Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Richard A. Ash, On Behalf of Himself, and On Behalf of Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Stewart S. Cort, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Nominaldefendant, 496 F.2d 416, 3rd Cir. (1974)
Richard A. Ash, On Behalf of Himself, and On Behalf of Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Stewart S. Cort, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Nominaldefendant, 496 F.2d 416, 3rd Cir. (1974)
2d 416
The district court's order granting summary judgment merely recited that no
material factual dispute existed and that defendants were not liable to plaintiff
for the claimed violation of federal law. We presume that this assertion was
bottomed on the findings and conclusions relied upon by the district court to
support its earlier denial of a preliminary injunction. See 350 F.Supp. 227
(E.D.Pa.1972). Defendants argue on appeal the propriety of those findings and
conclusions and urge that the summary judgment be affirmed on that basis. The
major points of the district court's decision are that plaintiff would have no
cause of action from defendants' violation of 18 U.S.C. 610 (1970), as amended
(Supp. II 1972), and that, in any event, defendants did not violate 610.
I.
Plaintiff's standing is not defeated by the fact that his injuries are shared by
countless others. Although the Supreme Court's language in Froth ingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923), indicated that
an injury to many might confer standing to none, Flast intimates that
Frothingham stated policy, not constitutional dogma, Flast v. Cohen,supra, 392
U.S. at 93-94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, and SCRAP declared that standing is not lost
10
To find a cause of action 'implied' in a statute, we must determine (1) that the
provision violated was designed to protect a class of persons including the
plaintiff from the harm of which plaintiff complains and (2) that it is
appropriate, in light of the statute's purposes, to afford plaintiff the remedy
sought. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395-397, 91
S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191, 200-202, 88 S.Ct. 379, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431-435, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). Finding an implied
cause pursuant to these criteria is not entirely an exercise in divining legislative
intent. Certainly, legislative intent is relevant; where the legislature clearly has
indicated its intent to grant or withhold a cause of action, implicitly or
explicitly, courts will give effect to that intent. E.g., National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railorad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
458-461, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974). Absent some reasonably clear
12
For the Amtrak rule to apply, the statute must expressly provide the plaintiff a
remedy that may logically be said to be exclusive. In Amtrak, the remedy
expressly provided to correct the harm of which plaintiffs complained was a
civil action prosecuted by the Attorney General. 45 U.S.C. 547 (1970). In the
instant case no express civil action is provided to remedy plaintiff's, or any
other, alleged injury.4 Only a criminal sanction is expressly provided for
violation of 610. Courts have consistently held that statutes rpoviding for
criminal liability do not preclude assertion of private causes of action. E.g.,
Wyandotte Co. v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. at 200-202, 88 S.Ct. 379;
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 3941, 35 S.Ct. 482, 60
L.Ed. 874 (1916). In Rigsby the Supreme Court, inferring a private cause of
action for violation of a criminal provision, distinguished 'remedial' from 'penal'
application of a statute. Id. at 41, 36 S.Ct. 482. Thus, since 610 cannot be said
to provide any remedy for the alleged harm to plaintiff here, Amtrak would not
preclude finding an implied cause.
Statutory Design
13
Our inquiry, then, must be, first, whether 610 was designed to protect plaintiff
from the harm he alleges. Section 610 is the end-product of a series of
enactments limiting campaign giving and spending. See United States v. UAW,
352 U.S. 567, 570-584, 77 S.Ct. 529, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957). In discussing the
seminal federal limitation on corporate campaign contributions, carried forward
into the present 610, the Supreme Court stated that it was 'motivated by two
considerations. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elections
which corporations exercised through financial contribution. Second, the
feeling that corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for
contribution to political parties without the consent of the stockholders.' United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948).
14
As a voter and citizen, plaintiff is within the class Congress sought to protect
by prohibiting corporate expenditures in campaigns for federal office;
Congress, in the various enactments embodied in 610, declared its view that
such expenditures reduced the ability of voters to secure a government
responsive to their wishes and increased the likelihood of governmental actions
favorable to particular economic blocs but inimical to the general welfare. Id.;
117 Cong.Rec. 43379-81 (1971) (remarks of Congressman Hansen).
15
16
17
19
20
21
22
The district court concluded, defendants contend rightly, that even if plaintiff
were found to have a cause of action under 610, defendants would be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 350 F.Supp. at 231-232. The court decided that the
meaning of 'contribution or expenditure' in 610 was governed by the definition
of those terms in 18 U.S.C. 591 (1970), as amended (Supp. II 1972); that 591
requires a purpose to influence the nomination or election of a particular
person; and that defendants' advertisements and pamphlets were designed not to
influence election of any person but to advocate an honest campaign and
'respond to an accusation leveled against the business community.' Id. Plaintiff
contests and defendants support each of these conclusions.
