United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 1719, Docket 93-9053
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.: No. 1719, Docket 93-9053
3d 865
Mrs. Eagleston has presented her claim to two juries in the Eastern District of
New York; the first trial was conducted by Judge Wexler and the second by
visiting Judge Tsoucalas (Court of International Trade, sitting by designation).
Both juries deadlocked. At the end of the second trial, Judge Tsoucalas entered
an order directing a verdict in favor of the defendants then remaining in the
case. Mrs. Eagleston's appeal alleges a variety of errors committed in the course
of the proceedings. First, Mrs. Eagleston disputes the district court's conclusion
that the statute of limitations had expired on her claims against police officers
Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly. Second, she challenges the dismissal of the
defendant police officers Ozer, Pesale and Milward on qualified immunity
grounds. Third, she challenges several of Judge Tsoucalas's evidentiary rulings,
most notably his refusal to receive in evidence a report prepared by Suffolk
County which records a sharp increase after 1987 in the number of domestic
incidents resulting in arrest. Fourth, she challenges Judge Tsoucalas's order
following the second trial, directing a verdict against her and dismissing the
complaint against the County of Suffolk and the County's former Police
Commissioner, on the ground that Mrs. Eagleston had failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support her equal protection claim. Her remaining
arguments do not justify extended treatment.
BACKGROUND
4
Mrs. Eagleston's marriage turned violent on October 20, 1986, the day she
served her husband with divorce papers. Between then and December 27, 1986,
Mrs. Eagleston contacted the police ten times to report harassment and threats
against her by Mr. Eagleston. On one occasion, Mrs. Eagleston brought her
complaint directly to the police station; on another occasion, a police officer
was summoned to a neighborhood restaurant; eight times, police were
dispatched to the Eagleston home. During this two month period, Mrs.
Eagleston resided on the ground floor of the Eagleston home while Mr.
Eagleston sporadically occupied the same house, sometimes with his wife, and
sometimes in a basement apartment that the Eaglestons had rented to his sister
before divorce proceedings began.2
Mr. Eagleston reacted to notice of the divorce proceedings on October 20, 1986
by threatening Mrs. Eagleston, by throwing objects at her and by smashing
plasterboard walls in their home. Mrs. Eagleston called the Suffolk County
police department, which dispatched officers to the house. The officers
concluded that an arrest was not justified.
6
On October 23, 1986, the Suffolk County Supreme Court issued an Order to
Show Cause, returnable on November 3, 1986, which included a "temporary
order of protection" requiring Mr. Eagleston "to refrain from any acts of
violence" towards Mrs. Eagleston or the Eagleston's son, Steven. A second
judge of that court extended this order of protection on November 26, 1986,
and temporarily granted Mrs. Eagleston "exclusive use of and occupancy of the
marital residence." On November 10, 1986, Mr. Eagleston sought and obtained
his own temporary order of protection requiring Mrs. Eagleston to refrain from
acts of violence against him.
After the initial incident on October 20, Mrs. Eagleston reported incidents
involving her husband to the Suffolk County police on November 7, 9, 20, 23
and December 7, 8, 9, 19 and 24. The police responded to all of these demands
for assistance. Most of the complaints did not allege physical injury. In each
instance, Mrs. Eagleston expressed fear of harm, and in some instances she
reported threats by her husband. Prior to the stabbing on December 27, 1986,
the only reported knifing took place on November 9, 1986, when Mrs.
Eagleston stabbed her husband in the leg with a paring knife; and the only
arrests were made on November 23, 1986, when both Mr. Eagleston and Mrs.
Eagleston were arrested following an incident in which Mr. Eagleston claimed
his wife had violated his order of protection while Mrs. Eagleston claimed her
husband had beaten her. Both Eaglestons subsequently withdrew the charges
against each other arising out the November 23 fracas.
