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Raymond Miranda v. United States, 458 F.2d 1179, 2d Cir. (1972)
Raymond Miranda v. United States, 458 F.2d 1179, 2d Cir. (1972)
2d 1179
Judson A. Parsons, Jr., New York City (Steven C. Kany, New York City,
of counsel), for appellant.
Bobby C. Lawyer, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Whitney North Seymour, Jr., U. S.
Atty., for the S.D. of N.Y., and Howard Wilson, Asst. U. S. Atty., of
counsel), for appellee.
Before FRIENDLY, Chief Judge, MOORE and OAKES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
from his decision would not be taken in good faith and he certified the same
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(a).
2
Petitioner then applied to this court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis and
for assignment of counsel. This first motion was denied without opinion but
petitioner's counsel renewed his motion, relying on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(d)
(6) which he claimed entitled petitioner to proceed without prepayment of
docketing fees despite the adverse certification. In an opinion by this panel, we
rejected petitioner's contention but granted leave for both sides to file further
briefs for consideration by the same panel of "the question whether Judge
Wyatt's failure to issue a good faith certificate under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(a)
was an abuse of discretion." 455 F.2d 402, 405 (2 Cir., 1972). Both sides filed
extensive briefs which largely dealt with the merits of petitioner's claims. We
conclude that the judge erred in certifying the appeal as not taken in good faith;
we reverse that part of the judge's decision, and grant leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. Because the papers already filed are sufficient for this purpose we
proceed to consideration of the merits; here we concude that the denial of
petitioner's Sec. 2255 motion should be affirmed.
I.
3
The standard for determining whether an appeal is taken in good faith was set
forth in Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 448, 82 S.Ct. 917, 922, 8
L.Ed.2d 21 (1962) in connection with a direct appeal from a conviction:
4 is not the burden of the petitioner to show that his appeal has merit, in the sense
It
that he is bound, or even likely, to prevail ultimately. He is to be heard, as is any
appellant in a criminal case, if he makes a rational argument on the law or facts. It is
the burden of the Government, in opposing an attempted criminal appeal in forma
pauperis, to show that the appeal is lacking in merit, indeed, that it is so lacking in
merit that the court would dismiss the case on motion of the Government, had the
case been docketed and a record been filed by an appellant able to afford the
expense of complying with those requirements.
5
See also Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 674-675, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d
1060 (1958). Since the same statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915, applies to collateral
attacks as well as direct criminal appeals, the same standard of good faith must
likewise be applied. This threshold level for permitting persons to proceed in
forma pauperis is not very great and doubts about the substantiality of the
issues presented should normally be resolved in the applicant's favor. Lee v.
Habib, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 403, 424 F.2d 891 (1970). Based on the record
before us we believe that rational arguments on the law and facts can be made,
and the appeal is not one we would dismiss on motion of the Government.
II.
6
The detailed facts of this case are thoroughly set forth in both of Judge Wyatt's
extensive opinions, 325 F.Supp. 217; 330 F.Supp. 1002, and in an earlier
opinion of this court, 437 F.2d 1255, and need not be repeated here. It is
enough to say that petitioner's claim centers around his contention that he was a
drug addict suffering withdrawal symptoms and under heavy sedation at the
time he entered his guilty plea in August, 1968. Petitioner was represented both
prior to and at the time of his plea by Bernard Moldow, then of the Legal Aid
Society and now a judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York. Judge
Moldow had over 20 years of criminal defense experience including over 5,000
drug related cases. Unquestionably, Miranda, who himself had a great deal of
experience with the crimnal law albeit from a different vantage point, was
provided with able counsel whose experience thoroughly attuned him to the
possible danger signals that an addict may not be fully competent to plead
guilty or proceed to trial. Judge Moldow found Miranda rational and coherent at
all times.1 We find this weighty support for the district court's conclusion that
Miranda was neither undergoing withdrawal nor sedated, heavily or otherwise,
and was competent to enter a guilty plea. When the other evidence before the
district court is also considered, the judge's findings are unassailable.
found petitioner's allegations sufficient to justify a hearing; now that he has had
his hearing and failed to substantiate his allegations, the argument that the
hearing was bound to be unproductive lacks appeal.
8
We express our appreciation to Judson A. Parsons, Jr., Esq. for his able and
persistent representation of appellant.2
The certification that the appeal was not taken in good faith is reversed; leave
to appeal in forma pauperis is granted; the order denying petitioner's motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 is affirmed.
It appears uncontradicted that Judge Moldow was not informed by Miranda, the
Assistant United States Attorney responsible for the case, or New York City
corrections officials, of events occurring during Miranda's confinement in City
detention facilities at Rikers Island prior to his appearance in federal court.
Briefly, Miranda claims that on two occasions prior to his plea-the last one six
days before-he attempted suicide by hanging himself from a bed frame, a
method described as "impossible" to accomplish a fatal result. Judge Wyatt
found that both attempts were feigned-in order to secure additional drugs-and
his conclusion is amply supported by the record. The failure to disclose these
facts to counsel was not attributable to the federal authorities who themselves
knew nothing of them. In light of the court's conclusion that the attempts were
feigned, and other evidence in the record, such as that indicated in the text
accompanying this note, we do not see how disclosure would have led counsel
to question Miranda's competency