracy." Hope I, 861 F.2d at 1578. Tanner and Hope I both make clear
that when proceeding pursuant to the "to defraud" clause, the indictment must
allege and the proof must show that the object of the conspiracy was to defraud
the United States or one of its agencies or departments. While acknowledging
that the fraud may be accomplished either directly or indirectly by causing a
third party to perpetrate the fraud, the Supreme Court declined the
government's invitation to include within the scope of the statute conspiracies to
defraud an intermediary performing official functions on behalf of the federal
government. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 130-32, 107 S.Ct. at 2752-53, 97 L.Ed.2d at
111-13. Thus, in Hope I, the indictment was insufficient because it identified as
the targets or objects of the conspiracy certain agencies and officials of Dade
County. Nowhere in the indictment did the government identify any United
States agency or department as either the object of the conspiracy or the target
of any overt act. Moreover, by explicitly identifying county agencies as the
ultimate targets of the conspiracy, the government precluded itself from
introducing evidence that the United States was directly or indirectly the
conspiracy's target. To permit the introduction of such evidence would result in
a fatal variance from the language of the indictment. Hope I, 861 F.2d at 157778.
12
In Hope I, the government argued that the indictment was sufficient because it
alleged as a second, independent object of the conspiracy the violation of 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1001. The panel noted that "[a] conspiracy to commit 'any offense'
against the United States (here a Sec. 1001 offense) is as much a violation of
Sec. 371 as is a conspiracy to defraud the United States." Id. at 1578.
Emphasizing that the holding in Tanner applied with equal force to both clauses
of section 371, the panel again relied upon the concept of "variance" and
rejected the government's argument.
13
Again,
by specifically referring to county departments and agencies as the targets of
the conspiracy, to the exclusion of departments or agencies of the United States, the
overt acts section of the indictment precludes the Government from presenting
evidence as to a Sec. 371 conspiracy, no matter what its object. To permit the
Id. at 1578.
15
Here, the government has avoided the errors identified in Tanner and Hope I.
Proceeding under the "commit any offense" clause, the government alleged in
the indictment that Hope and Marin conspired to embezzle, steal, purloin and
convert to their own use funds of the United States exceeding one hundred
dollars, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. The indictment alleged that Hope
diverted federal funds from HUD which were intended for loans to minority
owned businesses and that Hope utilized the funds to purchase certificates of
deposit and arrange lines of credit. The indictment also alleged that the lines of
credit were used to make an unauthorized loan to ATJ Industries and that Hope
and Marin shared the proceeds of that unauthorized loan.
16
The indictment here specifically alleges that the object of the section 371
conspiracy was to commit the offense proscribed by section 641, the
embezzlement or theft of federal funds, and the indictment specifically
identifies the source of those funds as HUD and therefore as federal funds. The
government's proof during the trial proceeded on that basis, thereby avoiding
the problem of variance evident in Hope I. The indictment adequately charges
Hope with a violation of section 371.
17
18
In United States v. Smith, 596 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.1979),11 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals had the occasion to consider whether federal funds placed in a
college's general revenue account, subsequently transferred to a college workstudy account before disbursal to eligible student recipients and ultimately
stolen from this account were federal funds. The court stated that "the pertinent
inquiry is when such funds lose their federal character." Id. at 664. The court
drew one bright line: "when an outright grant is paid over to the end recipient,
utilized, commingled or otherwise loses its identity, the money in the grant
ceases to be federal." Id. (citations omitted). The court held that "while
identifiable funds appropriated for use in a federal program are in transit
between their federal source and their intended recipient and are still subject to
substantial federal controls, they remain federal funds." Id. at 669; see also
Hayle v. United States, 815 F.2d 879 (2d Cir.1987) (federal grant money
remains federal money even after being deposited in grantee's bank account and
even if commingled with non-federal funds so long as the government exercises
supervision and control over the funds and their ultimate use).
