United States v. Edward Ross, 3rd Cir. (2015)
United States v. Edward Ross, 3rd Cir. (2015)
Will W. Sachse
Katherine U. Davis
Ellen L. Mossman
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
18th Fl., Cira Centre
Philadelphia, PA 19104
John McClam (Law Student) (ARGUED)
University of Pennsylvania School of Law
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellant
Emily McKillip
Floyd J. Miller
Robert A. Zauzmer (ARGUED)
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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BACKGROUND
A.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DISCUSSION1
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F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court has
distilled a three-part test for deciding what constitutes
custody: the restraints on the petitioner must be (1) severe, (2)
immediate (i.e., not speculative), and (3) not shared by the
public generally. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351-53; Ira P Robbins,
Habeas Corpus Checklists 465 (2014-2015 ed.).
We have not previously considered whether a
monetary penalty such as the $100 special assessment
associated with Rosss conviction under 922(o) is a severe
restraint on a defendants individual liberty, but the answer
must be no. Supreme Court decisions holding that a
petitioner suffered from a severe restraint on liberty have
emphasized the physical nature of the restraints. Hensley,
411 U.S. at 351 (emphasizing that the petitioner cannot
come and go as he pleases and that his freedom of
movement rests in the hands of state judicial officers, who
may demand his presence at any time and without a
moments notice); Peyton, 391 U.S. at 67 (1968) (holding
that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is in custody
under any one of them); Jones, 371 U.S. at 242 (Petitioner
is confined by the parole order to a particular community,
house, and job at the sufferance of his parole officer. He
cannot drive a car without permission.). Our sister circuits
have followed the Supreme Courts lead. See Calhoun v.
Atty Gen. of Colo., 745 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the requirement to register under state sex
offender registration statute does not satisfy the in custody
requirement because it involves no physical restraint), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 376 (2014); Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d
707, 718 (7th Cir. 2008) ([T]he collateral consequences of a
conviction, those consequences with negligible effects on a
petitioners physical liberty of movement, are insufficient to
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COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
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CONCLUSION
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