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Reba Monisoff v. American Eagle Investments, Inc, Allen R. Rosenberg, 104 F.3d 356, 2d Cir. (1996)
Reba Monisoff v. American Eagle Investments, Inc, Allen R. Rosenberg, 104 F.3d 356, 2d Cir. (1996)
3d 356
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL E. BACINE, ESQ.
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: RUSSELL K. STATMAN, ESQ. NEW
YORK, NEW YORK
S.D.N.Y.
AFFIRMED.
Before CARDAMONE and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,*
JJ.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff, J.),
and was argued.
On March 27, 1996, plaintiff Reba Monisoff ("plaintiff") brought suit against
the defendants in the Southern District of New York, alleging primarily that
defendants negligently and/or fraudulently mismanaged the securities account
plaintiff maintained with AEI. Contending that an arbitration agreement (the
"agreement") between plaintiff and defendants entitled defendants to arbitrate
plaintiff's claims, defendants moved to stay the litigation pending arbitration,
pursuant to 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. 3. On June 10, 1996,
the district court denied the defendants' motion to stay the action pending
arbitration. Defendants filed this appeal.
This court reviews a district court's denial of a motion to stay an action pending
arbitration de novo. See In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders, 68 F.3d 554, 557 (2d
Cir.1995).
While there exists a strong federal policy favoring arbitration agreements and
resolving "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues ... in favor of
arbitration," Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983), a court first must conclude that the parties intended to
arbitrate in the first instance before the scope of arbitration may be defined, see
Spear Leeds & Kellog v. Central Life Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir.1996)
(scope of arbitration is a different inquiry than is threshold issue of existence of
arbitration agreement). As the district court noted, although "federal arbitration
policy may help to define the scope of what the parties are agreeing to when
they agree to arbitrate a contractual dispute, it cannot create a contract between
non-contracting parties." Monisoff v. American Eagle Inv., Inc., 927 F.Supp.
137, 138 (S.D.N.Y.1996).
intent if we find the contract to be ambiguous. See McPheeters, 953 F.2d at 772
("Where the dispute concerns an issue of a contract, the application of federal
law simply comprises generally accepted principles of contract law.") (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
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In the present case, we find that the language of the arbitration agreement
unambiguously applies only to plaintiff and Ernst & Company, the clearing
broker. First, the agreement was written on Ernst & Company letterhead.
Second, AEI is not mentioned by name anywhere in the agreement, nor is there
any other language in the Agreement from which to infer that the term "broker"
should be interpreted to include AEI.
Finally, we find meritless defendants' argument that the Federal Arbitration Act
gives them a right to a jury trial on the issue of whether or not an arbitration
agreement existed. The statute makes clear that the right to have a jury decide
this question applies only to the party opposing arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. 4
("Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default [of the
arbitration agreement] may ... demand a jury trial"); cf. Painewebber Inc. v.
Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510-11 (3d Cir.1990) ("An 'issue' requiring resolution
by the district court arises under 4 only when the party refusing to arbitrate
contends that the dispute is not one that the parties agreed to arbitrate."). In the
present case, defendants sought to compel, not avoid, arbitration, and thus the
right to a jury trial never attached.
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AFFIRMED.