Mrs. Eagleston filed suit on December 7, 1989 against the County; the Suffolk
County Police Department (hereinafter sometimes referenced collectively with
the County as the "County"); Police Commissioner Daniel Guido; the former
commissioner, Dewitt C. Treder; and ten police officers. Judge Wexler
dismissed the claims against two policemen in a ruling that has not been
appealed. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against another policeman
and against Commissioner Guido. On April 22, 1992, Judge Wexler granted
partial summary judgment dismissing Mrs. Eagleston's claims against
defendant police officers Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly on statute of
limitations grounds, and those against police officer Ozer on the ground of
In May 1992, the case proceeded to its first jury trial against the County, the
former police commissioner and the two remaining policemen. At the close of
plaintiff's case, Judge Wexler dismissed the claims against police officers
Pesale and Milward on the ground of qualified immunity. The claims against
the County and its former police commissioner, Dewitt Treder, were submitted
to the jury, which deadlocked after three days of deliberations. Judge Wexler
declared a mistrial.
11
The second jury trial commenced August 11, 1993, Judge Tsoucalas presiding,
solely on the issue of the liability of the County and its former police
commissioner. After four days of deliberation, the eight-member panel was
able to reach a unanimous verdict on only two issues: first, that the plaintiff
failed to prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that Suffolk County and/or
[Police] Commissioner Treder had an unconstitutional policy which denied
women equal protection of the law"; and second, that the plaintiff did establish
"by a preponderance of the evidence that Suffolk County and/or [Police]
Commissioner Treder had an unconstitutional policy which denied victims of
domestic violence equal protection of the law." (Emphasis added.) The jury
was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on whether this "unconstitutional
policy" was the proximate cause of Mrs. Eagleston's stabbing injuries.
12
After excusing the jury and declaring a mistrial, Judge Tsoucalas granted
defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and dismissed the remainder of the
case, explaining his reasoning as follows:
13
[T]here is no evidence that this Court heard that there was a policy of Suffolk
County or the Police Commissioner that deprived the plaintiff of her
constitutional rights. It hasn't been proven at all.
14
There was testimony showing that some police officers didn't do their job and
were negligent in their job and in performing their duties, but that doesn't mean
that there was a policy for all police officers to do something, and most of the
police officers acted in accordance with the law and in accordance with the
Constitution ... and didn't deprive Mrs. Eagleston of her constitutional rights at
all.
15
There is nothing in the facts that I have heard that showed any policy on behalf
of Suffolk County or any policy on behalf of the Commissioner.
16
The fact that the Commissioner didn't know what was going on shows that he
wasn't a good commissioner, that he may have been an incompetent
commissioner, ... but it doesn't mean that he had a policy of discriminating
against women or discriminating against victims of domestic violence.
17
....
18
19
In his written order, dated August 25, 1993, Judge Tsoucalas stated simply that
he had dismissed the matter because the plaintiff had failed to establish that
either the County of Suffolk or Police Commissioner Treder "had a policy of
denying women or victims of domestic violence equal protection of the law."
20
DISCUSSION
21
Mrs. Eagleston raises numerous claims of error, none of which requires a third
trial in this case.
A. Statute of Limitations
22
Plaintiff sued individually the policemen who had responded to her calls for
help. Judge Wexler dismissed her claims against four of these officers on
statute of limitations grounds. We review de novo the grant of summary
judgment and all evidence and all inferences to be drawn from the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to Mrs. Eagleston. Prunier v. City of
Watertown, 936 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.1991).
23
For Sec. 1983 actions arising in New York, the statute of limitations is three
years. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250-51, 109 S.Ct. 573, 582, 102 L.Ed.2d
594 (1989). Mrs. Eagleston filed suit against the defendants on December 5,
1989, within three years of the December 27, 1986 stabbing but more than
three years after the dates on which Officers Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly
acted. Officer Bugge reported to the Eagleston home on October 20, 1986, the
day Mr. Eagleston learned of the divorce proceeding. Officer Kopf interviewed
Mrs. Eagleston on November 7, 1986 at the police station. Officer Kern
responded to a call from Mrs. Eagleston on November 9, 1986, and arrived at
the Eagleston home to discover that Mrs. Eagleston had stabbed her husband.
Officer Donnelly reported to the Eagleston home on November 20, 1986 to find
the Eaglestons arguing over the deed to their house.
24
Plaintiff argues that, for statute of limitations purposes, the repeated failure of
the several police officers to arrest Mr. Eagleston constitutes one continuous
two-month wrong which culminated in the December 27 attack.
25
While state law supplies the statute of limitations for claims under Sec. 1983,
federal law determines when a federal claim accrues. See Cullen v. Margiotta,
811 F.2d 698, 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97
L.Ed.2d 764 (1987). The claim accrues when the plaintiff "knows or has reason
to know" of the harm. Id. Plaintiff claims that she did not know, or have reason
to know, of the harm done to her until the knife attack of December 27.
However, "the proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the
point at which the consequences of the act becomes painful." Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 29, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981). This Court
previously considered this issue in Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d
185 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1368, 67 L.Ed.2d 347
(1981). The plaintiff in Singleton alleged the existence of a conspiracy to
violate his civil rights, and contended that the separate acts of the defendants-each of which would have supported a claim for compensatory damages when
the act was done--should be viewed as one transaction for the purpose of
determining when the statute of limitations began to run. We disagreed:
26 crucial time for accrual purposes is when the plaintiff becomes aware that he is
The
suffering from a wrong for which damages may be recovered in a civil action. To
permit him to wait and toll the running of the statute simply by asserting that a series
of separate wrongs were committed pursuant to a conspiracy would be to enable him
to defeat the purpose of the time-bar, which is to preclude the resuscitation of stale
claims.
27
Id. at 192.
28
In this case, the wrong alleged was the failure of the four policemen to afford
Mrs. Eagleston equal protection of the law when she needed assistance. The
district court held that any claim against Bugge, Kopf, Kern and Donnelly
accrued on the date that each allegedly failed to protect Mrs. Eagleston, and
that the three year period had run at the time Mrs. Eagleston filed her complaint
on December 5, 1989.
29
Plaintiff contends that the District Court should have allowed a jury to
determine when she "had knowledge of both the injury and its connection with
the acts of the defendant" and thus when the statute of limitations would have
begun to accrue. While she is correct that, in some circumstances, factual issues
related to statute of limitations should be put before a jury, see, e.g., Santiago
Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 909 F.2d 628, 633 (1st Cir.1990), the statute of
limitations issue in this case does not present disputed facts.
30
Plaintiff argues that her claims for police inaction on prior occasions did not
accrue until the December 27 episode in which she suffered the physical injury
for which she seeks damages. The district court held that each officer's
allegedly improper failure to act was "sufficient to enable plaintiff to realize
that she had suffered a compensable injury at that time." Accepting as true that
the police culpably failed to arrest plaintiff's husband, time after time, that
wrong was done repeatedly, in her presence and to her knowledge. Under
Singleton, however, the claim does not accrue until "the plaintiff becomes
aware that [s]he is suffering from a wrong for which damages may be
recovered in a civil action." Singleton, 632 F.2d at 192. The district court
therefore should have considered specifically as to each defendant at what point
Mrs. Eagleston had a compensable claim for the officer's alleged inaction.
31
It may be that the district court considered that, as to each failure to act, a
proven violation would support at least an award of nominal damages, even if
she suffered no physical injury or property loss. See Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d
107, 110 (2d Cir.1994). To affirm on that basis, we would have to hold that
nominal damages may be deemed compensable within the meaning of
Singleton. It is unnecessary for us to reach that question, however, under the
facts presented on this appeal. The four episodes involving officers Bugge,
Kopf, Kern and Donnelly all pre-dated November 23, on which date Mrs.
Eagleston testified she was beaten. Therefore, by November 23, she had
suffered compensable damages in respect of any claim she may have had
against those four policemen. Since the complaint in this action was filed more
than three years after November 23, 1986, the statute of limitations had expired
in respect of the claims against these four defendants. We therefore affirm the
district court's order dismissing the complaint against them.
B. Qualified Immunity
32
The district court held that officers Ozer, Pesale and Milward enjoy qualified
immunity, and dismissed the claims against them. We affirm because we agree
that it was objectively reasonable for these three officers to believe that they
lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Eagleston.
