United States v. Charles Wilson, 342 F.2d 43, 2d Cir. (1965)
United States v. Charles Wilson, 342 F.2d 43, 2d Cir. (1965)
2d 43
18 A.L.R.3d 254
David C. Reynolds, New York City (Anthony F. Marra, New York City),
for appellant.
Daniel Donnelly, New York City (Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Atty., for
Southern District of New York, Neal J. Hurwitz, Asst. U.S. Atty., of
counsel), for appellee.
Before WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and HAYS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
where they turned. After identifying and securing the package, the agent found
the men on 34th Street and arrested them. On being interrogated, they first
'denied any knowledge of being in the area or anything about the carton'; when
appellant Wilson was later asked why he had left the terminal when a tractor
came in, he said 'he had gotten scared.' An FBI agent testified that, in an
interview, Wilson gave false information as to his residence and employment
and denied being in the terminal or touching any carton. The judge dismissed
the conspiracy count and also the substantive count against Gibbons and
Sterling, but convicted Wilson on the substantive charge.
2
Wilson's first point is that the Government failed to meet the standard, now
applied in this circuit, of adducing evidence sufficient that a trier of the facts
could reasonably be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see
United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 932 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
979, 84 S.Ct. 1885, 12 L.Ed.2d 747 (1964), and cases there cited, and
particularly that the evidence was insufficient to eliminate reasonable doubt as
to his animus furandi. We disagree. Despite arguments as to the agent's limited
opportunity for observation the judge could permissibly have credited his
version of what occurred. Once that was done, the physical act of taking the
carton from the platform was sufficiently colored by the suspicious behavior
before and after, by the false denials, and by the lies as to residence and
employment, to warrant inferring the required intent. United States v.
Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310, 316 (2 Cir. 1960).
The second, and more serious, point is that Wilson's conviction on the
substantive count is inconsistent with the acquittal of his co-defendants and his
own consequent acquittal on the conspiracy count. This is argued to offend the
principle, stated in United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899 (2 Cir. 1960), that,
in contrast to the rule as to verdicts, inconsistency in a judge's decision on
counts in an indictment affords ground for reversal-- a principle which United
States v. Sells, 325 F.2d 161 (2 Cir. 1963) indicated would also apply to
inconsistency as between defendants tried together. We do not find it easy to
understand how the judge arrived at his varying conclusions, particularly in the
light of the rather small degree of assistance required to render a participant an
aider or abettor, United States v. Garguilo, 310 F.2d 249, 253 (2 Cir. 1962); the
difference in the degree of proof as to the various defendants was not as great in
this trial as in Sells. Still the result is not wholly irreconcilable with any rational
theory, as was the case in Maybury, where the judgments could be explained
only on the basis of compromise. As to all three defendants the evidence was
close to the line of sufficiency. Wilson was the one who removed the package
from the platform and carried it outside the terminal, while the activities of
Gibbons and Sterling, absent proof of prior agreement, were a shade more
Affirmed.