Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 3rd Cir. (1992)
Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region III, 963 F.2d 603, 3rd Cir. (1992)
2d 603
34 ERC 1937, 60 USLW 2763, 22 Envtl.
L. Rep. 21,161
Beazer East, Inc. appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment
in favor of the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA cited Beazer for
This issue has two components: first, whether the EPA's interpretation of the
"provide structural support" language in 260.10 to require tanks to be
completely self-supporting when removed from the ground and filled to
capacity with the material they are intended to contain, was plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation; second, whether the EPA's interpretation of the
"designed to contain" language in 260.10 to require tanks to be watertight was
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
We conclude that the basins are surface impoundments and that the EPA's
interpretation of the "provide structural support" language of 260.10 is not
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Hence, we do not reach
the second component, the "watertight" test. We will affirm the district court's
order granting summary judgment in favor of the EPA.
I.
4
third, that Beazer violated 40 CFR 265.92(a) by failing to develop and follow
a groundwater sampling plan; and fourth, that Beazer violated 40 CFR 265.93
by failing to prepare an outline of a groundwater quality assessment program.
6
7
Tank
means a stationary device, designed to contain an accumulation of hazardous
waste which is constructed primarily of non-earthen materials (e.g., wood, concrete,
steel, plastic) which provide structural support.
8
9
Surface
impoundment or impoundment means a facility or part of a facility which is
a natural topographic depression, man-made excavation, or diked area formed
primarily of earthen materials (although it may be lined with man-made materials),
which is designed to hold an accumulation of liquid wastes or wastes containing free
liquids, and which is not an injection well. Examples of surface impoundments are
holding, storage, settling, and aeration pits, ponds and lagoons.
10
The EPA and Beazer stipulated that if the basins are found to be surface
impoundments, Beazer would pay a civil penalty of $30,000 and either comply
with RCRA or close the basins.
11
After the EPA filed its Administrative Complaint, the parties moved for an
accelerated decision by the ALJ. The ALJ denied this motion. In his Opinion
and Order, the ALJ opined that the foundation test applied by the EPA to the
definition of tanks was neither expressed nor implied in the 40 CFR 260.10
definition of tanks. The ALJ also concluded that the EPA may have violated
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 to 559 (1977 & Supp 1991),
by adopting the "Weddle memorandum,"2 as the basis for its foundation test.
The ALJ reasoned that the EPA had adopted a rule without subjecting it to the
notice and comment procedures required by 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act. The ALJ scheduled the matter for a full adjudicative hearing.
12
After hearing extensive testimony from both parties' experts, the ALJ reversed
his position. In his Initial Decision, the ALJ concluded that the EPA's reliance
on the Weddle memorandum for its foundation test and the EPA's
watertightness test were both reasonable interpretations. He held that Beazer's
basins did not meet the definition of tanks and were instead surface
impoundments subject to RCRA groundwater monitoring requirements. The
ALJ assessed a civil penalty of $30,000 against Beazer and entered an order to
comply with RCRA monitoring requirements under 40 CFR 260.90-93.
Beazer appealed to the EPA Administrator.
13
On appeal, the EPA Administrator affirmed the ALJ. The Administrator did not
discuss the agency's use of the Weddle memorandum. Instead, the
Administrator concluded that both the foundation test and the watertightness
test were compatible with the regulatory purpose underlying RCRA, that is, to
protect groundwater from contamination by hazardous waste. The
Administrator upheld the civil penalty and the compliance order against
Beazer. Beazer appealed the Administrator's decision to the U.S. District Court.
The district court granted the EPA's motion for summary judgment, concluding
that the EPA's interpretation of 260.10 was neither plainly erroneous nor
inconsistent with the regulation.
III.