33
The claims against Officer Ozer were dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment and those against Officers Pesale and Milward were dismissed
following presentation of plaintiff's case in the first trial. We review the
dismissal of these claims de novo. See Prunier v. City of Watertown, 936 F.2d
677, 679 (2d Cir.1991) (review of summary judgment is de novo ); Sir Speedy,
Inc. v. L & P Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1992) ("The same
framework [used by the district court] governs appellate review of the granting
of a motion for a directed verdict ...").
34
Police officers may be held personally liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983 when, acting under color of state law, they deprive a person of "any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution." However,
qualified immunity functions as a judicially-created restraint to the threat of
civil punishment. See Magnotti v. Kuntz, 918 F.2d 364, 365 (2d Cir.1990).
"Th[is] defense affords not only protection from liability, but, in addition,
freedom from suit." Id. at 365 (2d Cir.1990). Qualified immunity affords
government actors broad protection from personal liability "insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "[W]hether an official
protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly
unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness'
of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at
the time it was taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct.
3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citations omitted). We consider the
particular circumstances that bear upon the immunity of each defendant.
35
36
Mrs. Eagleston showed Ozer the November 26, 1986 order of protection
granting her "exclusive use and occupancy of the marital residence." Mr.
Eagleston then appeared on the front lawn, claiming that he too lived in the
basement apartment and paid rent for it. Under these facts, it is difficult to
imagine the crime for which Ozer might have arrested Mr. Eagleston. It was
objectively reasonable for Ozer to end his search of the basement upon being
denied access by Mr. Eagleston's sister. Furthermore, it was objectively
reasonable for Ozer to conclude that the term "marital residence" as used in the
order of protection did not include an apartment rented to a third party. When
the rights of an aggrieved party are not clearly established, there can be no Sec.
1983 liability. See Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 319-21 (2d Cir.1987)
(when federal law on an issue was far from "clearly established," individuals
acting under color of state law could not be held liable under Sec. 1983). It is at
least debatable whether or not the protective order embraced a basement
apartment occupied by a tenant. Therefore, Ozer's decision not to arrest Mr.
Eagleston on December 7, 1986 was objectively reasonable. We affirm the
finding of qualified immunity.
37
2. Officer Pesale. After hearing testimony at the first trial, Judge Wexler
concluded that Michael Pesale "did everything he was supposed to have done."
Mrs. Eagleston alleged that, on December 8, 1986, Mr. Eagleston attempted to
run her down with his car and threatened to beat her up. Pesale responded to the
call. He interviewed Mrs. Eagleston at the Eagleston home, and she told him
that Mr. Eagleston was not in the house. Pesale filled out a field report charging
reckless endangerment and referred Mrs. Eagleston to the Crime Control Unit.
He also drove around the neighborhood in an attempt to locate Mr. Eagleston
and his car.
38
39
C. Evidentiary Rulings
40
Mrs. Eagleston claims that Judge Tsoucalas erred in the course of the second
42
43
44
does not in itself describe any specific body of scientific or technical expertise
pertinent to this case. The district court found that the plaintiff failed to
establish that Bengston was an expert in either criminology or domestic
violence. Furthermore, Bengston had no familiarity with New York procedure
in general or the practices of the Suffolk County Police Department in
particular. Judge Tsoucalas acted within the bounds of his discretion in
concluding that someone unfamiliar with arrest practices in New York was
unqualified to testify about them.
45
3. The Progress Report. In 1988, the County changed its arrest policy for
situations involving domestic violence. Previously, mediation played a
significant role in Suffolk County's resolution of domestic disputes. Under the
new policy, police officers were directed to arrest anyone who violates an order
of protection. Police officers were also directed to arrest whenever the officer
had reasonable cause to believe an individual committed a misdemeanor in a
domestic dispute, unless the victim prefers that no arrest be made; and, where a
felony may have been committed, police officers were directed to effect an
arrest regardless of what the victim may prefer or say. Suffolk County
Executive Order 1a-1988. In 1991, the Office of the County Executive
published a study entitled "Progress Report: A Comprehensive Anti-Domestic
Violence Program for Suffolk County," documenting the police department's
arrest record in the years following the 1988 change in the domestic violence
arrest policy. Other statistical evidence, admitted and summarized at trial,
furnishes data on arrests for domestic violence in the period 1985-1987.
