707 F.

2d 757
13 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 75

UNITED STATES of America

v.
Thomas A. DALFONSO, Appellant.
No. 82-5376.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued Feb. 18, 1983.
Decided May 12, 1983.
As Amended May 17, 1983.

James K. O'Malley, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

J. Alan Johnson, U.S. Atty., Constance M. Bowden, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before GIBBONS, HUNTER and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Thomas A. Dalfonso was tried to a jury and convicted in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of distributing
and conspiring to distribute the narcotic dilaudid in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs.
841(a)(1) and 846. He appeals his conviction and sentence of five years
imprisonment and fine, contending that the trial judge committed reversible
error by (1) failing to recuse himself, and (2) permitting a government witness
to invoke the fifth amendment on cross-examination. We see no merit in these
contentions and therefore affirm.

I.
2

The events leading to Dalfonso's conviction began in August 1981 when Joseph
Carbone, a professional "confidence man," communicated with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and offered his services as a government

informant. In return, Carbone sought to have the Government report his
cooperation to the state authorities so that he might effect a reduction of his
sentences for two crimes of which he had already been convicted. Carbone and
the Government were able to strike a bargain and Carbone became an
informant.
3

Assuming his role as informant, Carbone described for the FBI his contacts
with appellant Dalfonso and one Fred Kovalchuk. Dalfonso and Kovalchuk
recently had boasted to Carbone of the money to be made in selling dilaudid,
and offered to supply Carbone with the drug if he were interested in dealing.
Carbone had turned down this offer at the time, but at the Government's behest,
Carbone renewed his contacts with Dalfonso and told him that he was
interested in purchasing a large quantity of dilaudid. Dalfonso made
arrangements for the transaction through Kovalchuk. Dalfonso completed the
sale at the Inn America, New Stanton, Pennsylvania, in the presence of an FBI
agent posing as a friend of Carbone. Dalfonso and Carbone completed a second
sale several days later and following an aborted third sale shortly thereafter,
Dalfonso and Kovalchuk were indicted and charged with violating federal
narcotics laws.

At the pretrial hearing a notable incident occurred, forming the basis for one of
Dalfonso's allegations of error. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned
to the case apprised the court that an informant (not Carbone) had notified the
FBI that the prosecutor and one of the defense attorneys were going to fix the
case. This informant later changed his story and said that one of the defense
attorneys was going to fix the case with the court.1 The judge replied that he
was friendly with defense counsel, as he was with many other lawyers at the
bar of Western Pennsylvania, but was not going to fix the case.

This exchange apparently stimulated co-defense counsel to come forward with

related information. According to him, a former client of the district judge
when he was a practicing lawyer, one Henry Richitelli, who had since acquired
a lengthy criminal record, had telephoned defendant Dalfonso's father, a former
Mayor of Monessen, Pennsylvania, and told him that the case could be fixed
through the judge's former preceptor and friend. Dalfonso's father responded
that he was not interested. Richitelli later telephoned Dalfonso's father again,
telling him that a sum of $100,000 had been made available for the benefit of
his son's codefendant, Kovalchuk, for delivery to the judge through his former
preceptor. Again, Dalfonso's father turned down the offer.

The trial judge disclaimed having any contact with Richitelli since he

represented him "years ago in a tax matter," denied an effort had been made by
anyone to bribe him, and directed that an FBI investigation be made of the
alleged improprieties. Next, following an off-the-record conversation with
counsel, the judge announced that he was recusing himself from the case and
would have it reassigned to another judge. The judge then held further off-therecord discussions with counsel in chambers. At the close of these discussions
he announced that after further reflection, he had concluded that to recuse
himself would set an undesirable precedent, and after conferring with the
United States Attorney and defense counsel, he decided to vacate the recusal
order and hear the case. Both counsel for the defendants assented without
comment.

At trial Dalfonso did not deny that he had performed the criminal acts charged,
but instead asserted the affirmative defense of entrapment. To prove that he was
entrapped, Dalfonso sought to introduce evidence showing that Carbone was a
professional confidence man who might easily frighten or persuade even a
person of reasonable firmness to perform acts against his better judgment.

Prior to trial, the court had ruled that the defense would be permitted to
introduce evidence of Carbone's prior convictions for impeachment purposes,
but that the defense could not question Carbone about certain activities
appearing on his rap sheet for which he had not been convicted. Carbone's
conviction record included three counts of theft, burglary, larceny, and
receiving stolen goods, a firearms violation, making an illegal threat, and most
recently, theft and conspiracy.

Subsequently, the prosecution at trial asked Carbone on direct examination to

explain certain criminal activities to which he had referred in a taped
conversation with Dalfonso. Specifically, government counsel inquired what
Carbone meant by the terms "rip-off" and "scam," and whether he had not in
fact engineered numerous "rip-offs" in the past. At this point, defense counsel
asserted that the door had been opened and that the defendant should now be
permitted to cross-examine Carbone concerning fraudulent activities with
which he had been involved, but for which he had not been convicted. The
court agreed and ruled that Dalfonso could question Carbone concerning his
alleged prior "rip-offs" subject only to Carbone's right to invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination.

10

Ultimately, Carbone testified extensively concerning scams he had perpetrated,

but invoked his fifth amendment privilege not to testify concerning one
particular scam involving the sale of gold Kruggerands and the alleged threat to
kill one of the victim's daughters if he turned Carbone in to the police.2

Notwithstanding all of the above evidence directed to Carbone's character,

Dalfonso did not succeed with his entrapment defense and the jury convicted
Dalfonso on all counts of the indictment.3
II.
11

We first address Dalfonso's contention that the trial court's failure to recuse
constituted reversible error. At the outset we observe that a federal trial judge's
decision with respect to recusal may be reversed only for abuse of discretion.
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999,
101 S.Ct. 1704, 68 L.Ed.2d 200 (1981); Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159
(3d Cir.1977). Furthermore, in cases such as this, where no objection to the
district court's failure to recuse was made at trial, a plain error standard of
review applies. United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 86, 62 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979). This standard is, if anything,
even more rigorous than the abuse of discretion standard. As we observed in
Schreiber, the error must be egregious or otherwise constitute a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 535. With this plain error standard of review in
mind, we turn to the appellant's argument that the trial judge was required to
disqualify himself because his impartiality in this case "might reasonably be
questioned."

12

Dalfonso presses his recusal argument under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a). That
section provides: "Any justice, judge or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." The above language has been interpreted to mean that a judge
should recuse himself where a reasonable man knowing all the circumstances
would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality. United States v.
Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940, 102 S.Ct.
1431, 71 L.Ed.2d 650 (1982).

13

We see no reason why any reasonable person familiar with the facts of this case
would question the trial judge's impartiality. First, there is nothing in either the
record or in the briefs submitted by the parties to suggest that the allegations of
judicial corruption in this case had any reasonable basis in fact. On the
contrary, the trial judge's prompt decision to order an FBI investigation speaks
for the emptiness of the allegations. The investigation ordered by the trial judge
vindicated him. As the Government asserts in its brief to this court, "The FBI
subsequently investigated the matter and found that all of the allegations made
by the various sources were without substance." Second, the trial judge had no
reason to, nor is there any evidence that he did, hold Dalfonso responsible for
the incident. Third, there is nothing in this record to warrant the fear that the

judge had become so emotionally involved by the disclosures of possible

efforts to corrupt that his ability to preside impartially might reasonably be
questioned. On the contrary, it appears that defense counsel believed that the
judge would be able to preside over the case in an impartial manner for they
both readily assented to his decision to hear the case.
14

Finally, important considerations weighed against recusal. When the trial judge
refused to recuse because of his concern that the recusal, under the
circumstances, might set an undesirable precedent, he may have recognized the
temptation that such a procedure offered to defendants ready to seize upon any
opportunity to avoid trial before a particular judge. An anonymous telephone
call to the FBI or to the judge himself, or a telephone call to the prosecuting
attorney by an impostor falsely claiming that an effort was being made to
influence or even corrupt the trial judge, might open avenues for judge
shopping by impelling the trial judge to recuse. We cannot reasonably call into
question the impartiality of a presiding judge upon so tenuous a basis as a
telephone call, made by a meddler or even an accused, suggesting that the judge
might succumb to improper inducements.4

15

This potential judge shopping problem was not lost upon the framers of the
federal recusal statute. In the House Report accompanying the bill they
cautioned:

16

Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis. Nothing

in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the transformation of a
litigant's fear that a judge may decide a question against him into a "reasonable
fear" that the judge will not be impartial. Litigants ought not have to face a
judge where there is a reasonable question of impartiality, but they are not
entitled to judges of their own choice.

17

H.R.Rep. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. &
Ad.News 6351, 6355. There is no reasonable basis in this record to question the
judge's impartiality. A decision to recuse in the instant case might encourage
false impugnment of the integrity of trial judges as a tactic in future cases.