Scope of 610
23
24
When used in sections 597, 599, 600, 602, 608, 610 and 611 of this title--
25
26
27
Section 610, as pertinent, states that 'as used in this section, the phrase
'contribution or expenditure' shall include any direct or indirect payment . . . to
The definition given 'expenditure' in both sections traces back to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, P.L. 92-225, Title II, 201, 205,86 Stat. 3. The
drafters clearly intended 591's definition to affect interpretation of 610, for they
expressly provided that the definitions in 591 applied to use of those terms in
610. We note also that 591 indicates the 'meaning' of expenditure while 610
only indicates certain matters 'included' in that term. We therefore read 610 as
supplementing rather than replacing 591's definition. Nothing specifically
included as an expenditure for 610, however, covers Bethlehem's challenged
actions. Thus, it appears that the district court was correct in concluding that
Bethlehem's challenged expenditures are not proscribed unless they fall within
591's definition of 'expenditure.'
29
30
31
The expenditures challenged here were for activities that would not seem to
have the hallmarks of a 'get-out-the-vote' drive-- Bethlehem's communications
were in writing and aimed at the entire public, rather than selected portions, so
their partisanship, if any, could be readily determined. We would not, on the
present record, find Bethlehem's expenditures for these communications, if
non-partisan, to be proscribed by any prohibition on non-partisan get-out-thevote drives that may be implicit in 610. We turn to the inclusion or exclusion of
these expenditures from the definition of that term in 591.
32
The district court found that Bethlehem's expenditures were non-partisan and
thus outside the sweep of 591 and, hence, of 610. This finding rests on the fact
that no candidate or party was named in the corporation's ad and pamphlet.
Unless 591 requires that a candidate or party be named, the district court's grant
of summary judgment cannot be upheld; the partisanship of Bethlehem's
statements is a factual question as to which the parties are in dispute,9 and on
summary judgment we must accept as true plaintiff's allegation of partisanship.
See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1973).
33
34
35
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
36
37
Standing in this case does not trouble me. This is not a taxpayer's suit, Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923); nor suit to obtain
judicial review of agency action, United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254
(1973), Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636
(1970), Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); nor a vater's complaint
alleging impairment of his right to vote, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct.
691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Only the damages aspect of the complaint has
survived the mootness of the injunctive request. Thus, the claim is reduced to a
garden variety case or controversy in which a plaintiff stockholder asserts
economic harm to the corporation for which he has standing derivatively on
behalf of the corporation. Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 323 (1971).
38
39
The standing issue aside, I would affirm the district court because I find that
Congress has not provided a civil remedy for the plaintiff expressly or by
implication. While an implied right of action may be rationalized with
considerable persuasion, this can be done only by defying the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncement in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National
Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d
646 (1974) (Amtrak). I see Amtrak to be a definite singnal to the courts of
appeal and district courts to decelerate use of excerpts from Justice Clark's
opinion in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-432, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12
L.Ed.2d 423 (1964), to find implied civil remedies not expressly authorized by
Congress. Three bright warning lights were flashed in Amtrak:
40
41
42
43
in Part I.' 359 U.S. at 471, 79 S.Ct. at 908. I would apply the ratio decidendi of
T.I.M.E., Inc., to these proceedings.
44
Further, Congress recently has had occasion to reexamine 610. In the course of
amending this section and enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
Congress did not provide a private remedy to supplement the express criminal
sanctions.
45
46
We recognize that the tripartite classification of governmental powers-legislative, executive and judicial-- has no absolutes, and that governmental
functions are not easily defined as 'legislative', 'executive' or 'judicial'. But in
the cases at bar the substantive rights relied upon by the appellants have been
promulgated by Congress in the exercise of its power to enact penal statutes. In
effect, appellants urge this court, under its classical adjudicative power, to
legislate. When Congress was dealing with the subject matter of the statutes
here involved, it was capable of clearly and directly providing the rights and
remedies urged by the appellants.
