General Trading Corporation, in No. 74-2245 v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., Appeal of John Randal McDonald in No. 74-1924, 523 F.2d 98, 3rd Cir. (1975)
General Trading Corporation, in No. 74-2245 v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., Appeal of John Randal McDonald in No. 74-1924, 523 F.2d 98, 3rd Cir. (1975)
2d 98
The district court, sitting without a jury, denied the landowner's claim against
the builder, found for the builder on its claim against the landowner and
imposed upon the architect liability over to the landowner for most of the
amount awarded to the builder. The landowner and the architect have appealed.
The record is clear that one of McDonald's undertakings for the landowner was
the preparation of plans, their presentation to the Planning Board and the Public
Works Department, the conduct of negotiations with these agencies and the
modification of plans as necessary to obtain governmental approval. Indeed, in
his crossclaim for professional services, McDonald alleged that he "rendered
architectural services only to General Trading Corporation culminating on
Planning Board approval of the plans on 17 April 1969". Very early in 1969,
the Public Works Department permitted work on the project to begin but
directed that certain changes in design and detail be made and submitted to the
Planning Board for approval. Particularly, the Board had advised McDonald
that a "hip" roof should be designed and substituted for the combined "gable"
and "shed" type of roof contemplated by the original proposal. McDonald
correctly understood that to satisfy this requirement the pitch of the planes of
the roof had to be "3 or 4 to 12", a rise of 3 or 4 feet for every 12 feet that it
extended horizontally.
7
The building in question is roughly "L" shaped, the bottom of the "L" being a
rectangular section fronting on Church Street, while the upper part of the "L" is
a smaller rectangle extending to the rear toward Government House. As the
reconstruction was conceived in the original thinking of the parties, a gabled
roof would cover the front section of the building, while the rear section would
be covered by a flat, or almost flat, shed roof. In contrast, a hip roof
characteristically inclines upward from the eaves on every side of the building
toward a ridge.
McDonald has conceded that he understood that the Planning Board wanted the
entire roof structure to be hipped so that it would show a pitch of 3 or 4 to 12
along each face. But the sketch he had prepared, copying the illustrative
elevation drawn by the Board's in-house architect, showed a roof change from
gable to hip, but without treating with particularity the roofing of the wing to
the rear of the building. At best McDonald's sketch was ambiguous as to what
was to be done about the roof of the rear wing. Cf. Covil v. Robert & Company
Associates, 1965, 112 Ga.App. 163, 144 S.E.2d 450. Utilizing this sketch and
the original plans for a gable and shed roof, the fabricator of the metal work
prepared working drawings and designed a skeleton appropriate for carrying a
roof over the rear wing pitched at not more than 1 to 12, though it could
accommodate 3 or 4 to 12 hips over the front section.
10
McDonald testified that technically a roof area with a 1 to 12 pitch was hipped,
since it was not quite flat, although he knew that was not what the Planning
Board required. However, he also testified that the contractor never showed
him the fabricator's working drawings. This testimony was explicitly
contradicted by the contractor's construction manager and principal witness,
Joseph Caudill, who testified that he had discussed with McDonald the
modification of the roof to provide hips with moderate pitch over the front
section while retaining a very low pitch for the rear wing, had later showed him
the fabricator's detailed shop drawings that incorporated these features and had
proceeded on the basis of the modified design only after McDonald had
approved it, first in general concept and then as shown in the fabricator's shop
drawings.
11
The district court, which sat without a jury, did not make a specific finding on
this disputed question of fact, but we read the court's opinion as implicitly
finding that McDonald was aware of and sanctioned the design of the roof for
the rear wing as it was in fact constructed.
12
13
The construction work relevant to the present controversy was undertaken and
nearly completed during the spring and summer of 1969, and McDonald
periodically certified this work to the owner for payment. Indeed, it was not
until October 30, 1969, after the public authorities, spurred by citizen
complaints, had questioned the design of the roof in place, that McDonald
qualified his earlier certification of this work with a notice to the contractor that
the roof was improperly designed and pitched. By so doing he recognized that
his professional responsibility extended to the monitoring of this aspect of the
work. Whether he did not observe sooner the very low pitch of a substantial
section of the framework for the roof or, having observed it, chose not to
inform the owner or the contractor that Planning Board requirements were not
being satisfied, the district court reasonably concluded that McDonald's
conduct did not exhibit the care and professional judgment required of an
architect to whom an owner has entrusted certification of work for progress
payments. "(T)he standards of reasonable care, which apply to the conduct of
architects, are the same as those applying to . . . like professional men engaged
in furnishing skilled services for compensation . . .." See Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Cerny & Associates, Inc., D.Minn.1961, 199 F.Supp. 951, 953. Cf. Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Hellmuth Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 8th Cir. 1968, 392 F.2d 472;
Nieman-Irving & Co. v. Lazenby, 1933, 263 N.Y. 91, 188 N.E. 265;
Restatement of Torts, 552. Here the finding of negligence is buttressed by the
fact that McDonald, acting for the landowner, was the professional who had
conducted the negotiations with the Planning Board that had culminated in the
hip roof requirement and the additional fact that his sketch of the required
modification was ambiguous.
14
15
We have not overlooked the fact that the construction contract incorporated a
letter that stipulated generally that the reconstruction must satisfy Planning
Board requirements. But, as between the principal parties, the builder was
entitled to treat sanction of the low pitch of the rear roof by the owner's
architect as the owner's own approval. Cf. Beattie Mfg. Co. v. Heinz, 1906, 120
Mo.App. 465, 97 S.W. 188. Of course, the architect's tardy disapproval, after
the Planning Board had indicated dissatisfaction with the substantially
completed roof, came too late to affect the issue of responsibility for delay. The
landowner was properly denied recovery from the contractor for delay in
completion of the building.1
16
The district court allowed the builder to recover from the landowner on
"Change Order No. 6", which both parties executed after the stop order to cover
the work and materials required to modify the then practically completed roof
to conform with Planning Board requirements. We agree with the district court
that as "between the contractor and the owner, General Trading must bear the .
. . (added expense) resulting from the negligence of its architect". Moreover, as
the court properly added, "General Trading nonetheless does have the right to
recover damages from McDonald to the extent of its losses that were directly
caused by McDonald's negligence".
17
The district court accorded separate consideration to several small items that
were included in the claims of the parties. We have examined each of these
items and find no reversible error in their disposition.
18
Finally, McDonald claims that General Trading owes him $7,000 pursuant to
his unpaid billing for certain architectural work. Apparently this work consisted
of the design of interiors, particularly for the first floor boutique. We find no
disposition of this claim in the opinion or in the judgment of the court. It should
be adjudicated, either on the present record alone or with a supplementary
evidentiary hearing as the district court shall deem just and proper.
19
Accordingly, the judgment as entered will be affirmed and the cause remanded
for further proceedings and whatever supplementary judgment may be
appropriate on McDonald's claim against General Trading for services
rendered.
20
The costs of Burnup and Sims in this court shall be awarded against General
Trading and McDonald. However, as concerns the controversy between
General Trading and McDonald, neither shall be awarded costs as against the
other.
The district court also found on this issue that proof of damage was inadequate