18

In view of all of the above circumstances and considerations, we cannot say

that the trial judge plainly erred or even abused his discretion by refusing to
recuse himself.5

III.
Having disposed of Dalfonso's recusal challenge, we briefly consider his

19

Having disposed of Dalfonso's recusal challenge, we briefly consider his

contention that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting
government witness Carbone to assert the fifth amendment on crossexamination. Prior to trial, the court had ruled, as previously mentioned, that
defense counsel would be permitted to cross-examine Carbone concerning his
prior convictions but not as to offenses on his rap sheet not resulting in
convictions. At trial, however, when the prosecution on direct examination
elicited information from Carbone that he had engineered a number of "ripoffs," the court expanded its initial ruling and permitted the defense to question
Carbone concerning any alleged prior "rip-offs" without regard to criminal
conviction, reserving, however, the witness' right to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Dalfonso contends that the
trial court, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 608, should have admitted testimony
concerning Carbone's involvement in the Kruggerand scam, a scam which
allegedly occurred during the same period as covered by the instant indictment,
and that the court erred by permitting Carbone to assert the fifth amendment
privilege.6

20

In his brief in this court, Dalfonso explains that his purpose in attempting to
cross-examine Carbone with respect to the Kruggerands was "to show that at
the same time Carbone was convincing [Dalfonso] to get drugs, he was
convincing other people to give him great sums of money for non-existent gold
Kruggerands and bargain televisions." Evidence of Carbone's prior "rip-offs"
was of course admissible only to impeach Carbone's credibility. Dalfonso was
not entitled to introduce evidence of Carbone's previous scams to demonstrate
Carbone's propensity to defraud or influence his victims, and to suggest that
Dalfonso himself had been tricked into doing what he ought not do. Compare
Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) and 609(a) with Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).7

21

We need not address the question of whether Carbone, by taking the stand or by
testifying concerning his history as a confidence man, waived his right to
remain silent with respect to the alleged Kruggerand scam for which he had not
been tried or even charged.8 In view of the extensive testimony offered
concerning Carbone's convictions, prior "rip-offs," and method of operation,
testimony concerning the Kruggerand scam would have been merely
cumulative. We cannot believe that such cumulative testimony could have
substantially influenced the jury's assessment of Carbone's credibility, see
generally Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ruiz, 495 F.2d 1175, 1180 (3d
Cir.1974), and its exclusion was within the broad discretion of the trial court,
Fed.R.Evid. 403; Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ruiz, supra, 495 F.2d at
1177. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a new trial merely because a
government witness has exercised his fifth amendment privilege to remain
silent during cross-examination on a collateral matter relating to credibility.

Rather, the defendant must at least show a substantial danger of prejudice

flowing from the absence of such testimony. United States v. Newman, 490
F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir.1974). We see no such danger of prejudice here in light
of the cumulative nature of the proposed collateral inquiry.
22

The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.

The trial judge requested the name of the FBI informant, but the Assistant
United States Attorney declined to reveal the informant's name in open court

Carbone asserted his fifth amendment right not to testify concerning the
Kruggerand scam through counsel in chambers. The jury never heard Carbone
"take the fifth."

Dalfonso's co-defendant, Kovalchuk, was also convicted. Kovalchuk apparently

took no appeal

We have no reason to believe that the trial judge thought that defense counsel
in this case had fabricated events in the hope of persuading the court to recuse.
Defense counsel did not mention the Richitelli incident until the prosecution
had first raised the story of the FBI informant. Finally, the judge was on
friendly terms with one of the defense attorneys and unequivocally expressed
his belief that he thought him to be an honorable man. Thus, the court would
have little cause to suspect defense counsel of attempting to manipulate the
court

The Government does not allege that defendant waived his right to challenge
the judge's decision to sit. As we see nothing violative of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a)
in the court's conduct, we need not raise the waiver issue sua sponte. See
United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 238 (3d Cir.1982) (Rosenn, J.,
concurring)

The defendant also contends that the court erred in permitting Carbone to
invoke the fifth amendment privilege with respect to another "scam"
concerning the defrauding of a large number of people in Westmoreland
County in a proposed sale of television sets. The witness, however, did not
invoke the fifth amendment with respect to the television sets. His counsel
reported to the court that Carbone would answer questions with respect to the
television sets and deny any wrongdoing. He would however, refuse to testify
concerning the alleged sale of gold Kruggerands on fifth amendment grounds.
The court thereupon directed counsel not to cross-examine the witness
concerning the Kruggerands but to "go ahead on the televisions."

Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) provides in relevant part:

Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction
of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness ....
Fed.R.Evid. 609(a) provides in relevant part:
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence
that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime ...
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement ....
Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.

We note in passing that we are not impressed with Dalfonso's argument that
Carbone waived his fifth amendment rights simply by taking the stand.
Fed.R.Evid. 608(b) explicitly provides that, "[t]he giving of testimony, whether
by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as waiver of his
privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters
which relate only to credibility." See also United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d
139, 145 (3d Cir.1974)