Although the data for 1986--the year Mrs. Eagleston was stabbed--is not in all
respects comparable to the data in the Progress Report, the data can be
contrasted, making certain allowances, and a jury easily could conclude from
that comparison that arrests in domestic violence incidents rose fivefold
between 1986 and 1991.
46
47
Plaintiff's claim was that the County was engaged in an unconstitutional policy
or practice in regard to its treatment of domestic violence. The district court
decided that "what the police officers do ... and did" does not bear upon what
the policy may have been. Certainly, however, "what police officers do ... and
did" is material to the issue of what the practice may have been. The Progress
Report documents a sharp increase in domestic violence arrests after 1987, and
explicitly states that the County acted to "implement a pro-arrest policy in
incidents of family violence and abuse." Standing alone, the Progress Report
does not evidence that the County was sluggish in its prosecution of domestic
violence incidents during the time Mrs. Eagleston claims the police ignored her
pleas for help; the change in the arrest rate could reflect the reluctance of
victims to ask that their spouses be arrested or prosecuted, a choice given less
deference after 1988. Nevertheless, the Progress Report was material to the
issues presented.
48
At trial, the County argued that the Progress Report should be excluded as a
subsequent remedial measure under Federal Rule of Evidence 407. According
to the County, admission of the Progress Report would offend public policy
because the increased arrest rate should be deemed a "subsequent measure"
taken by the county in an effort to remedy a defective policy or practice.
49
Other courts have concluded that Rule 407 does apply to policy changes in civil
rights cases. See Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1417 (9th
Cir.1986); Specht v. Jensen, 863 F.2d 700, 701 (10th Cir.1988); Luera v.
Snyder, 599 F.Supp. 1459, 1463 (D.Colo.1984). For several reasons, however,
we decline to determine whether it was within the district court's discretion to
exclude this document under Rule 407. Appellants have not briefed the issue,
and neither party has attempted to explore the public policy values that are
implicated on both sides of this issue. Moreover, because the district court
based its decision on materiality, it never considered the Federal Rule 407
issue.
50
Since we conclude that the district court erred in excluding this document on
the only ground stated by the court, we proceed on the assumption that the
progress report should have been admitted. However, as discussed below, we
conclude that Judge Tsoucalas would have been correct to direct a verdict in
favor of the County even if the Progress Report had been admitted into
evidence.
D. Directed Verdict
51
Following his dismissal of the deadlocked jury in the second trial, Judge
Tsoucalas directed a verdict in favor of Suffolk County and former Police
Commissioner Treder because he found that plaintiff had "failed to present any
evidence that the defendants ... had a policy of denying women or victims of
domestic violence equal protection of the law." The district court did not
separately address Mrs. Eagleston's allegation that there was such a practice
irrespective of the policy. Judgment as a matter of law should be granted when:
52 there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the
(1)
jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or
(2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that
reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [it].
53
Bauer v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir.1988). An appellate
court reviewing the district court's decision to grant a motion for a directed
verdict makes the same inquiry. Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P Graphics, Inc., 957
F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1992). We affirm the directed verdict in favor of the
County and the former Police Commissioner, because, (a) on the basis of the
admitted evidence, the jury could not have concluded without conjecture that
the County's practice deviated from its stated arrest policy of treating domestic
violence the same as other acts of violence; and (b) even if the "Progress
Report" is deemed to show that the County's practice deviated from its stated
policy, that deviation is insufficient to create a jury issue in the absence of a
showing that its purpose was invidious discrimination against women.
