Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States of America Ex Rel. Frank Esola, 53517 v. Ronald M. Groomes, Superintendent, 520 F.2d 830, 3rd Cir. (1975)
United States of America Ex Rel. Frank Esola, 53517 v. Ronald M. Groomes, Superintendent, 520 F.2d 830, 3rd Cir. (1975)
2d 830
David M. Botwinick, and Eric J. Ludwig, Stark & Stark, Trenton, N. J.,
for appellant.
James M. Coleman, Jr., Monmouth County Prosecutor, and Charles E.
Shaw, III, Edward A. MacDuffie, Jr., Assistant County Prosecutors,
Freehold, N. J., for appellee.
Before FORMAN, VAN DUSEN and GARTH, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal challenges the district court order filed August 5, 1974, which
dismissed plaintiff's habeas corpus petition. We disagree with the lower court's
holding that no cause of action is presented by this claim arising under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers1 and therefore vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
On June 25, 1974, Frank Esola filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey and alleged the following
facts. On June 23, 1970, plaintiff was indicted by a Monmouth County, New
Jersey, grand jury for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and possession of
stolen property. On July 6, 1970, he was arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty,
and was released on $5,000 bail. On March 15, 1971, petitioner received a four
year sentence from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on an
unrelated charge and began service of the federal sentence.
3
On April 21, 1971, Esola was transferred via a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum2 from the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury,
Connecticut to Monmouth County, New Jersey, to stand trial. On April 27,
1971, he was returned to Danbury without having been tried. Thereafter, by
unspecified procedures, Esola was returned to Monmouth County on June 10,
1971, September 25, 1971, and January 6, 1972 for trial. During the January
transfer he was tried and convicted.3
It was further alleged that petitioner, following his return to Danbury after his
first transfer to New Jersey, requested the Danbury authorities not to allow any
future transfers because of a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
The request was refused.
On November 15, 1971, appellant filed a pro se motion in the state trial court to
dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Article IV(e) of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter Agreement). The motion was renewed
during trial and denied in an order dated February 18, 1972. On July 6, 1973,
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the conviction,
specifically rejecting the claim relating to a violation of the Agreement. On
November 27, 1973, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.
Neither the trial court nor the Appellate Division set forth reasons for denying
petitioner's claim.
State remedies having been exhausted, the instant habeas corpus proceeding
was initiated. Petitioner contended that he was entitled to have the state
conviction voided because New Jersey violated Article IV(e) of the Agreement,
N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4(e),4 when he was returned to Danbury without having
been brought to trial. In answer to the petition the Monmouth County
Prosecutor denied all of the factual allegations. The only state records which are
part of the record before this Court are the documents which were attached to
the habeas petition.
The district court held that state remedies had been exhausted as required by 28
U.S.C. 2254(b) but dismissed the petition, citing United States ex rel. Huntt v.
Russell, 285 F.Supp. 765 (E.D.Pa.1968), aff'd. 406 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1969).
Huntt involved a claim that an illegal extradition rendered a subsequent
conviction void. Based on a long line of Supreme Court cases5 rejecting this
contention, relief was denied. Huntt does not control this case, however,
because there was no assertion in that case that the rendition was violative of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.
8
Although the opinion of the court below did not state the procedural basis upon
which the petition was dismissed, the record is clear that the court treated the
respondent's answer as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), United States ex rel.
Gaugler v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 516, 523 (3d Cir. 1973), and granted the motion.
This Court's function is to determine whether, assuming all of the facts alleged
in the petition to be true, the petition states a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 2A Moore's Federal Practice P 12.08.6
10
Article III of the Agreement8 gives to a prisoner the right to demand disposition
of any untried indictment, information or complaint which is the subject of a
detainer lodged by a party state. If the trial is not commenced within 180 days
of the request and a continuance is not granted in open court, for good cause
shown, with the prisoner or his counsel present,9 then the appropriate court in
the jurisdiction in which the outstanding charge is pending shall enter an order
dismissing the criminal charges with prejudice.10 Thus, Article III is concerned
with providing a mechanism, capable of being invoked by a prisoner, to insure
the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial.11
11
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present. Finally, Article IV(e)14
provides that if the trial is not held prior to the prisoner's return to the sending
state, then the "indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further
force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice." The purpose of the Article IV provisions is to insure that
interruptions of the sending jurisdiction's incarceration are minimized, and in
exchange for the small added hardship placed on the prosecutor of the
demanding state regarding time limits, a simplified procedure for obtaining the
defendant's presence is made available.
