481 F.

2d 976

UNITED STATES of America

v.
Alfred J. JASPER, Appellant.
No. 72-1776.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6) March 8, 1973.
Decided June 22, 1973.

Robert E. J. Curran, U. S. Atty., Barton A. Hertzbach, James C. Sommar,

Asst. U. S. Attys., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Richard C. Glazer, Harry P. Begier, Jr., Orlofsky, Cozen & Begier,
Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Before FORMAN, VAN DUSEN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court which denied appellant
Jasper's motion pursuant to Fed.R. Crim.P. 32(d) to withdraw a guilty plea, and
which denied his motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 to vacate a judgment
of sentence.

On May 28, 1968 Jasper and two codefendants entered pleas of guilty to all
three counts of an indictment charging violations of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2113(a),
(b) and (d). On April 15, 1969 Jasper was sentenced to imprisonment of fifteen
years on each count, with the sentences on the second and third counts to run
concurrently with that imposed on the first count. On December 16, 1969
Jasper filed a motion, pursuant to rule 35, for correction of sentence. He
contended that multiple sentences on a single indictment growing out of a single
bank robbery, even though concurrent, are illegal. See Prince v. United States,
352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). He also contended that the

fifteen year sentence is illegal because it is in excess of the maximum sentence

of ten years permissible under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(b), the larceny count. On
February 9, 1970 the district court, without the defendant being present either
in person or by counsel, entered an order:
3
"AND
NOW . . . under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in
light of the ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158 (1969), it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the sentences imposed on Counts 1 and 2 of
Indictment No. 23280 on April 21, 1969 [sic], are hereby vacated and the sentence
corrected as follows:
4 is adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney
'It
General or his authorized representative for a period of fifteen (15) years on Count 3
of the Indictment. Imposition of sentence on Counts 1 and 2 is hereby suspended."'
5

In the applications now before us Jasper urges (1) that because the district court
failed, at the time his guilty plea was accepted, to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P.
11 he should be permitted to retract that plea and plead anew; (2) that the
district court's failure to comply with rule 11 was compounded when the
government attorney and the court at the hearing on his guilty plea gave him
erroneous advice as to the possible maximum sentence which could be imposed
if he were convicted on all counts of the indictment; (3) that the new sentence
imposed was illegal when measured against the standard laid down in United
States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971); and (4) that he was entitled to be
present at all stages of the criminal proceedings against him, including the
February 9, 1970 resentencing.

The district court, without conducting a hearing, evidentiary or otherwise, and

without appointing counsel, rejected each of Jasper's contentions. It did so on
the basis of a report and recommendation of a United States Magistrate, based
on the transcript of the May 28, 1968 hearing on entry of Jasper's plea. The
magistrate's report states: "It would appear, and the Notes of Testimony
indicate, that the Court complied with the provisions of Rule 11." With respect
to the advice about the possible maximum sentence the magistrate's report
states: "There is no indication from the record that the statements made by the
Assistant United States Attorney or the Court were in error and Petitioner has
failed to establish his burden of persuasion." The report does not deal with
Jasper's contentions that the new sentence is not in compliance with United
States v. Corson, supra, and that he should have been present at his
resentencing.

Rule 11 is designed to assure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so

Rule 11 is designed to assure that a defendant who pleads guilty does so

voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. In McCarthy v. United States, 394
U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), the Court held that
noncompliance by the court with the strict requirements of the Rule would be
deemed automatically prejudicial. The remedy for such prejudice is permitting
the defendant to plead anew. In Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89
S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969) (per curiam), however, the Court held that
the per se rule of McCarthy v. United States, supra, need not be applied
retroactively. The plea in this case was taken prior to April 2, 1969, the date of
the McCarthy decision. In such cases if the court finds noncompliance with rule
11 a factual inquiry should be made to determine whether in fact the
defendant's plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered. Cf.
Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973)
(per curiam). When a petitioner has shown noncompliance the burden, in that
factual inquiry is, upon the Government. Halliday v. United States, supra;
Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d 959, 963 (3d Cir. 1970). See United
States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790, 795-796 (3d Cir. 1968); United
States ex rel. McCloud v. Rundle, 402 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 398 U. S. 929, 90 S.Ct. 1822, 26 L.Ed.2d 92 (1970). In Woodward v.
United States, supra, we held that the Government had, in an evidentiary
hearing, met that burden. In this case the district court held no hearing. Thus
the order appealed from may be sustained only if the record in the proceedings
leading to the plea shows compliance with rule 11, or if it shows conclusively
that the plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. Short of these
situations, a hearing is required.
Prince v. United States, supra, construed 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 as not permitting
the cumulation of sentences, although a single indictment may contain separate
counts charging violations of each subsection. In United States v. Corson,
supra, we considered what steps should be taken when a district court had in
imposing sentence misapplied 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 by imposing separate
sentences on each count. We said:

9 this case, the trial court erroneously imposed separate sentences on all three
"In
robbery counts. It is impossible to say that certain of these sentences rather than
others were 'illegal' under Rule 35. Rather, it was the cumulation of sentences, the
sentencing in its entirety which was 'illegal.' It was therefore error for the district
court merely to have vacated the sentences on counts II and III and to have left
standing the sentence on count I. Thus, all the sentences originally imposed were
invalid and ought to have been vacated in their entirety, so that the appellant could
then be resentenced.16
10

Corson explicitly directed that the resentencing be in conformity with Fed.

R.Crim.P. 43, and that rule requires the defendant's presence. Consequently the
remedy for correction of a sentence illegal under Prince v. United States, supra,
was not the vacation of the sentences on some of the counts, but a resentencing
at which the defendant must be present.
11

Thus the law governing this appeal is settled. If a violation of the Prince rule
took place in the original sentencing the defendant must be brought before the
court for resentencing. If at the time of entry of the guilty plea the district court
did not comply with rule 11 the Government must establish that the guilty plea
was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made or the defendant must be
permitted to plead anew.

12

Complicating Jasper's resentence claim, however, is the fact that our decision in
United States v. Corson, supra, with respect to the appropriate remedy for a
Prince violation represented a change in the law from the remedy announced in
United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158, 166 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 994, 90 S.Ct. 1131, 25 L.Ed.2d 401 (1970). The district court, when it
entered the February 9, 1970 order, acted in reliance on Conway, which had
said:

13
"Under
these circumstances, we will direct the District Court to reword the
sentences to show that they are imposed only under Count 2 of the indictment, which
count charges the offense under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d)." Id. at 166.
14

The proximity in time between Jasper's December 16, 1969 rule 35 motion and
the district court's February 9, 1970 order suggests, although the order does not
say so, that this order was on Jasper's motion. No appeal was taken from the
February 9, 1970 order. The time for appeal expired before the filing of the
moving papers now before us. To the extent that the order appealed from
rejects a rule 35 motion identical to that on which the court acted on February
9, 1970, it is, on the ground of res adjudicata, correct. But the proceedings
before us were brought not only pursuant to rule 35, but also pursuant to 28
U.S. C. Sec. 2255. An attack upon the legality of a sentence may be made in a
Sec. 2255 proceeding, and principles of res adjudicata have only limited
application to such proceedings. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83
S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963). The final paragraph of Sec. 2255 applies.
Here Jasper has applied to the district court for relief by motion and that court
has denied him relief. The question then is whether "it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. In Sanders the Court held that the statutory
form of res adjudicata set forth on Sec. 2255 applied:

"only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined
15
adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was
on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits
of the subsequent application." 373 U.S. at 15, 83 S.Ct. at 1077.
16

Equating the December 16, 1969 application to a prior application on the merits
of the same sentence claim is difficult here, for while the illegality of the first
sentence was presented, the illegality of resentencing in the absence of the
defendant was not. Moreover, Sanders makes clear that because of the change
in the law of remedies which took place between Conway and Corson the ends
of justice would best be served by permitting a redetermination. The Court said:

17 purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new
"If
hearing upon showing an intervening change in the law or some other justification
for having failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior application." 373
U.S. at 17, 83 S.Ct. at 1078.
18

We conclude, therefore, that relief with respect to the resentence claim is

available under Sec. 2255 despite the February 9, 1970 ruling on Jasper's first
rule 35 motion. Since that resentencing took place in his absence, at the least
the order must be vacated and appellant brought before the district court for
resentencing.

