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United States v. Christopher Young, 3rd Cir. (2011)
United States v. Christopher Young, 3rd Cir. (2011)
We exercise
whether the conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor, the sentencing court
may look beyond the statute to certain other documents in the record. Shepard v.
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
The record presented to the District Court included a criminal complaint and
a certified record of the state court judgment. The District Court was entitled to
consider both documents to determine whether Youngs convictions were felonies
that qualified Young as a career offender. Id.; United States v. Howard, 599 F.3d
269, 272 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a district court may rely[ ] on the terms of
the plea agreement, the charging document, the transcript of colloquy between
judge and defendant, or other comparable judicial records of sufficient reliability).
Because these documents conclusively showed that Youngs prior convictions
qualified as felonies, the District Court did not err by sentencing him as a career
offender.
Young also argues that the District Court erred by denying his motions to
withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. We review for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003). A district court must
consider three factors when evaluating a motion to withdraw a plea: (1) whether
the defendant meaningfully asserts actual innocence; (2) the defendants reasons
for withdrawing the plea; and (3) whether the government would be prejudiced by
withdrawal. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001).
With respect to the first factor, Young does argue that he is actually innocent
of the crime to which he pled. However, [b]ald assertions of innocence are
insufficient to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Jones, 336 F.3d at
252. Rather, Young must [ ] not only reassert innocence, but must give sufficient
reasons to explain why contradictory positions were taken before the district court
and why permission should be given to withdraw the guilty plea and reclaim the
right to trial. Id. at 253 (quoting United States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d
Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized by United States
v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011)). He has not done so here, having
made a blanket assertion of innocence . . . , but offer[ing] no credible facts in
support of his claim. Jones, 336 F.3d at 253.
As to the second factor, Young claims that he should have been allowed to
withdraw his plea because his plea was not voluntary and intelligent, due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.2 Specifically, Young argues that counsel was
ineffective for informing him that he would be sentenced as a career offender
based on his prior felony convictions. To succeed on this appeal, Young must
show, among other things, that counsels performance was deficient. Premo v.
Moore, -- U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 733, 743 (2011). Counsels performance is deficient
where that performance fails to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.
Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202 (3d Cir. 2000). Counsels performance is
objectively reasonable where counsels advice is legally correct. As discussed
above, Young did, in fact, qualify as a career offender. Counsels advice was thus
legally correct, and counsels performance was not deficient.
Finally, as to the third factor, the Government need not show such
prejudice when a defendant has failed to demonstrate that the other factors support
a withdrawal of the plea. Jones, 336 F.3d at 255. Accordingly, the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions to withdraw his plea.
Young has not shown that the District Court either erred in sentencing him
as a career offender, or abused its discretion in denying his motions to withdraw
his guilty plea. We will affirm the District Courts judgment.
prior to sentencing. Jones, 336 F.3d at 254 (quoting United States v. Headley, 923
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991)).
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