II.
47
I am persuaded that this is a classic case for the application of Amtrak's second
principle which teaches: 'when legislation expressly provides a particular
remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to
subsume other remedies.' A legislative schema expressly providing for a private
remedy in one title of the Act and not in another title would call into play the
familiar 'principle of statutory construction (reflecting) an ancient maxim-expressio unius est exclusio alterius.'
III.
48
Amtrak's third principle, that statutory construction must yield to clear contrary
legislative intent, renews the previous emphasis on Congressional intent. But
appellant conceded at oral argument that the Congressional history is devoid of
any reference to a private civil remedy. Therefore, we lack any semblance of
It seems to me, therefore, that a discussion of the necessity for destroying the
influence over elections which corporations exercise through financial
contributions and the recognition that corporate officials have no right to use
corporate funds improperly, United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 113, 68
S.Ct. 1349, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948), is simply irrelevant to the narrow issue
posed by this appeal: whether it can be properly concluded that a private civil
right of action may be implied to supplement the penal provisions of Title II.
Our polestar is Congressional intention. To imply such a right is to presume
that Congress intended to provide for such an action, but overlooked its
inclusion when the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was originally enacted, and
that Congress overlooked it again when it enacted the comprehensive Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. I cannot impute such derelictions to a
Congress vitally concerned in a matter so universally discussed and the subject
of manifest, if not all-consuming, public interest.
50
51
this, because it is the Congress, and not the federal judiciary, which creates
subject matter jurisdiction for the federal courts. See, Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How.
440, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850); Ex Parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264
(1869).
52
I am persuaded that the Amtrak court could not fail to notice the plethora of
implied civil remedy cases which arose from an unrestricted application of J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak, supra, and an overgenerous use of Justice Black's
overgenerous quotation in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777,
90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), that 'federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done.' I am convinced that the Amtrak court consciously and
deliberately applied the brakes and meant exactly what it said when it declared
that a 'private cause of action not otherwise authorized by the statute' may not
be implied in the absence of clear 'evidence of legislative intent.'
53
54
Because I cannot begin to accept this notion, I would affirm the judgment of the
district court.
Plaintiff in his amended complaint has dropped the allegations contained in the
state law count of his original complaint. One allegation from the federal count
of the original complaint and carried over verbatim in the amended version,
however, declares, without elaboration that defendants violated both state and
federal law. Defendants, presuming that plaintiff thus had not abandoned his
state claim, moved for summary judgment on the federal claim and dismissal of
plaintiff's pendent state claim for want of jurisdiction following judgment for
defendants on the only federal matter. The district court does not mention
plaintiff's state claim, but merely grants defendants' motion. We assume that if
plaintiff did not abandon his state law claim, the district court's order dismissed
that claim for want of federal jurisdiction but do not reach the dismissal's
propriety
2
Since the controversy between plaintiff and defendants is not moot, the
viability of plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief must be determined, if plaintiff
prevails on the merits, according to settled principles controlling the district
court's discretion to grant or withhold injunctive relief. See J. Moore, 7 Moore's
Federal Practice P65.18(3) (2d ed. 1969)
The extent to which the Supreme Court relied on the rule of statutory
construction in Amtrak is unclear. After announcing the rule, the Court went on
to find evidence of a clear legislative intent to withhold the remedy sought,
National R.R. Pass. Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pass., 414 U.S. 453, 458461, 94 S.Ct. 690, 693-695, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974); the Court also examined
the policies, as it conceived them, behind the 'Amtrak Act', Railroad Passenger
Service Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. 501 et seq. (1970), and found that implication
of a private remedy there would be inconsistent with those policies, id. at 461464, 94 S.Ct. 690
Among reasons cited by the district judge for concluding that plaintiff lacked a
cause of action was his unwillingness to 'assume the partisan enforcement of
the Act as plaintiff suggests.' 350 F.Supp. at 231. We make no such assumption
here. While plaintiff has alleged, and presumably stands ready to prove,
partisan enforcement of 610, our finding of a cause of action is supported
simply by the possibility of such enforcement, or non-enforcement-- presence
or absence of actual partisan enforcement in this case is irrelevant to our
determination
United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U.S. 153,
156, 73 S.Ct. 609, 612, 97 L.Ed. 918 (1953)