19
20
21
23
Hope did not object to this purported deficiency in the trial court's instructions.
Therefore, we review his assignment of error under the "plain error" standard
of review. United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.1988),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). Plain errors
are obvious and substantial errors which seriously affect the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. Considering as we must the jury
instructions as a whole, id., we conclude that Hope's argument is without merit.
24
Count one of the indictment alleged, and the trial court's instructions made
clear, that Hope had conspired in violation of section 371 to embezzle, steal or
convert money belonging to the United States, a violation of section 641. In
instructing the jury on count one, the court read a portion of section 641,
though it omitted at that time any mention of the value requirement. After
thoroughly explaining to the jury the meaning of conspiracy, the court
addressed again, in terms of count two of the indictment, the elements
constituting a violation of section 641. On at least three occasions the district
court informed the jury of the requirement that the value of the money
embezzled, stolen or converted must exceed $100.00. While the instructions
could have been clearer, an examination of the instructions as a whole leads to
the conclusion that the instructions as given do not amount to plain error.12
25
26
The evidence in a criminal case need not "exclude every reasonable hypothesis
28
Finally, Hope seeks to overturn his conviction because of alleged grand jury
improprieties. Specifically, he contends that the Justice Department's
appointment as special federal grand jury agents the Dade County auditors who
previously had audited EDCO and who had recommended civil and criminal
action against Hope was improper in that these agents were biased and had
prejudged the case. In support, however, Hope offers only innuendos of
complicity between the government and the special agents and allegations of
misconduct on the part of the special agents. Hope offers nothing which
indicates that the independence of the grand jury has been usurped, that its
integrity has been impugned, or that his rights have been infringed. See United
States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1468 (10th Cir.1987), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom., The Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988), citing United States v. Phillips, 664
F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73
L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982). We refuse, on these facts, to invade the traditionally
private province of the grand jury.
29
Dade County's proposals for the relevant years specifically identified EDCO as
a beneficiary, or subgrantee, of the federal funds
This check bore a "VF number," a notation reflecting that the check was a
federal voucher
Just prior to these events Adrian Marin, Hope's codefendant in the conspiracy
count and at the time of trial a fugitive from justice, appeared on the scene.
Marin met with Hope at EDCO several times between March and July of 1984
Marin allegedly paid personal expenses with the $30,000.00. Included among
the checks drawn on ATJ Industries' account was a check signed by Marin and
made payable to Hope in the amount of $5,000.00. This $5,000.00 was the
focus of a second count against Hope in which the government alleged that
Hope stole $5,000.00 in federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. The
jury acquitted Hope of this charge
10
861 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1988). Hope I charged the same defendant presently
before us on appeal, and the case involved allegations of diverted funds similar
to the allegations in the instant case
11
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), the
Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the Fifth Circuit
rendered prior to October 1, 1981
12
That the jury acquitted Hope of count two does not alter our conclusion. First,
that a jury reaches what might be construed as inconsistent verdicts is not an
adequate ground for reversal. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105
S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). Second, the evidence at the trial created a
reasonable doubt both as to whether Hope received the $5,000.00 check which
was the subject of count two and as to whether he cashed that check if received.
That acquittal in no way undermined the evidence adduced to establish Hope's
participation in the conspiracy to embezzle or misappropriate the $33,000.00
that was not paid to The Learning Center
Hope also claims that the district court erred in refusing to give certain
requested jury instructions. Having reviewed the instructions in their entirety,
we conclude that the district court adequately charged the jury as to the
applicable law and properly presented the issues to the jury. The district court
14
when we consider that the documents were backdated to July 27, 1984, the date
on which Hope wrote the check to Marin and a date clearly within the life of
the alleged conspiracy. See Grenewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405, 77
S.Ct. 963, 974, 1 L.Ed.2d 931, 944 (1957) (repainting a stolen car is in
furtherance of conspiracy to steal)