Georgios Vlassis, Also Known As George Vlassis, Also Known As George Vlasis, Also Known As George Vlajsis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 963 F.2d 547, 2d Cir. (1992)
Georgios Vlassis, Also Known As George Vlassis, Also Known As George Vlasis, Also Known As George Vlajsis v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 963 F.2d 547, 2d Cir. (1992)
2d 547
On July 14, 1988, Vlassis, a resident alien who had been convicted of drug
trafficking, was held deportable after a hearing before Immigration Judge
Stephanie Marks. On April 21, 1989, Immigration Judge Sydney B. Rosenberg
granted Vlassis' request to reopen the proceedings in order that Vlassis might
seek a discretionary waiver of deportability pursuant to section 212(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the "Act"), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c),
which, as interpreted, allows aliens who have resided in the United States for
seven consecutive years to seek such a waiver. See Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d
268, 269-73 (2d Cir.1976). By order dated July 19, 1990, Judge Rosenberg
denied Vlassis' waiver application and ordered him deported. On June 20,
1991, the BIA dismissed Vlassis' appeal from Judge Rosenberg's order. On
August 19, 1991, Vlassis moved the BIA to reopen the proceedings, remand
the case to an immigration judge for the presentation of new evidence, and stay
deportation during pendency of the motion.
3
Counsel for the respondent has applied for a stay of deportation pending
consideration by the Board of a motion to reopen. After consideration of all
information, the Board has concluded that there is little likelihood that the
motion will be granted. Accordingly, the request for stay of deportation is
denied.
Fearing that deportation was imminent, Vlassis decided not to wait for the
BIA's ruling on his motion to reopen. In order to invoke an automatic stay of
deportation pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(3), he immediately petitioned this
court for relief on the ground that the BIA's August 22 decision "denied all
further administrative review." It is obvious, of course, that the above-quoted
written order did no such thing. Moreover, the administrative record contains
no mention of an alleged telephone conversation between Vlassis' attorney and
an unidentified BIA representative that the attorney contends constituted a
denial of the motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a)(4); Michelson v. INS,
897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir.1990) (review is limited to administrative record).
If as Vlassis' attorney asserts in this court a conversation did take place, we are
satisfied that it involved no more than what is contained in the above-quoted
order. Decisions of the BIA are made in writing, not over the telephone. See 8
C.F.R. 3.1(f).
the attorney reminded the BIA that his client had moved for a stay of
deportation and a reopening, that the BIA had ruled only on his client's request
for a stay but that "no decision has been reached as to the second portion of this
motion." The attorney requested that this decision be expedited. On October 21,
1991, the BIA issued a written order denying the motion to reopen. Vlassis has
not petitioned for review of that order.
8
It is well settled, in this circuit as elsewhere, that the denial of a motion for stay
of deportation is not a final order reviewable in a court of appeals pursuant to
section 106(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1105a(a). See Muigai v. INS, 682 F.2d
334, 337 (2d Cir.1982); Pang Kiu Fung v. INS, 663 F.2d 417, 419 (2d
Cir.1981); Li Cheung v. Esperdy, 377 F.2d 819, 820 (2d Cir.1967); GandoCoello v. INS, 857 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir.1988); Reid v. INS, 766 F.2d 113, 11516 (3d Cir.1985); Bonilla v. INS, 711 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir.1983). We have
spoken out on a number of occasions against meritless dilatory tactics of aliens
or their counsel designed to delay departure from the United States. See, e.g.,
Muigai, supra, 682 F.2d at 337; Der-Rong Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 467-69
(2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980, 99 S.Ct. 1786, 60 L.Ed.2d 239
(1979); Ballenilla-Gonzalez v. INS, 546 F.2d 515, 521-22 (2d Cir.1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 819, 98 S.Ct. 58, 54 L.Ed.2d 75 (1977). Treating the BIA's
August 22 order as a denial of Vlassis' petition to reopen, rather than merely the
denial of a stay, would only encourage the tactics we have condemned. We
refuse to do so.
10
12
13
At the next hearing held on September 1, 1989, Vlassis produced none of the
requested documents or witnesses, and the matter was adjourned again until
April 4, 1990. At the April hearing, the requested documentary evidence still
was not produced. Vlassis' mother did appear and testify. Her testimony did
little to bolster her son's case, as it did not appear that she and her son were very
close. She did not know that he had a drug problem or that he had been arrested
Not surprisingly, Judge Rosenberg concluded that Vlassis had not established
that he had rehabilitated himself from his drug-related problems so that the
social and humane considerations in his favor were not outweighed by the
undesirability of permitting him to remain a permanent resident. See Matter of
Edwards, Interim Decision 3134 (BIA 1990); Matter of Marin, 16 I & N Dec.
581 (BIA 1978).
15
In an eight-page order which recited at length the facts and findings below, the
BIA on June 29, 1991 dismissed Vlassis' appeal from Judge Rosenberg's denial
of his request for waiver, demonstrating thereby a complete knowledge of the
facts and the applicable law. Its reasoning followed very closely that of Judge
Rosenberg and is persuasive.
16
17
The granting of a motion to reopen is discretionary with the BIA. INS v. RiosPineda, 471 U.S. 444, 449, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 2101, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985). Our
review of the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen is limited to whether the
decision "was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law." Vargas v. INS, 938 F.2d 358, 360 (2d Cir.1991). We
find no abuse of discretion or misinterpretation of the law in the instant case.
The record reflects that the new equities raised by Vlassis--his marriage to an
American citizen and the impending birth of their child--were considered by the
BIA. Although these events were not without significance, they did not entitle
Vlassis as a matter of law to the reopening he sought. See Sang Seup Shin v.
INS, 750 F.2d 122, 127 (D.C.Cir.1984); see also Cobourne v. INS, 779 F.2d
1564, 1565-67 (11th Cir.1986); Ahwazi v. INS, 751 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th
Cir.1985). Here, the BIA was of the opinion that in view of Vlassis' history he
still had not made an adequate showing of rehabilitation. Because our right of
review is limited, we cannot second guess the BIA by holding that it abused its
broad discretion.
18
For all the foregoing reasons, Vlassis' petition for review is dismissed.
18
For all the foregoing reasons, Vlassis' petition for review is dismissed.