12
With this basic statutory framework in mind, we turn to the issues presented by
this appeal.
I. JURISDICTION
13
14
"15The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is hereby enacted into law and entered into
by the United States on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of Columbia
with all jurisdictions legally joining in substantially the following form: . . .."
16
17
The habeas petition alleges that Esola, while an inmate of the Federal
Correctional Institution at Danbury, was transferred to Freehold, New Jersey,
on several occasions. As a federal prisoner, the transfer could have been
accomplished through the use of the Agreement. This was possible only
because both the sending jurisdiction, the United States, and the demanding
state, New Jersey, were both parties to the agreement. If the machinery created
by the Agreement had been used, then N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4(a) would have
entitled the Monmouth County Prosecutor to temporary custody of the prisoner
for the purpose of standing trial. In order to make this New Jersey entitlement
effective, 18 U.S.C. Appendix (1975 Supp.) Article IV(b) and Article V(a)
would have required the warden at Danbury to honor the request. It is clear that
the statutes of each jurisdiction are relevant and necessary to accomplish the
transfer.
18
19
We therefore hold that a claim, by a prisoner in federal custody at the time the
Detainers Agreement is invoked, arising under N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-1 et seq., as
it operates in conjunction with the federal enactment of the Agreement, 18
U.S.C. Appendix (1975 Supp.), is a claim arising under the " laws . . . of the
United States," within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2254.
20
As noted above at page 4, no hearing was held and the district court dismissed
the claim, treating the answer as a motion to dismiss under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)
(6). Under these circumstances, our discussion of the merits must treat the
allegations in the petition as true, since petitioner was given no hearing, trial or
other opportunity to prove his allegations. We express no opinion whatever on
the legal result which the district court should reach on remand when it has a
more complete record, but consider it necessary to comment on the contentions
made by respondent on this appeal for the assistance of the district court and
counsel on remand in view of our disagreement with several of such
contentions, particularly in light of the legislative history of P.L. 91-538 as
applied to this record.
22
Esola argues that, since he was transferred from Danbury to Freehold, New
Jersey, and returned to Danbury without having been tried, Article IV(e)
requires a dismissal of the indictment for which he is now serving a custodial
sentence. Article IV(e), N.J.S.A. 2A:159A-4(e), provides:
In order to rebut the Article IV(e) claim, the appellee offered two arguments in
its brief filed in this Court and a third contention was raised at oral argument.
25
First, the appellee contends that the five transfers in this case were pursuant to
writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by a state court and honored as
a matter of comity, by the Federal Bureau of Prisons.18 Since the request was
not made pursuant to Article IV of the Agreement, it is argued that the remedial
provisions could not be relevant. Further, the State at oral argument took the
position that the Agreement could not have been used in this case because,
following arraignment on the state charges and prior to his sentencing by the
district court, Esola was released on bail.19 Since he was on bail, no detainer
was or could have been lodged by the state with the federal prison. We think
both of these arguments must fail on these allegations because they
misconceive the broad nature of the Agreement and misconstrue the meaning of
It has been held that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, because it "is
obviously remedial in character(,) . . . should be construed liberally in favor of
(those whose problems were sought to be alleviated.)" State v. West, 79
N.J.Super. 379, 384, 191 A.2d 758, 760 (App.Div.1966); People v. Esposito,
37 Misc.2d 386, 201 N.Y.S.2d 83, 88 (1960).20 Those whose problems are
addressed in the Agreement are prisoners with outstanding criminal charges
from another jurisdiction. The purpose of the provision which this case brings
into issue is to minimize the adverse impact of a foreign prosecution on
rehabilitative programs of the confining jurisdiction. When a prisoner is
needlessly shuttled between two jurisdictions, then any meaningful
participation in an ongoing treatment program is effectively foreclosed for two
reasons. First, participation requires physical presence and the continuous
physical presence of a prisoner is not possible when multiple trips to a foreign
jurisdiction are made. Secondly, the psychological strain resulting from
uncertainty about any future sentence decreases an inmate's desire to take