19

There remains the question whether he should also be permitted to retract his
guilty plea and plead anew. We reject at the outset the magistrate's finding,
adopted by the district court, that the record shows compliance with rule 11.
The transcript of the April 15, 1969 proceeding shows it to be deficient in
several respects. The requirements of rule 11 were stated for us by Judge Van
Dusen in Woodward v. United States, supra, 426 F.2d at 962:

20
"First,
the court must satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the
charge. Routine questioning or a single response by the defendant that he
understands the charge is insufficient. To satisfy itself that the defendant actually
does comprehend the charges, the court must explain the meaning of the charge and
what basic acts must be proved to establish guilt. Secondly, the court must assure
itself that the defendant understands the possible consequences of his plea, including
the maximum sentence that can be imposed together with any restriction on the
availability of parole. . . Finally, the court must satisfy itself that a factual basis for
the plea exists, although fulfillment of this requirement does not require
interrogation by the court itself." (footnotes omitted).
21

The application of these three requirements to a plea to a multicount indictment

under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 is more complex than in other cases because of the
peculiarity that the various subsections of Sec. 2113 make criminal different
kinds of conduct. Thus it is entirely possible that a defendant, having the
elements of the offense defined in each subsection explained to him, would
realize that his conduct only fell within one of the subsections. That realization
could be quite significant, since not only the kinds of conduct but also the
ranges of sentence differ between the subsections. In Jasper's case, for example,
he was indicted under Secs. 2113(a), (b) and (d). The maximum term under
Sec. 2113(a) is twenty years; that under Sec. 2113(b) ten years; and that under
Sec. 2113(d) twenty-five years.
22

The transcript of the May 28, 1968 proceeding shows, with respect to Jasper's
comprehension of the three charges, and with respect to the factual basis for a
plea to all three charges, this single question and answer:

23
"THE
COURT: Are you pleading guilty because of your guilt, and for no other
reason?
MR. JASPER: Yes." (Tr. 2)
24

There was no advice or inquiry respecting the separate factual elements covered
by the separate counts. The same transcript shows, with respect to Jasper's
knowledge of the consequences of the plea:

25
"THE
COURT: And do you realize that you are subject to a maximum penalty of
$5,000.00 fine and/or 20 years imprisonment?
MR. JASPER: I do.
26
THE COURT: Notwithstanding that, you are prepared to enter a plea of guilty?
27
MR. JASPER: Yes, sir.
28
29 Assistant United States Attorney]: Your Honor. Excuse me, sir. If it please the
[The
Court, perhaps it might be pointed out to Mr. Jasper that he is being indicted in each
of the three counts in the indictment, and for that reason he faces a possible
maximum of, I believe, 55 years in prison.
30 COURT: Well, the Count One is $5000.00 and/or 20 years, Count Two is
THE
$5000.00 and/or ten years. Count Three is $10,000.00 and/or 25 years. Are you
aware of that?
MR. JASPER: Yes, sir." (Tr. 3-4)

31

32

Thus the court's first advice gave too low a maximum, the statement by the
Assistant United States Attorney assumed, contrary to Prince, that the sentence
could be pyramided, and the court, while finally stating the correct maximum
on each count, did not correct the pyramiding misstatement. Jasper's "yes, sir"
response to the first and last question is hardly sufficient to indicate that he
knew the real potential consequences of his plea. Later, as the transcript makes
clear, the mistaken impression that the maximum sentence was 55 years was
reiterated by the district judge while addressing a codefendant in Jasper's
presence. (Tr. 6) The record of the May 28, 1968 proceeding does not establish
compliance with rule 11.
The Government urges that any defects in the rule 11 proceedings can be
overlooked in this case because of the contents of the record at the time of
Jasper's sentencing on April 15, 1969. At that time Jasper pleaded guilty to and
was sentenced on another offense. In the same hearing sentence on the bank
robbery counts was imposed. The only reference in the April 15, 1969
transcript to the factual basis for the bank robbery plea is a single sentence by
his attorney:

33 involved, the bank robbery involved the institution in South Philadelphia

"This
where the defendants were apprehended in the bank." (Tr. 2)
34

It does not appear from his report that even this scanty record was before the
magistrate. Had it been, however, it would not have sufficed to carry the
Government's burden of showing, where rule 11 has not been complied with,
that the plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. The sentencing
proceeding does not establish, for example, whether Jasper knew that putting in
fear is an essential element of an 18 U. S.C. Sec. 2113(d) offense, or whether
anyone was put in fear. Nor does it establish whether Jasper knew that carrying
away more than $100 in money or value is an essential element of an 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 2113(b) offense, or whether any sum was carried away.

35

On appeal the Government also urges that because Jasper was represented by
counsel at the time of his plea, that plea should, under the principles laid down
in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed. 2d 747 (1970),
and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763
(1970), be insulated from collateral attack. Those cases deal, however, with the
insulating effect of valid guilty pleas. They do not stand for the proposition that
guilty pleas by counselled defendants are insulated from Sec. 2255 challenge.
For such challenges the governing authorities are Halliday v. United States,
supra, and Woodward v. United States, supra.

36

We do not suggest that in all cases of guilty pleas accepted prior to April 2,
1969, the date of McCarthy v. United States, supra, and after July 1, 1966, the
effective date of rule 11 as amended, where there was noncompliance with rule
11 the Government can meet the burden of establishing that the plea was
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made only in an evidentiary hearing.
There may well be cases where the record of the plea and the sentence establish
the necessary facts quite conclusively. Moreover, in cases where the record is
not conclusive the Government may be able, in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 2255, to establish the facts by deposition.1 See Sanders v. United States,
supra; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed.2d 473
(1962); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972). In this case,
however, the record is not sufficient and has not been supplemented in any way.

37

The order denying Jasper's motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 will be
reversed and the case will be remanded to the district court for the entry of an
order directing that a hearing be held on Jasper's application to withdraw a
guilty plea. If in that hearing the court concludes that his plea was not
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made he should be permitted to plead
anew. If the court concludes that the plea was made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently he should be resentenced in accordance with United States v.
Corson, supra.

38

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

39

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

40

In United States v. Welty, 468 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1972), this court held that
resentencing was not always required when sentences under counts charging
crimes under various subdivisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113 had been amended,
prior to our decision in United States v. Corson,1 449 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1971),
to accord with the basic principle of Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77
S.Ct. 403, 1 L. Ed.2d 370 (1957), that penalties under such subdivisions may
not be cumulated where a single bank robbery is the subject matter of all counts
in this case, the amending sentence of February 9, 1970, was entered prior to
Corson and was in effect a general sentence of 15 years on all counts. If, as I
believe, such a sentence could have been validly imposed in 1970 on Count I2
of the indictment, I believe the case should be remanded so that the sentencing
judge has the option of either amending the February 9, 1970, sentence to
delete all words after "years"3 or to vacate that sentence and bring the defendant
back before him for resentencing, in the discretion of such sentencing judge.4

41

I believe that the record justified the district court's finding and conclusion that
the Government had met its burden of showing a voluntary and knowing plea to
Count I of the indictment.5 As stated in Woodward v. United States, 426 F.2d
959, 963 (3d Cir. 1970), in regard to a plea entered prior to McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), "[a]n examination
of the record discloses that substantial evidence supports the District Court's
conclusion that the plea was entered voluntarily." Also, defendant-appellant has
made no allegation that would lead to a different result as to the plea to Count
I.6

