United States v. Gomez-Villa, 59 F.3d 1199, 11th Cir. (1995)
United States v. Gomez-Villa, 59 F.3d 1199, 11th Cir. (1995)
3d 1199
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
July 31, 1995.
Lori Barrist, Asst. Federal Public Defender, West Palm Beach, FL, for
appellant.
Kendall Coffey, U.S. Atty., Linda Collins Hertz, Lisa T. Rubio, Suzan H.
Ponzoli, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, FL, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court properly found
that it could not depart downward based on sentencing misinformation in a
deportation form. We affirm.
I.
2
Gomez-Villa first illegally entered the United States in 1986. He was convicted
of cocaine trafficking in March 1990 and was deported to Colombia in March
of 1991. He illegally reentered the United States in March of 1992. His other
criminal conduct included a sealed record for trafficking in cocaine in 1986.
With an offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of III, the PSI
calculated his guideline range as 46 to 57 months.
II.
7
Gomez-Villa contends that the Commission did not consider the mitigating
circumstance present in this case--that the government provided Form I-294
erroneously advising aliens that they would be subject to a two-year sentence if
they illegally reentered the country--when formulating the guidelines, and that
the district court's conclusion that it was without authority to depart on this
ground under Sec. 5K2.0 was therefore erroneous. He also claims that the court
could have departed under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(1), based on the nature and
circumstance of the offense and his history and characteristics, because he did
not purposely engage in criminal conduct, but rather returned to provide
financial support for his children.
The government concedes that the ground at issue is a circumstance that was
not adequately considered by the Commission, but argues that because none of
the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines would be promoted by a downward
departure premised on this ground, the district court was, in fact, without
discretion to consider a departure.
III.
9
Ordinarily, an appellate court may not review a district court's refusal to grant a
request for downward departure. United States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 919
(11th Cir.1993). However, a district court's refusal to consider a departure is
reviewable on appeal if the district court's decision is based on the belief that it
lacked the authority to consider a departure. United States v. Williams, 948
F.2d 706, 708 (11th Cir.1991). The district court's determination that it lacked
the authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. Id.
10
11
reliance on the factor is consistent with the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Godfrey, 22 F.3d 1048, 1053 (11th Cir.1994). The goals of
sentencing are to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, provide appropriate punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the public
from the defendant's criminal conduct, and provide the defendant with needed
care or treatment. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a)(2).
IV.
12
This court has not had an occasion to determine whether the Commission
contemplated the situation surrounding the issuance of Form I-294 to deported
aliens when formulating the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0. Two of our
sister circuits, however, have confronted situations involving requests for a
downward departure based on Form I-294. The First and Ninth Circuits agree
that the Commission did not take into consideration the Form I-294 situation
when formulating the guidelines. United States v. Smith, 14 F.3d 662, 666 (1st
Cir.1994); United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir.1994),
cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1367, 131 L.Ed.2d 223 (1995). We agree
with the analyses of our sister circuits. Indeed, nothing in the guidelines, policy
statements, or commentary suggests that this situation was even remotely
contemplated by the Commission.
13
Next, we must decide whether a departure based upon Form I-294 is consistent
with the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. See Godfrey, 22 F.3d at 1053.
Contrary to Gomez-Villa's contentions, a downward departure based on the
government's misconduct would not promote respect for the law because it did
not encourage or threaten Gomez-Villa into breaking the law by illegally
reentering the country. See Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d at 938. Gomez-Villa,
however, intentionally violated the law by illegally reentering the United States
after deportation. Both the First and Ninth Circuits concluded that allowing
departures in similar circumstances would be contrary to the Sentencing
Guidelines' goals of deterring criminal conduct and promoting respect for the
law. Smith, 14 F.3d at 666 (concluding that departing after Smith intentionally
committed a felony by illegally reentering the United States would be contrary
to the goals of the guidelines); Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d at 938 (concluding that
the only purpose served by a departure would be to deter government
misconduct and that the court does not permit departures based on
circumstances that neither bear on the offense in question, nor speak to the
offender's character). Thus, like our sister circuits, we hold that a departure in
this case would be contrary to the guidelines' goal of deterring criminal conduct
and promoting respect for the law among those who violate it.
14
As a second basis for departure, Gomez-Villa suggests that the court could
have considered a downward departure based upon the circumstances
surrounding the offense and his reasons for illegally reentering the country, i.e.,
his family ties and financial responsibilities. At sentencing, Gomez-Villa
contended that he reentered the United States only to help support his children
while they attended college, that he immediately admitted that he was an illegal
alien when found, and that his criminal history was significantly overrepresented by a criminal history category III. The law is clear that family ties
and responsibilities are not relevant in determining sentence unless there are
extraordinary circumstances. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.6; United States v. Cacho, 951
F.2d 308, 310-11 (11th Cir.1992) (unless there are extraordinary circumstances,
a district court may not depart downward to reflect a defendant's parental
situation). Nothing in this case demonstrates that Gomez-Villa's financial
responsibilities to his college-age children are extraordinary.
15
16
AFFIRMED.