Ben D. Spivak and David S. Shapiro v. United States, 370 F.2d 612, 2d Cir. (1967)
Ben D. Spivak and David S. Shapiro v. United States, 370 F.2d 612, 2d Cir. (1967)
2d 612
67-1 USTC P 9158
Myron L. Shapiro, New York City, (Donald J. Swords, New York City,
on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Laurence Vogel, Asst. U.S. Atty., Southern District of New York (Robert
M. Morgenthau, U.S. Atty., So. District of New York, and Joseph Kovner,
Dept. of Justice, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, and FRIENDLY and SMITH, Circuit
Judges.
J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Ben D. Spivak and David S. Shapiro appeal from a May 16, 1966 judgment of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Richard
H. Levet, Judge, which dismissed their complaint for a refund of taxes and
awarded the United States $27,192.27 with interest and costs on its counterclaim for 100% penalties pursuant to 66721 and 6671(b)2 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. 254 F.Supp. 517. We find no error and affirm the
judgment.
The penalty assessments were for unpaid income withholding and social
security (FICA) taxes for the first quarters of 1955 and 1956 due from Lincoln
Industries, Inc., a corporation of which the appellants were the responsible
officers.
In June 1965, Shapiro and Spivak became president and treasurer, respectively,
of Lincoln Industries, a Virginia corporation engaged in the manufacture of
furniture. Prior to this date, a bona fide dispute existed between Lincoln and the
Internal Revenue Service about payments made by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation to IRS. Lincoln claimed that these payments should be credited to
its tax liabilities and not, as was being done, to the tax debts of its parent, the
Virginia-Lincoln Corporation. Judge Levet found that, had the disputed
payments been credited to Lincoln, they would have covered the liabilities in
question.
On July 16, 1956, Lincoln was adjudicated a bankrupt and in the ensuing
proceedings the government filed a claim for unpaid taxes of $107,135.02
which the bankruptcy court reduced to $84,540.89. This sum included the taxes
presently in issue. On February 22, 1960, the government compromised this
claim for $42,971.26, even though the trustee had funds sufficient to pay it in
full. Among other matters the settlement provided:
'In consideration of the payments above specified, the United States of America
is to assert no further claim for Withholding taxes, FICA taxes, or FUTA
(federal unemployment) taxes, penalties, or interest against the bankrupt or its
Trustee herein.
The court found that the appellants had a duty to collect and pay the taxes
involved, were authorized to do so and were aware that payment had not been
made. It found that the dispute about prior misallocation with the IRS was not
the reason for non-payment. During the relevant quarters, appellants paid for
raw materials and labor and thereby 'voluntarily, consciously, and intentionally
preferred other creditors of the corporation over the United States.' 254 F.Supp.
at 521. These facts are sufficient evidence of wilfulness. See Bloom v. United
States, 272 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied 362 U.S. 803, 80 S.Ct. 1236,
4 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1960); Horwitz v. United States, 236 F.Supp. 812
(S.D.N.Y.1964), aff'd 339 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1965).
10
The primary issue for review is whether the compromise by the government in
the bankruptcy proceeding of its claim against the corporation precludes it, in
spite of the express reservation, from seeking the unpaid balance of the taxes
from appellants. The question has been put in terms of whether the appellants
are secondarily liable as sureties for the taxes and are therefore arguably
released by the form of the compromise with their obligor, or whether Lincoln
and appellants are co-debtors with no suretyship relation between them.
However, we are here concerned only with the collectibility of the penalty
assessments, and with the nature of the obligation of the appellants to the
United States.
11
12
Appellants contend, however, that the United States should be barred from
recovery on principles of estoppel. We do not agree. Any possible contention
that the United States is estopped to assert its rights against appellants because
of the compromise with Lincoln must fail in view of the reservation in the
compromise agreement, and the appellants' knowledge of and acquiescence in
its terms. The essential element of a misleading of appellants to their harm is
strikingly absent. Compare Freedman v. The Concordia Star,250 F.2d 867 (2d
Cir. 1958), Helvering v. Schine Chain Theatres, 121 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1941),
News Projection Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 38 F.Supp. 854, 856
(S.D.N.Y.1941).
13
14
While in Singer v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 354 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.
1966), we limited our consideration to its facts (the United States had additional
claims exceeding the bankrupt's assets), we think that decision may be
extended to the situation here, that the Congress in enacting 6672 was solely
interested in protection of the revenue and intended that the trust funds be fully
collectible from those responsible persons who caused the diversion as well as
from the corporation for whose purposes they may have been used, without any
duty to protect the delinquent, see Kelly v. Lethert, supra, and that compromise
of the claim against the bankrupt estate of the corporation cannot serve to
release the responsible persons from their direct liability under the statute.
15
6672. Failure to collect and pay over tax, or attempt to evade or defeat tax
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account
for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax
evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be
imposed under section 6653 for any offense to which this section is applicable.
6671(b) Person defined.-- The term 'person' as used in this subchapter, includes
an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a
partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to
perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs