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United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
2d 448
In 1978, Respondent Kovalchick filed a claim for medical benefits under Part
C of the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901 (1978). Petitioner Elliot
Coal Mining Company ("Petitioner") contested both Kovalchick's entitlement to
benefits and Respondent Director's identification of Petitioner as a responsible
operator under 30 U.S.C. 802(d) (1977).1
On October 24, 1984, an Administrative Law Judge issued a decision and order
finding that Petitioner was not a responsible operator. On June 30, 1988, the
Benefits Review Board issued a decision and order reversing the ALJ's finding
on the responsible operator issue and remanding the case for consideration on
the merits of Kovalchick's entitlement to benefits. Petitioner sought review of
the Board's decision of June 30, 1988, and the petition for review was
dismissed by this court on May 19, 1989.
The ALJ entered a decision and order on remand on January 28, 1991. The ALJ
amended its decision and order on May 6, 1991, and again on May 14, 1991.
Petitioner appealed the ALJ's decision and order to the Benefits Review Board
on June 12, 1991. On June 13, 1991, Petitioner filed with this court a "Petition
for Review To Set Aside Amended Decision or in the Alternative Petition To
Reopen Previous Petition for Review." On July 1, 1991, Respondent Director
moved this court to dismiss the instant petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner, citing National Steel & Shipbuilding v. Director, OWCP, 703 F.2d
417 (9th Cir.1983), asks us to accept jurisdiction. In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted jurisdiction over an employer's
appeal from an ALJ's decision on remand on the ground that an appeal to the
Benefits Review Board would have been futile, because the Board was bound
by its prior decision as law of the case.
7
When
National Steel filed its current petition for review, the time for further review
before the BRB had passed and neither side had appealed to the Board. The threat of
confusion from concurrent jurisdiction no longer exists.
8
We therefore hold that the ruling of the Board on [claimant's] permanent loss of
vision is final and that we have jurisdiction over this petition.
703 F.2d at 418-19 (footnotes and citations omitted). In the instant case, the
employer did appeal to the Benefits Review Board (on the day before it filed
the instant petition for review). In this case, therefore, there is a "threat of
confusion from concurrent jurisdiction."
10
Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit went on to note:
703 F.2d at 419 n. 3 (emphasis in original). We agree that this is the proper
procedure.
13
Even if National Steel were not distinguishable, we would decline to follow it.
As noted above, the authority of this court to review administrative decisions
under the Black Lung Benefits Act stems from 33 U.S.C. 921(c), as
incorporated by 30 U.S.C. 932(a), which allows this court to review a "final
order of the Board." Sun Shipbuilding, 535 F.2d at 760. That provision is
jurisdictional. Shendock v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d 1458 (3d Cir.1990). This
court may not expand its own jurisdiction on the ground that to do so would be
expeditious.
14
We hold that 33 U.S.C. 921(c), which allows this court to review a "final
order of the Board," does not grant this court jurisdiction to review an order of
an administrative law judge upon which the Board has not yet passed. Because
the Board has not yet issued a final order in this case, the petition for review is
hereby dismissed as interlocutory.
15