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Not Precedential
Not Precedential
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. 401-34, 1381-83f. Because we perceive no legal error and the Administrative
Law Judges (ALJ) decision is supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.
I.
Dority was born on July 23, 1958 and has previous work experience as a home
health aide, teachers aide, school crossing guard, daycare operator, deli clerk, cashier,
and cosmetologist. She initially filed an application for disability benefits under Title II
and Title XVI of the Social Security Act in June 2006, alleging that she is disabled due to
degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine and diabetes mellitus with neuropathy and
retinopathy. The Social Security Administration denied her claim, the ALJ affirmed, and
the Appeals Council denied her request to review the decision.
Dority then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, which reversed and remanded on the ground that the ALJs
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The District Court also ordered the
ALJ to conduct a new hearing, to obtain medical evidence from a physician, and to fully
develop the record. On remand, the ALJ heard testimony from Dr. Robert Sklaroff, a
medical expert and physician, and Dr. Carolyn Rutherford, a vocational expert, and again
denied her application for social security benefits, finding that she was not disabled.
After the Appeals Council denied Doritys request for review, the District Court held that
the ALJs decision was supported by substantial evidence and affirmed the denial of
benefits.
Dority now appeals the District Courts order affirming the ALJs decision. The
District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g), and we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
II.
The Social Security Administration follows a five-step process to determine
whether an individual is disabled.1 Consistent with that process, the ALJ found that
Dority (1) has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset
date; (2) has severe impairments, namely diabetes mellitus, discogenic disease,
fibromyalgia, and obesity; (3) does not have a severe impairment that meets or medically
equals the severity of the listed impairments; (4) has the residual functional capacity to
perform a light range of work; and (5) is capable of performing past relevant work as a
home health aide and teachers aide. On the basis of these findings, the ALJ concluded
Dority was not disabled.
therefore demonstrates that the ALJs decision, including the weight the ALJ ascribed to
the testimony of various medical experts, is supported by substantial evidence.
Dority next asserts that the ALJ committed reversible error by ignoring her
testimony about the severe restrictions on her daily activities and the intensity and
persistence of her symptoms. In assessing an applicants credibility, an ALJ must
consider the extent to which [the claimants] symptoms can reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, including the
opinions of medical experts. 20 C.F.R. 404.1512(b)(1)(i)-(viii); 404.1529(a).
[S]tatements about [the claimants] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that
[the claimant is] disabled. 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(a).
The ALJ here fulfilled that mandate by considering Doritys testimony in the
context of the medical evidence. The ALJ noted, among other things, that Dr. Sklaroff
testified that although Dority was insulin-dependent, her diabetes was under control, and
that, despite her complaints of back pain, she had minimal evidence of neuropathy, no
evidence of radiculopathy, and only mild stenosis with no disk disease. Substantial
evidence therefore supports the ALJs finding that Doritys statements were not credible
to the extent that they conflicted with the medical evidence.
Doritys final argument, that the ALJ improperly substituted her own medical
opinion for the opinions of medical experts, also fails because it lacks support in the
record. The ALJs opinion in fact relied heavily on the expert testimony of Dr. Sklaroff,
Dr. Olewiler, and Dr. Rutherford and their analyses of the medical evidence.
III.
Because there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJs denial of benefits, we
will affirm the decision of the District Court.