advantage of institutional opportunities.21
27
These problems are well documented in the instant case. At least since April
21, 1971, the date of the first return to New Jersey, Frank Esola was aware that
the New Jersey authorities fully intended to prosecute him on the 1970
indictment. Yet it was not until February 18, 1972, nearly 10 months later, that
final sentence was pronounced. Between April 1971 and February 1972 there
were five interruptions of the Danbury incarceration. It is precisely this type of
situation which the Agreement was designed to eliminate. Were we to hold, as
New Jersey urges, that the machinery of the Agreement is not the exclusive
means of effecting a transfer for the purpose of prosecution on these
allegations, then Article IV(c), requiring prosecution within 120 days of arrival,
and Article IV(e), allowing for only one rendition, would be meaningless. As
one court cogently noted in construing a different section of the Agreement,
"By that view, this law has wax teeth and is little more than a legislative
exercise in futility." People v. Esposito, supra, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
28
Our holding that the Agreement provides the exclusive means of transfer when
it is available was foreshadowed by and is fully consistent with the recent case
of Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220 (3d Cir. 1974). Grant, a federal prisoner,
brought suit in a federal court seeking an order directing that the federal warden
"hold for naught" a detainer representing an untried indictment which had been
lodged by a state. The basis for the attack was a claimed denial of a speedy
trial. This Court held that absent unusual circumstances an attack on a detainer
must be preceded by a demand for trial pursuant to Article III of the
New Jersey next claims that it could not have used the Agreement in this case
because Esola had previously been released on bail on the outstanding
indictment and therefore the warden at Danbury could not have been requested
to "detain" Esola following his release on the federal sentence. This argument
must be rejected because its premise, that a detainer is a hold order, is incorrect.
30
The word "detainer," as it is used in the Agreement, is "a notification filed with
the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is
wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction." See Senate
Report 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p.
4865. This definition of a detainer from the Senate Report finds support in the
other legislative history of the Agreement and is consistent with the purposes of
the Agreement.
31
32
the prisoner does not waive extradition. Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No.
7500.14A(a), (b) and (d).26
33
In light of the fact that a detainer is only a document indicating that there are
pending criminal charges and a request to be notified of the impending release
date, the state's argument that New Jersey had no right to file a detainer and
thereby invoke the simplified transfer procedures of the Agreement must be
rejected.
34
New Jersey further contends that Article IV(e) of the Agreement, N.J.S.A.
2A:159A-4(e), was not violated by Esola's return to Danbury without having
been tried because the various continuances which were granted were for good
cause.
35
36
37
We emphasize that we decide no more in this case than that a cause of action is
stated by the apparent failure of New Jersey to comply with the terms of the
Agreement, and hence that further proceedings in the district court are required.
As was noted earlier in this opinion,29 there is a very incomplete record before
this Court, the state records not having been filed and the appellee having filed
as an answer to the petition only a general denial of Esola's factual allegations.
It is, therefore, necessary to remand this case to the District Court for the
development of a full record. From the briefs filed in this Court and from the
representations made at oral argument by counsel for appellee, there may be no
dispute with regard to facts which were alleged in the habeas petition. Since we
have determined that, under the facts alleged and because the relator is
confined, appellant would be entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
the District Court should consider this case on a proper record at its earliest
opportunity.
38
The judgment of the District Court will be vacated and the case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs taxed against the
appellee.
GARTH, Circuit Judge (concurring):
39
I agree with the majority of the Court that a federal question is presented by the
petition for habeas corpus and that the case must be remanded for further
proceedings. Nevertheless, I believe it important to note my disagreement with
the majority's jurisdictional analysis (Part I of the Majority Opinion) which
holds that the petition suffices as a claim alleging state "custody in violation of
the . . . laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. 2254(a); Majority Opinion at
834-836.
