Not Precedential

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-4689
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SELENA A. SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
BANK OF AMERICA; BANK OF AMERICA CONSUMER CREDIT;
BANK OF AMERICA FUNDING, LLC; CAVALRY SPV I, LLC;
JOHN DOES 1-100
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania


(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-00987)
District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 20, 2014
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 3, 2014)
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OPINION *
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge
I.
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Selena A. Scott opened a credit card account with Bank of America/FIA Card
Services, N.A. (Bank of America) in 2005. It securitized the receivables from
Scotts and other credit card accounts, and sold them to a trust under a so-called Pooling
and Servicing Agreement. This movea typical one by credit card issuersprovides
steady liquidity for card issuers and transfer[s] most downside credit risk on the
card[.] Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card
Securitization, 81 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 813 (2013).
Scotts account became delinquent on June 30, 2009. After the default, Bank of
America charged-off her account (i.e., wrote the debt off as uncollectable). It then
sold Scotts debt to Cavalry SPV I, LLC (Cavalry), and Cavalry in turn filed a
collection action against Scott seeking $3,936.54 (the amount Scott owed) plus interest.
Scotts counsel notified Cavalry of its belief that Bank of America did not have an
interest in Scotts account to transfer, and Cavalry promptly withdrew its suit.
Motivated by her apparent victory, Scott filed a class-action complaint against,
among others, Bank of America and Cavalry alleging violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit
Extension Uniformity Act, 73 PA. CONS. STAT. 2270.1 et seq. In an amendment to that
complaint, she further alleged violations of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et
seq., and Pennsylvanias Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA.
CONS. STAT. 201.1 et seq. Underlying all of Scotts allegations was her belief that
Bank of America had nothing to transfer to Cavalry once it securitized the receivables
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from Scotts account. Thus, Cavalrys attempt to collect the amount Scott owed was
unlawful.
Bank of America and Cavalry moved to dismiss Scotts Amended Complaint,
arguing that the critical premise on which Scotts claims relythat once a credit card
company securitizes the receivables of a credit card account, it no longer retains an
ownership interest in the accountis incorrect. The District Court granted the motion to
dismiss with prejudice. Scott appeals that dismissal. We affirm in all respects. 1
II.
Scott renews the argument she advanced before the District Court: because Bank
of America lost any interest in Scotts credit card account once it securitized and sold the
receivables, it had nothing to transfer to Cavalry. Thus, Cavalrys attempt to collect on
the amount she owed was unlawful.
Scott misapprehends the effect of securitizing a credit card receivable. Credit
card securitization involves the securitization solely of the receivables, not of the
accounts themselves. Levitin, supra at 826; see also J.A. 15455 (Pooling & Servicing
Agr. 2.01) (providing that Bank of America was selling only the receivables associated
with the credit card accounts, not ownership of the accounts). Thus, even after
securitization the card issuer retains an ownership interest in the account.
The courts that have considered the effect of securitizing credit card receivables
are all in agreement that it does not divest the issuer of its ownership interest in the credit

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1332. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
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card accounts. See, e.g., Tostado v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., No. 09-CV-549, 2010
WL 55976, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2010) (assignment of receivables does not prevent a
credit card issuer from recovering past-due credit card charges because, as the real party
in interest, the issuer retains the right to enforce its interest on [its] accounts and
loans); Shade v. Bank of America, No. 2:08-cv-1069, 2009 WL 5198176, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 23, 2009) (plaintiff has provided no binding legal authority for his theory that
because Bank of America securitized the account balances, it was no longer the real party
in interest and could not assign the debt for collection to the other defendants).
In addition, once Scotts account fell into default, the Pooling and Servicing
Agreement provides that ownership of these Ineligible Receivables automatically
reverts to Bank of America. See J.A. 160-61 (Pooling & Servicing Agr. 2.04(d)(ii)
(iii)). At that pointand regardless whether as a general matter ownership of a credit
card account can be divorced from ownership of the accounts receivablesthe Pooling
and Servicing Agreement placed ownership of the receivables squarely back in Bank of
Americas hands.
For these reasons, we affirm.

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