54
55
stated policy. The district court admitted the following evidence on that
question, none of which is sufficient to raise a question for the jury:
56
57
58
59
that they were inadmissible hearsay, contain observations that some police
officers did not enforce the policy regarding criminal domestic violence. They
also reflect that the former Police Commissioner was "for the resolution
100%," albeit with one particular caveat: the former Police Commissioner was
concerned that the resolution, with its focus on "criminal enforcement in cases
of family violence," was eliminating the option of family court--an option
available under New York state law for domestic disputes involving disorderly
conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless endangerment and less serious
instances of assault. At trial, the County's attorney referenced "a provision
requir[ing] police officers in these incidents to advise the victim of their option
to go to family court [in addition to] criminal court." This is doubtless a
reference to Sec. 812 of the Family Court Act, which gives a complainant a
choice of alternate forums. N.Y. Family Court Act Sec. 812 (McKinney 1983).
As the Practice Commentary to Sec. 812 indicates, the family court judge has
the discretion to transfer the case to criminal court, notwithstanding the
complainant's election, if it is clear that criminal sanctions would be
appropriate.
60
--Raw data on domestic disputes. At trial, Officers William Murphy and Joseph
Kistinger described the data they helped compile on domestic disputes between
1984 and 1987. An examination of the data shows that arrests were made in
about 2% of these cases. The County represented at oral argument--and Mrs.
Eagleston's counsel did not dispute--that this data included complaints of
harassment as well as complaints of assault and violent crimes. The exhibit
does not reflect how many of these cases could have resulted in an arrest, but
the County's lawyer suggests that in many of these instances there would have
been no probable cause to arrest. Mrs. Eagleston's personal experience, as
recounted in her testimony, reinforces this conclusion. In the absence of more
detailed analysis of the circumstances involved in the recorded incidents, this
material is next to useless.
61
--Police testimony regarding mediation. Two police officers testified about their
training in mediation techniques. Assuming that such training could support an
inference of invidious discrimination in any circumstances, the training given
by Suffolk County encompassed mediation for all disputes, not solely for
domestic disputes.
62
262 (1987), the document does include statistics showing a sharp increase in
arrests for domestic violence after the 1988 change in policy.
63
Mrs. Eagleston sought the opportunity at trial to use these later statistics,
showing many more arrests, as evidence that the earlier statistics reflect a
practice of ignoring domestic assaults. However, nothing in the record supports
an assumption that the later statistics reflect a more appropriate level of arrests,
or achieve some parity with arrests that do not involve domestic violence. Nor
is there any basis for assuming that any variation in the level of arrests was
caused by an earlier discriminatory policy rather than by a tendency for victims
of domestic violence to forgo pressing charges or to elect proceedings in Family
Court. On appeal, as in the district court, the County attributes the higher level
of arrests to a new policy of making an arrest whenever an order of protection
is violated, regardless of the victim's expressed preference.
64
In presenting its defense, the County argued that its practice was the same as its
policy, and that there was no difference between the way its officers treated
incidents of domestic violence and the way its officers treated other incidents of
violence. The County did not attempt to justify the existence of a discrepancy
because it argued there was none. Mrs. Eagleston argues that the Progress
Report, viewed in light of the other evidence, shows a sharp change in the
arrest rate for domestic violence; and that the County's denial of any
discrepancy, and its resulting failure to justify any discrepancy, would have
allowed the jury to conclude, as it did, "that Suffolk County and/or
Commissioner Treder had an unconstitutional policy which denied victims of
domestic violence equal protection of the law."
65
67
The statistics presented by Mrs. Eagleston may or may not establish that
victims of domestic violence are treated differently; but no evidence offered at
trial tends to show that any such distinction resulted from an impermissible
discriminatory intent. Absent some evidence of such an intent or purpose, there
is no equal protection claim. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293-94.
68
CONCLUSION
70
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Honorable David G. Trager of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, who was originally a member of the panel, recused
himself prior to oral argument. See Murray v. National Broadcasting Company,
Inc., 35 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.1994)
Although the Eaglestons had been living as husband and wife for eight years,
their actual marital status was dubious. At trial, Mrs. Eagleston testified that she
had never actually been divorced from her first husband. We refer to the
Eaglestons as husband and wife for convenience