United States v. Domenic Nicholas Disilvio, 520 F.2d 247, 3rd Cir. (1975)
United States v. Domenic Nicholas Disilvio, 520 F.2d 247, 3rd Cir. (1975)
2d 247
In this case, we must decide whether the double jeopardy clause bars the
federal government from prosecuting appellant, Domenic DiSilvio, on a second
indictment. The initial indictment was dismissed on defendant's motion after the
jury had been impanelled and after evidence had been offered by the
prosecution. We conclude that the double jeopardy clause does not bar a second
trial. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of appellant's motion to
dismiss the second indictment.
I.
2
Appellant DiSilvio was indicted for receipt and possession of radios stolen from
an interstate shipment in violation of 18 U.S.C. 659. After presentation of the
government's case in a jury trial in April of 1974, DiSilvio moved for judgment
of acquittal. The motion was denied.1 DiSilvio then moved for dismissal of the
indictment which was defective in failing to state the facility from which the
theft had occurred. The district court granted DiSilvio's motion to dismiss the
indictment.2 A more complete indictment charging DiSilvio with the same
violation of 18 U.S.C. 659 was subsequently issued. DiSilvio's pretrial motion
to dismiss was denied and the instant appeal followed.2aII.
3
DiSilvio argues that, although he moved for dismissal of the first indictment,
we must grant the requested relief because the evidence offered by the
government in the first trial was insufficient to support a guilty verdict. The
first trial ended not because of any assessment of the evidence but because the
district court ruled as a matter of law that the indictment was defective. We
conclude that the evidence introduced at the trial on the original indictment was
sufficient to make out a prima facie case under the statute. Therefore, we need
not address DiSilvio's contention that the double jeopardy clause prohibits the
government from trying a defendant on a legally sufficient indictment when at a
previous trial based on a defective indictment devoted to the same allegedly
criminal act the prosecutor has rested his case without establishing all the
elements of the offense. Our focus for purposes of this appeal is directed solely
at the district court's dismissal of the indictment.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the double jeopardy clause does
not bar reprosecution of a defendant who succeeds in overturning his
conviction on appeal. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072,
23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41
L.Ed. 300 (1896).3 See: United States v. Beard, 414 F.2d 1014, 1017 (3d Cir.,
1969) (where we stated that reversal of a conviction obtained under a defective
indictment did not bar retrial.) Similarly, the Supreme Court has stated: "Where
circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching,
a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any
barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial errors." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91
S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1970); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463,
84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964).4 In this Circuit, the cases applying the
double jeopardy provision have been consistent with the above statement by the
Supreme Court. United States v. Pappas, 445 F.2d 1194, 1200 (3d Cir., 1971)
cert. denied sub nom; Mischlich v. United States, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 449,
30 L.Ed.2d 368 (1971); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d
552, 558 (3d Cir., 1969) cert. denied 399 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 2206, 26 L.Ed.2d
566 (1970). See also: United States v. Jamison, U.S.App.D.C., 505 F.2d 407,
410 (1974); United States v. Romano, 482 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir., 1973);5
United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir., 1973); Roberts v.
United States, 477 F.2d 544, 545 (8th Cir., 1973); United States v. Franki, 409
F.2d 958, 959 (7th Cir., 1969); Raslich v. Bannan, 273 F.2d 420 (6th Cir.,
1959).6
5
In the instant case DiSilvio does not even allege that he was forced to seek a
mistrial because of any intentional misconduct by the court or prosecution. At
most, the United States Attorney was negligent in preparing a defective
indictment. In Jorn, the Supreme Court suggested that negligent errors by the
government which necessitate defendant's motion for a mistrial, are not
sufficient to bar reprosecution. The court stated:
The language makes clear that a defendant need not be set free on double
jeopardy grounds where negligence on the part of the government requires the
court to grant defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Absent a showing of more than mere negligent error by the United States
Attorney in the preparation of the first indictment, DiSilvio's argument in this
case is without merit.7
III.
9
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss the
indictment will be affirmed.
DiSilvio appealed from the denial of his motion for acquittal. This court held
that under 28 U.S.C. 1291, it was without jurisdiction to review such a nonfinal order
Relying on this court's decision in United States v. Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421 (3d
Cir., 1956), the district court dismissed the indictment. The government
appealed from the dismissal of the first indictment and we affirmed
2a It is the general rule that a defendant may not appeal from a denial of a
motion to dismiss since there has been no final order as required by 28 U.S.C.
1291. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct.
1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to the
final judgment rule where denial of an immediate appeal would effectively deny
580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) has been satisfied. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at
485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543; United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior
Court, 483 F.2d 7, 12 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023, 94 S.Ct. 447, 38
L.Ed.2d 315 (1973). It should be noted that even under this stringent "manifest
necessity" test, a trial court's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial upon discovery
of a defective indictment has been held not to bar reprosecution under the
double jeopardy clause. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469, 93 S.Ct.
1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1972). If retrial was constitutionally proper on the facts
of Somerville where the trial court declared a mistrial without defendant's
consent, surely retrial is proper in the instant case where defendant's own
motion initiated the declaration of a mistrial
5
Over a strong dissent, the Fifth Circuit has more recently barred retrial of a
defendant who moved for a mistrial when the trial judge acted precipitously in
banishing defense counsel. United States v. Dinitz, 492 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.,
1974). The decision was affirmed by a divided court en banc, 504 F.2d 855 (5th
Cir., 1974). The decision seems to go beyond the Jorn dicta that severe judicial
overreaching which causes the defendant to move for mistrial must be shown
before retrial will be barred. Even under the Dinitz court's expansive
interpretation of the double jeopardy bar, DiSilvio could expect no relief.
DiSilvio has failed to allege any abuse by the court or prosecution
It has been suggested that a defendant who moves for a mistrial or who seeks a
reversal of a criminal conviction has waived his double jeopardy objection.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 at 189, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199
(1957); United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164 at 171 n. 8 (4th Cir., 1972).
The Supreme Court recently noted in United States v. Wilson, --- U.S. ---, 95
S.Ct. 1013 at 1022, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975) "(that) the practical justification of
the exception is simply that it is fairer to both the defendant and the
(g)overnment."
We note that the Supreme Court's recent double jeopardy cases are not helpful
to DiSilvio. In United States v. Wilson, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d
232 (1975), retrial was not required since the district court had ruled in post
guilty verdict motion that pre-indictment delay required dismissal of the
indictment. Appeal was allowed since a decision in the government's favor
would not require retrial. The jury verdict rendered at the first trial could
merely be reinstated
In United States v. Jenkins, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975),
the district court as trier of fact dismissed the indictment after presentation of
the government's case. The Supreme Court agreed that appeal and
reprosecution were barred since the dismissal, based as it was on facts adduced