40
41
While the majority's analysis reaches the same result as the analysis set forth
below under the particular facts present here, it neither specifies nor articulates
the authority by which a state statute enacting the Agreement as a law of that
state can suddenly become a law of the United States when the Agreement is
enacted by the United States but "on its (the United States') own behalf and on
behalf of the District of Columbia . . .." 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix 2 (1975
Supp.).1 Nor does the majority's analysis answer the question of whether a
violation of the Agreement between two states, one of which is not the United
States would give rise to federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.
42
The majority's analysis also fails to provide a jurisdictional basis for a claim
arising out of a pre-1971 violation of the Agreement. This analytical failure is
evident even if the violation occurred as between the United States and another
party state let alone between two party states, one of which was not the United
States.
43
Finally, the theory advanced by the majority does not explain which law
governs in the interpretation and application of the Agreement in the courts of
each of the party states.
44
It is true, of course, that we are presented here only with a violation which took
place after March 9, 1971 and which involves only the United States and New
Jersey. Hence, as a general rule of jurisprudence, it could be expected that the
majority go no further than to decide whether the facts in this particular case
give rise to jurisdiction. However, I believe that as jurisdiction is at issue, the
majority's approach is too restricted. Instead, because federal jurisdiction is at
issue, all possible circumstances that may arise should be considered to
determine the validity and the soundness of the proposed jurisdictional theory.
45
46
47
In League to Save Lake Tahoe, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that congressional
sanction of an interstate agreement transformed it into a "law" of the United
States for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1331(a) jurisdiction. I believe that a similar
conclusion must be reached with respect to New Jersey's enactment of a
congressionally approved agreement.
49
50
I believe only the "Compact Clause" analysis provides the breadth of habeas
corpus availability in federal courts and the concomitant uniformity of
interpretation. Uniformity of interpretation is necessary as the Agreement deals
with more than local concerns; indeed, the remedial provisions of the
Agreement, by allowing relief only in the receiving jurisdiction, even for
violations occurring in the sending jurisdiction, encompasses and affects
activities beyond the control of a single state. 4 The majority's analysis seriously
jeopardizes the attainment of such a uniform interpretation. The possibility
exists under the majority's theory of jurisdiction, that the Agreement may be
interpreted by the same receiving state under two, potentially different,
standards of law: one being a federal standard (and then if at all, only after
March 9, 1971), where the United States is the sending jurisdiction, thus giving
a "federal" content to the Agreement, and the other being a state standard where
the sending jurisdiction is a state, thus permitting the Agreement to be
interpreted according to the law of one of the two states. In contrast to the
majority's view, the "Compact Clause" analysis would require that the courts of
the several jurisdictions (38 states plus the United States) which have enacted
the Agreement interpret the Agreement according to a single standard a federal
one. See note 3, supra.
51
The majority and I have reached the same conclusion as to the petition before
us, that is that habeas corpus jurisdiction is available in the federal courts. We
part company, however, in the respective routes chosen to reach this
conclusion. It would appear that the majority's route must either begin with the
United States at one end of the prisoner's transfer or terminate with the United
States at the other end. In my view, the majority's route is too narrow and
limited as it may deny a federal forum for habeas corpus relief to petitioners
with justifiable grievances arising out of actions by states where the United
States is not a party. Certainly this would be so under the majority's theory
where pre-1971 matters are in issue. I would hope that in time this Court will
depart from the narrow one-lane route constructed by the majority to traverse
the broader jurisdictional highway which I have outlined.
52
1974)
2
Appellant's brief filed in this Court states that there was a fifth transfer to New
Jersey for the purpose of sentencing. The state records appended to the habeas
corpus petition show that the sentencing occurred approximately one month
after the trial but do not reflect whether a separate transfer was effected for this
purpose. Since the case is being remanded, plaintiff will have an opportunity to
file a Motion to Amend his Petition in the District Court if he so desires
The petition names Ronald N. Groomes as the respondent. Esola has apparently
been transferred to another institution in New Jersey. After remand, a Motion to
Amend the Caption to reflect the new custodian should be entertained. United
States ex rel. Jennings v. Pennsylvania, 429 F.2d 522, 523 (3d Cir. 1970).