42

The elements of the crime with which the defendant-appellant was charged in
Count I are (1) knowingly and unlawfully entering the bank, and (2) such entry
being with intent to commit larceny. At the sentencing in April 1969,
appellant's counsel conceded, in the presence of appellant, that he was
representing the appellant at "this sentencing on the bank robbery. This
involved the bank robbery, involved the institution in South Philadelphia where
the defendants were apprehended in the bank" (page 2 of transcript of
sentencing proceeding of April 15, 1969). The appellant has never contended
that he did not enter the bank with intent to commit larceny or that he was not
apprehended with his co-defendants in the bank. He relies solely on his
contention that no one explained to him at the time of his plea the nature of the
charge and the elements of the crime. In Woodward this court held that it was
proper to consider a colloquy taking place, prior to the pronouncement of
sentence and during the sentencing procedure, in determining whether a
defendant-appellant had voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea with an
understanding of the nature of the charge.

43

Appellant contends that since he was informed at the arraignment that he could
be sentenced to 55 years (as opposed to the correct maximum term of 25 years),
he was not adequately informed of the consequences of his plea. On the facts
presented by this record, I would apply the holdings in the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits that misinformation, given to a defendant at arraignment by a district
judge, which indicates a possible longer sentence than the law permits does not
invalidate a plea of guilty entered after receipt of such misinformation. United
States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317, 1329 (5th Cir. 1971); Murray v. United
States, 419 F.2d 1076, 1079 (10th Cir. 1969).7 In United States v. Woodall the
court said:

44
"Isolating
all other factors that could influence a defendant in determining to enter a
plea of guilty, the court is of the opinion that even if Woodall had been told the
district judge could pyramid the maximum sentences under each of the separate
counts of the two indictments to which he pled, this factor would not invalidate his

plea. The probability such information would have influenced Woodall not to change
his plea so far outweighs the possibility that the prospect of stiffer punishment may
have caused the change that we refuse to consider the latter as relevant."
45

Relying on Shutz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 1970), appellant
contends that the conviction under Count I merged into Count II. After careful
consideration, I reject this interpretation of Prince v. United States, 352 U.S.
322, 328, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). Judge Rosenn's opinion in
United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971), makes clear that
"the only practicable way of implementing Prince is to impose a general
sentence on all counts for a term not exceeding the maximum permissible
sentence on that count which carried the greatest maximum sentence." Since it
is clear that the conviction on Count I for an offense providing for a 20-year
maximum supports the 15-year sentence imposed by the district court, it is not
necessary to consider defendant's contention that the record does not support an
explanation to the defendant at the time he entered his plea in May 1968 of the
elements of the charges under Counts II and III. If a sentence does not exceed
that which might have been imposed on any one valid count, the judgment and
sentence remain in full force and effect, regardless of the disposition of other
counts. See Glazerman v. United States, 421 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1970).8

46

This court has held on a record virtually identical9 with the one now before the
court that the plea of appellant's codefendant Lindsey was entered knowingly,
voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charges in the
indictment. See Lindsey v. United States, 453 F.2d 867, 868-869 (3d Cir.
1972).

47

I would vacate that portion of the district court order from which this appeal is
taken, which denies appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to Counts II
and III of the indictment, and direct the district court to set aside such pleas, but
in all other respects I would affirm such order.10

"16. The remedy of resentencing is expressly required by Prince, 352 U.S. at

329, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370; cf., United States v. Parker [143 U.S.
App.D.C. 57] 442 F.2d 779 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Bryant v. United States, 135
U.S.App.D.C. 138, 417 F.2d 555 (1969). In addition, the resentencing
alternative most fully protects the rights of the defendant. The defendant must
be present at a resentencing just as if an original sentence were being imposed.
Williamson v. United States, 265 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. 1959); Fed.R.Crim. P.
43. Furthermore, in resentencing a defendant the district court is required to

exercise its discretion anew in fixing the penalty and need not simply choose
from among the sentences it originally imposed. 'Its duty [is] to resentence
rather than vacate one part and reinstate another part of the original sentence.'
Williamson v. United States, supra at 238." 449 F.2d at 551-552 & n. 16.
1

