Professional Documents
Culture Documents
United States v. Thomas Peter Vallejo Appeal of David Miller, 476 F.2d 667, 3rd Cir. (1973)
United States v. Thomas Peter Vallejo Appeal of David Miller, 476 F.2d 667, 3rd Cir. (1973)
2d 667
John J. Flynn, Flynn, Kimerer, Thinnes & Galbraith, Phoenix, Ariz., for
appellant.
Robert E. J. Curran, U. S. Atty., Jeffrey M. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty.,
Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before VAN DUSEN, GIBBONS and HUNTER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge.
David Miller appeals that May 22, 1972, district court order denying his motion
to withdraw before sentencing his guilty plea to Count I of a five-count
indictment.1 Miller also contends that the court failed to comply with F.R.Crim.
P. 11 when he was not advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and
that this failure should render his plea invalid. We have carefully examined the
record and conclude that each of these contentions is without merit. We
therefore affirm.
The district court opinion fully sets forth the facts. See United States v. Miller,
Crim. No. 71-229 (E.D.Pa. May 22, 1972). For our purposes, it is only
necessary to briefly summarize the events that transpired prior to Miller's
sentencing.
Miller had been indicted along with six others on charges relating to the illegal
Meanwhile, the trial, with Miller and four other defendants, commenced on
November 15 and continued on a daily basis until December 3. However, on
November 23, 1971, Miller, in the presence of the court and his counsel, agreed
to withdraw his motion, with prejudice, and requested leave of the court to
change his not guilty plea to Counts I and V of the indictment to guilty. The
court accepted his plea. Sentencing was postponed from February 24, 1972,
until May 4, 1972. On the day of sentencing, Miller presented the court with a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to F.R.Crim.P. 32(d).2
Although Rule 32(d) does not establish a standard governing the withdrawal of
a plea prior to sentencing,3 the district court may, in its discretion, permit a
defendant to substitute a plea of not guilty "if for any reason the granting of the
privilege seems fair and just. . . ." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927) (emphasis supplied); United
States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276, 1279 (3d Cir. 1970). However, this is not an
absolute right to be made in a vacuum without reference to surrounding
circumstances. See United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969);
cf. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972).
7"Witnesses for the government who were presented in opposition to the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment and who were trial witnesses had been assembled
to appear in Philadelphia from several far western and southwestern states.
Testimony most damaging to the defendant and which resulted in guilty verdicts
against codefendants had been received in evidence prior to the defendant's change
of plea.
8
"Finally
it appears appropriate to again point out that Miller changed his plea on
November 23rd, 1971. He waited until the day of sentencing, a time factor of almost
six months, before filing the motion under consideration." United States v. Miller,
supra, at 7.
9
We note that Judge Adams' opinion in United States v. Caldwell, 463 F.2d 590
(3d Cir. 1972), relied, in part, on the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Bradley, supra.
12
A change in the law subsequent to the entry of a guilty plea is not, in and of
itself, a ground for its withdrawal, where the plea is knowingly entered on the
advice of counsel. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773-774, 90 S.Ct.
1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 757, 90
S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). While Miller may have harbored a wistful
hope that he would be sentenced to less than five years, the court made
abundantly clear prior to accepting the guilty pleas, as the following colloquy
indicates, that he knowingly ran the risk of a substantial jail sentence and fine:
"Q. Are you pleading guilty because you are in fact guilty to the two counts?
13
"A. Yes.
14
"Q. What is the maximum?
15
"A. Thirty years.
16
"Q. What is the fine?
17
"A. Thirty-five thousand dollars."Q. Knowing that you wish to enter the plea?
18
"A. Yes.
19
"Q. Has anybody brought any pressure to bear on you from the government?
20
"A. No.
21
"Q. Anyone made any promises of leniency from the government or anywhere else?
22
"A. No, sir.
23
"Q. Anybody told you what I am going to do with you?
24
"A. No, sir.
25
"Q. Are you making this of your own volition?
26
"A. Yes."
27
28
29
Therefore, we are unable to say the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Miller's request.
30
The defendant's other contention that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22
L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), required the trial court to advise him of his privilege
against self-incrimination is equally without merit. McCarthy did not require
the courts to develop a litany, or fixed formula, when addressing a defendant;
but, rather, requires the courts "to inquire into the defendant's understanding of
the nature of the charge against him, and whether the defendant possesses an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." United States v. Cantor, 469
F.2d 435, 438 (3d Cir. 1972).
31
This court, in Davis v. United States, 470 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1972), rejected a
similar contention that a failure to specifically advise a defendant of his
privilege against self-incrimination invalidated his plea. In Davis we held that
". . . once the court has satisfied itself . . . that the guilty plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily, an independent warning against self-incrimination
becomes unnecessary." Id. at 1132. The record makes clear that the defendant
acted knowingly and voluntarily with full realization of the effect of his plea.
32
The district court judgment of conviction will be affirmed. However, the illegal
three-year sentence on Count I5 will be vacated and the case will be remanded
to the district court for sentencing on both Counts I and V in accordance with
Bradley v. United States, supra.
The Supreme Court in Bradley v. United States, supra, granted the petition for
writ of certiorari in order to resolve the conflict between the First and Ninth
Circuits. Our decision in United States v. Caldwell, 463 F.2d 590 (3d Cir.
1972), relying on the reasoning of the First Circuit opinion in Bradley, is in
accordance with the Supreme Court's decision and held that the penalties
prescribed by 26 U.S.C. Secs. 4705(a) and 7237(b) and (d) are preserved for
prosecutions commencing prior to May 1, 1971, even though the sentence was
imposed after that date
The issues discussed by the Court in Bradley were whether the trial court may
impose a sentence of less than the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by
26 U.S.C. Secs. 4705(a) (1964 ed.) and 7237(b) (1964 ed. and Supp. V),
suspend the sentence, place the offender on probation, or specify that he be
eligible for early parole, where that offender had been convicted of a federal
narcotics offense committed before May 1, 1971, but sentenced after that date.
See id. at 606 of 410 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 1151. The reasoning of Bradley establishes
that the District Judge in this case had no choice but to impose sentence on
Count I in accordance with the five-year mandatory minimum sentencing
requirements of Sec. 176a (see also 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7237(b) and (d)), which
were in effect prior to May 1, 1971.
5