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United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
2d 599
judgment in favor of the defendants in this action brought pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621 et seq.
(1982). Jurisdiction for this appeal exists under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982).
I.
2
On March 15, 1982, plaintiffs filed age discrimination charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") against Follmer, North
Penn Transfer, Incorporated ("North Penn") and Local 776 of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters ("Local 776"), the union representing the Harrisburg
employees. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' Change of Operations plan
discriminated against them on the basis of their age because it deprived them of
their prior seniority, causing plaintiffs to be treated less favorably than younger
employees who were on layoff status at the remaining Follmer terminals.
Plaintiffs also raised a claim of unlawful retaliation, contending that they had
been terminated because of their continued opposition to the loss of their
seniority.
The court ruled against plaintiffs on the tolling issue and entered judgment in
favor of the defendants. This appeal followed. Defendants Follmer and North
Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing the facts necessary to justify equitable
tolling. See Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1162 (3d
Cir.1979). The district court held that they had not satisfied this burden and
further found that the required notices had been properly posted during the
relevant period in both the Hummels' Wharf and Harrisburg terminals.
Plaintiffs assert two bases for attacking the district court's findings of fact. First,
they argue that the district court erred in finding that a notice had been posted
at the Hummels' Wharf terminal. Second, they contend that the district court's
findings with respect to the Harrisburg terminal are inadequate because the
court failed to find that the required notice had been conspicuously posted. To
succeed on these contentions, plaintiffs must demonstrate to us that the district
court's findings are clearly erroneous.
Plaintiffs simply failed to rebut this inference. Although some of the plaintiffs
testified that they had never seen an age discrimination poster at Hummels'
Wharf, their testimony was largely discredited by their prior inconsistent
deposition statements and by their admissions on rebuttal that they either did
not remember or did not pay much attention to whether the required notices had
been posted. See Butz v. Hertz Corporation, 554 F.Supp. 1178, 1182
(W.D.Pa.1983) (claimant's mere assertion that she had no knowledge of age
discrimination poster not sufficient to toll limitations period). Given these
inconsistencies, the district court could fairly find that plaintiffs' testimony was
not credible. The district court's factual finding is not clearly erroneous.
10
Plaintiffs do not challenge the district court's finding that an age discrimination
notice had been posted in the vestibule of the Harrisburg terminal. However,
they argue that the district court's findings were inadequate as a matter of law
insofar as they do not indicate whether the notice had been posted in a
conspicuous manner as required under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 627. We
do not agree. The court specifically found that the age discrimination poster
was located in an area "where employees would be likely to see [it]" on their
way to work. App. at 442. We construe this language to be a finding by the
district court that the age discrimination notice was conspicuously posted. That
finding is not clearly erroneous.
11
We therefore conclude that the 300-day filing period had not been tolled. All of
plaintiffs' claims which arose more than 300 days prior to the commencement
of EEOC proceedings are time-barred. Hence, the only remaining charge that is
arguably timely is plaintiff Kline's retaliation claim.
B. Kline's Retaliation Claim
12
Kline contends that his status as a temporary or casual basis employee was
terminated in August of 1981 in retaliation for his continued opposition to the
loss of his seniority under the Change of Operations. He argues that this is a
separate act of unlawful discrimination and that the EEOC charge was timely
filed with respect to this claim. Defendants concede that Kline's claim would be
timely if his termination is considered a separate discriminatory event. They
maintain, however, that Follmer's decision to terminate Kline was not an act of
retaliation but was merely an inevitable consequence of the original allegedly
discriminatory practice, i.e., the closing of the Hummels' Wharf terminal
pursuant to the Change of Operations plan. See Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New
Jersey Department of Civil Service, 667 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied,
458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982).
13
The district court did not make any findings of fact as to the circumstances
underlying Kline's termination. Arguably, the court could have found that
Kline's termination was the result of unlawful retaliation. An employer may not
discharge an employee for opposing practices made unlawful by the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. Sec. 623(d). We will therefore vacate the judgment with respect to
Kline's retaliation claim and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing and
appropriate findings.
C. Defendants' Cross-Appeal
14
Since we have determined that the claims of plaintiffs Byers, Schell and
Wagner were not timely filed, we will affirm the district court's judgment as to
them. We therefore find it unnecessary to reach the merits of defendants' crossappeal. With respect to Kline's retaliation claim, we will consider the crossappeal as asserting an alternative basis for affirming the district court.
15
Defendants urge that they are entitled to judgment as matter of law because
Kline's termination could not have been the result of any unlawful retaliation.
The ADEA makes it illegal for an employer to discriminate against an
employee or job applicant because that individual has either (1) filed charges
with the EEOC or assisted in any manner with an ADEA investigation or
proceeding; or (2) opposed a practice made illegal under the ADEA. See 29
U.S.C. Sec. 623(d). It is, of course, true that Kline could not have been
discharged in retaliation for his filing of EEOC charges since those charges
were filed several months after his termination.
16
17
We cannot tell from the record presented to us whether this issue was
specifically addressed by the district court in denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment. We believe that such an argument should be explicitly
addressed by the district court in the first instance. We will therefore remand
this claim for appropriate consideration.
III.
18
The Honorable James T. Giles of the United States District Court for the