In this case since the defendant must in any event be brought before the court
for resentencing, an evidentiary hearing probably will be the most expeditious
course

It is noted that the author of the Corson opinion was a member of the panel
which joined in the opinion in Welty, supra

The three-count indictment, to which defendant-appellant entered guilty pleas

to each count, charged, inter alia:
Count I. ". . . on or about April 24, 1968, . . . ALFRED J. JASPER, BERNARD
HARRIS and MELVIN LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully, enter the
Citizens Bank and Trust Company, 1849 South Street, Philadelphia . . ., with
intent to commit larceny; the deposits of said bank being insured by the
[F.D.I.C.] . . .," in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a).
Count II. ". . . ALFRED J. JASPER, BERNARD HARRIS and MELVIN
LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully take and carry away with intent to
steal . . . $54,221.00, . . . belonging to and in the care . . . and possession of the
Citizens Bank . . .," in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(b).
Count III. ". . . on or about April 24, 1968 . . . ALFRED J. JASPER,
BERNARD HARRIS and MELVIN LINDSEY, did knowingly and unlawfully
put in jeopardy by the use of dangerous weapons, to wit: a shotgun in the
possession of . . . ALFRED J. JASPER and a revolver in the possession of
BERNARD HARRIS, the lives of employees and customers of the Citizens
Bank . . .," in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d).

The sentence would then read:

"It is adjudged that the defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
Attorney General or his authorized representative for a period of fifteen (15)
years."

Although we recognize that United States v. Corson, supra, 449 F.2d at 551552, stated that resentencing is the better practice in most cases, it would exalt
substance over form to require defendant to be brought halfway across the
country from Leavenworth, Kansas, to Philadelphia, Pa., in order to have the
sentence of February 1970 reworded to comply with Corson and delete any

reference to counts in the sentence. I see no reason to require that defendant

should have been present in February 1970 (prior to Corson) when that
sentence was entered, reducing the sentence previously imposed in April 1969.
See United States v. Welty, supra
5

Count I of the indictment is based on 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a), which provides,

inter alia: "Whoever enters . . . any bank . . . with intent to commit in such bank
. . . any larceny shall be . . . imprisoned not more than twenty years. . . ." The
indictment based on the above language is set forth in note 2 above

Accepting appellant's allegation (page 5 of Motion) that his counsel informed

him in a conference a week before arraignment that "if he were to enter a plea
of guilty that he probably would not receive a sentence in excess of ten (10)
years" (emphasis supplied), the imposition of a 15-year sentence does not make
the plea involuntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463,
25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1969). The use of the word "probably" shows that counsel was
only giving an estimate of the length of the sentence the district court might
impose if a plea were entered. Furthermore, subsequent to the entry of a guilty
plea to this indictment and prior to the April 15, 1969, sentencing, defendant
had entered a guilty plea to a charge of escaping from the custody of an
authorized representative of the U. S. Attorney General (Cr.No.23,320,
E.D.Pa.), so that the sentencing judge was entitled to consider this additional
crime in imposing sentence

In the Woodall case, the defendant was informed that the maximum term was
45 years, and in Murray he was informed that the maximum was 35 years (as
opposed to the correct maximum of 25 years in both cases)

See footnote 4 above

Prior to accepting appellant's plea, the trial judge specifically pointed out to
him the separate penalties provided for the crimes described in each count of
the indictment, whereas this procedure was not followed in the trial judge's
colloquy with Lindsey

10

As noted above at page 2, the district court has the option of vacating the entire
sentence and providing for return of the defendant-appellant for resentencing in
its discretion, if this is deemed necessary under all the circumstances, since part
of the language in the February 1970 sentence can be construed as "illegal." Cf.
F.R.Crim.P. 35 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255