See, e. g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952);
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886)
Rule 81(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply to habeas corpus proceedings except to the extent that the procedure is
modified by statute
7
10
11
In Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969), decided
the year before federal enactment of the Agreement, the Court held that the
constitutional right to a speedy trial was not suspended because the state did not
have the power to compel the presence at trial of a defendant who was a
prisoner in another jurisdiction. There is some indication that the Smith
decision spurred the adoption of the Agreement by Congress. S.Rep.No.911356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) 3 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 4864
(1970)
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
It is the policy of the Bureau of Prisons to honor state court writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum absent some exceptional circumstances Bureau of
Prisons Policy Statement No. 7500. 14A(i). See also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S.
at 381, n.13, 89 S.Ct. 575
19
This factual assertion is consistent with the allegations contained in the habeas
petition
20
21
ineligible for probation or parole or for some of the more desirable work
assignments in prison. Also, if a defendant is uncertain as to whether he will
have to serve another jail term he is less likely to have the motivation to become
successfully rehabilitated. This latter consideration is especially important in
view of the fact that the basic purpose of the entire penal system is to prepare
its inmates to reenter society as law-abiding citizens." See also 116 Cong.Rec.
at 13999.
22
23
Insofar as United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1974), is
inconsistent with this decision, we decline to follow it on the facts of this case
24
25
26
Policy Statement 7500.14A states that warrants based on pending charges will
be treated as detainers, id. (a). It further provides that notice will be given to
the detaining authorities 60 days prior to release and advises that the detaining
authority should make arrangements with local authorities in the state where the
institution is located to take custody at the appropriate time, id. (b). Section
(d) states that if the prisoner does not sign a waiver of extradition then "the
detaining authorities should be notified immediately in order that they may
make their decisions with regard to the question of extradition," id. (d)
27
Respondent made no such allegation in its answer and implied at page 7 of its
brief that no such continuance was granted. For this reason, we need not meet,
on this record, the contention of respondent that Article IV(e) of the Agreement
is modified by Article IV(c)
28
New Jersey argues further that since it is liable for the costs of pretrial
incarceration under Article V(h), it would be unduly harsh to force them to bear
the expense of incarceration which, they assert, was necessarily very long in
this case. The response to this is that the scheme of the Agreement, to expedite
the disposition of the detainers, adds cost as one additional factor to encourage
careful planning and discourage the use of the Article IV(c) continuance.
Finally, the state asserts that the federal authorities at Danbury might have been
reluctant to agree to the extended temporary custody which is involved in this
case. The answer to this question is that had a proper Article IV(a) request for
temporary custody been made, absent intervention by the executive, Article
V(a) would have entitled New Jersey to such custody. The potential reluctance
of the Danbury authorities is no bar to the imposition of Article IV(e) sanctions
29
It would appear that the only tenable theory by which the majority could
support its thesis is one of contract, inasmuch as the Agreement itself refers to
"The contracting states solemnly agree that. . . ." 18 U.S.C.A. Appendix 2
(1975 Supp.) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, 2 by its terms appears in a
contract context, i. e., "the Interstate Agreement. . . is hereby enacted into law
and entered into by the United States . . . with all jurisdictions legally joining in
(enactment of the Agreement) . . .." Id. (emphasis supplied). Nothing, however,
appears in the Majority Opinion to indicate that the federal law concept arises
out of a contract by the United States with the other party states. If in fact that
is the underlying and implicit authority of the Majority Opinion, I nevertheless
am of the view that there are shortcomings to such a jurisdictional predicate,
some of which are indicated in the text of this Concurring Opinion
I recognize, as does the majority, that the enactment of the Agreement by each
party state is undoubtedly in identical statutory terms. Nevertheless, the gloss
which may be imparted by the courts to identical language may vary
significantly among the states which have separately enacted the Agreement. It
is for this reason that I consider the need for a uniform interpretation of the
Agreement to be significant, and indeed mandatory
Although the courts of each jurisdiction which has enacted the Agreement are
to interpret and apply their own respective statutes, it is only in the courts of the
receiving party state (here New Jersey) that remedies are available for
noncompliance with the Agreement. As the remedy provided by the Agreement
for acts of noncompliance is dismissal of the indictment "with prejudice", it
follows that any allegations that the Agreement has been violated are to be
presented to and resolved by only the courts of the jurisdiction where the