Not Precedential
Not Precedential
No. 10-2187
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THE BOBRICK CORPORATION; BOBRICK WASHROOM EQUIPMENT;
THE HORNYAK GROUP, INC.,
Appellants
v.
SANTANA PRODUCTS, INC., SANTANA PRODUCTS LIQUIDATING TRUST;
MICHAEL T. LYNCH, SR.; MICHAEL T. LYNCH JR.; JOHN A. CARNEY;
JAMES M. GAVIGAN; WILLIAM E. JACKSON, ESQ.
_____________
OPINION
_____________
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Bobrick and Hornyak named Santana Products, Santana Products Liquidating Trust,
Michael T. Lynch, Sr., Michael T. Lynch Jr., John A. Carney, James M. Gavigan and
William E. Jackson, Santanas attorney in the underlying action, (collectively Santana),
as defendants. Michael T. Lynch, Sr., was the owner and operator of Santana during the
relevant time period. Lynch, Jr., Carney, and Gavigan were alleged to be part of the
group responsible for the underlying litigation.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332. We have jurisdiction
over this final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.
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sub judice, Bobrick v. Santana, 698 F.Supp.2d 479 (M.D. Pa. 2010). Therefore, because
we write only for the parties and assume their familiarity with the factual and procedural
history of this case, we will set forth only the information necessary for resolution of the
issues before us.
In 1996, Santana filed a complaint alleging that Bobrick, Hornyak, and another
sales representative, Vogel Sales Company, were informing government architects that
Santanas products posed a hazard under the fire safety codes in order to induce the
government to specify Bobricks products for use in its projects. The complaint alleged
violations of Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1-2, and a state law claim of tortious interference with a
prospective contract.
In 2003, following three years of discovery that included 270 subpoenas, the
deposition of 200 witnesses, the inspection of over a million pages of documents, and
exchanges of 550,000 documents, the District Court issued an eighty-three page decision
granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the Sherman Act and state law
claims, but denying summary judgment on the Lanham Act claim. Santana Products,
Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc., 249 F.Supp.2d 463 (M.D. Pa. 2003).3
In Bobrick I, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on the Sherman Act, Section 1 claim and the state law claim of tortious
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Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1274-75 (Pa. 2006). As for Count Two, the Pennsylvania
common law tort of abuse of process permits a plaintiff to recover if he can show that
the defendant used legal process against the plaintiff in a way that constituted a
perversion of that process and caused harm to the plaintiff. Gen. Refractories Co. v.
Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2003).
On October 18, 2007, Santana and Jackson filed a joint motion to dismiss. On
February 26, 2008, the District Court issued an order staying discovery, but permitted the
deposition of one additional person. Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was held on
June 27, 2008.
On March 22, 2010, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. After
examining the plain language of the Dragonetti Act, its purpose, and the court cases
tackling the issue, the District Court concluded that a Dragonetti Act claim is not made
out if there was probable cause for any of the claims in the underlying litigation. The
court next found that, because probable cause existed for Santanas original Lanham Act
claim, Bobricks Dragonetti Act claim failed as a matter of law. The court also
determined that the Amended Complaint did not contain factual claims and contentions
showing that defendants were grossly negligent in bringing and continuing to prosecute
the 1996 litigation, and thus the alternative grounds for a Dragonetti Act were also
lacking. For these reasons, the motion to dismiss Count One was granted. Turning to
Count Two, plaintiffs abuse of process claim, the court concluded that the Amended
Complaint did not allege facts from which it could be inferred that Santanas primary
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purpose in bringing the underlying litigation was improper. Thus, Count Two was also
dismissed.
II.
On appeal, Bobrick and Hornyak argue that the District Court erred in its
interpretation of the elements of a Dragonetti Act claim; erroneously found that there was
probable cause for the Lanham Act claim; and improperly determined that the Amended
Complaint did not contain sufficient allegations of improper purpose or gross
negligence to survive a motion to dismiss. In addition, plaintiffs contend that the stay of
discovery was an abuse of discretion.
In its detailed and thoughtful opinion, which was partly based on its significant
experience with the underlying litigation and its related cases, the District Court
explained its reasons for granting Santanas motion to dismiss on the same issues raised
on appeal. Since we can add little to the District Courts reasoning, we will affirm the
order granting summary judgment substantially for the reasons set forth in the courts
thorough opinion.6 In addition, after reviewing the briefs and the record, we are not
persuaded by Bobrick and Hornyaks argument on appeal that the court made improper
findings of fact, drew impermissible inferences in favor of Santana, inappropriately relied
on other court decisions, or otherwise erroneously applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.7
Therefore, we will also decline appellants invitation to certify the Dragonetti Act issue
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
6
On March 29, 2011, Bobrick and Hornyak submitted a letter pursuant to Rule 28(j)
directing our attention to a case recently argued before the Supreme Court, Fox v. Vice,
594 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3063 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2010) (No.
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III.
For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Courts grant of Santana and
Jacksons motion to dismiss.
10-114). The question in Fox is whether a defendant can recover fees under 42 U.S.C.
1988 for a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit that is deemed frivolous, when the state law claims
arising out of the same facts and conduct have not been deemed frivolous. Fox also
raises the question of how those fees should be apportioned. After reviewing Fox, we
conclude that the issues therein are not applicable to the matter before us. Fox involves
the interpretation of two federal statutes and does not appear to raise any constitutional
issues. In the instant case, we deal solely with issues of state law and the Pennsylvania
Dragonetti Act.
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