14
15
16
promulgated in accordance with the proper procedures under the APA. See
United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C.Cir.1987). The
APA requires also that general notice of the proposed regulation be published
in the Federal Register and interested persons be given an opportunity to
comment on the proposed rule. 5 U.S.C. 553(b),(e). "Interpretive" rules, on
the other hand, seek only to interpret language already in properly issued
regulations. United Technologies, 821 F.2d at 718 ("An interpretive rule simply
states what the administrative agency thinks the [underlying] statute means, and
only "reminds" affected parties of existing duties." quoting Citizens to Save
Spencer County v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 n. 153 (D.C.Cir.1979)); See
generally, Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The
Deference Rule, 45 U Pitt L Rev 587, 589 n 13 (Spring 1984). Interpretive
rules and statements of policy are exempted from the notice and comment
requirement. 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).
17
Here, the EPA is interpreting language already found in 260.10. The agency
is not adding or amending language to the regulation, hence it is not subject to
notice and comment procedures. We will thus apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, guided as we must be, by the deference given an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 85
S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965).
18
IV.
19
20
24
V.
25
A.
26
27
Beazer concedes that if its basins were removed from the ground and filled to
capacity with its wastewater, they would not be self-supporting. Nevertheless,
Beazer argues that its concrete and welded wire fabric construction provides
adequate support to satisfy the "provide structural support" language of
260.10. Beazer contends that, by adopting the foundation test, the EPA imposed
a new substantive requirement, thereby giving legislative effect to an internal
agency memorandum without giving the regulated community an opportunity
to oppose or comment upon the new standard.
28
The EPA counters that its interpretation of the "structural support" language of
260.10 is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The
agency claims that its self-supporting requirement promotes the policy of
Final Decision of the EPA Administrator at 12. While we disagree that the
foundation test is the "only reading" of the regulation, we find this view to be a
reasonable interpretation of the regulation.3 See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 84
L.Ed.2d 90 (1985) (reviewing court need not conclude that the EPA's
interpretation is the only permissible interpretation of the regulation, but that it
is a "sufficiently rational" one). The EPA's interpretation of 260.10 is
therefore neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.
32
Section 260.10 requires greater structural integrity from tanks than from surface
impoundments. This requirement is consistent with the policy of protecting
groundwater from hazardous waste. The EPA requires that other tanks subject
to RCRA permitting requirements (for example, those regulated under Subpart
J) be certified by an engineer to have "sufficient structural strength ... to ensure
that it will not collapse, rupture or fall." 40 CFR 264.191(b). There is no reason
to believe that the rupture or collapse of Beazer's wastewater treatment basin is
any less hazardous to the groundwater than the rupture or collapse of other
tanks within the scope of RCRA.
33
Beazer argues that the regulation does not specify that anything more than
"some" structural support is needed to come within the RCRA definition of
tank. We note, however, that in the complex area of environmental regulation,
the EPA must create bright lines to separate prohibited and permissible activity.
We defer to this line-drawing provided the interpretation is both reasonable and
consonant with Congress' intent. For example, in Vineland Chemical Co. v.
EPA, 810 F.2d 402 (3d Cir.1987), the EPA interpreted RCRA's provision
requiring a regulated party to certify that it is financially responsible. 810 F.2d
at 409. While recognizing that the statute was somewhat ambiguous, we
nevertheless deferred to the agency's interpretation because it clarified RCRA's
regulation in a manner consistent with Congress' intent to accelerate the EPA's
enforcement activities under RCRA. Id. In like manner, the foundation standard
gives meaning to the operative language of 260.10, thereby creating a bright
line by which the EPA may determine which wastewater facilities are subject to
groundwater monitoring requirements.
35
Beazer also contends that, even assuming the reasonableness of the EPA's
interpretation, regulated parties were not provided adequate notice that tanks
must be self-supporting when removed from the ground and filled to capacity.
But it is a basic tenet of administrative law that agencies have some discretion
to chose between adjudication and rulemaking when interpreting statutes and
regulations committed to their authority, Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 476-79, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (Scalia,
concurring); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1772, 40
L.Ed.2d 134 (1974), subject only to the limitations imposed by Congress.
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S.Ct. at 1107; Martin, 111 S.Ct. at 1177. The
Administrative Procedure Act does expressly prohibit an agency from
retroactively imposing an interpretive rule upon a regulated party. See for
example 5 U.S.C. 551(4) (agency rules can only have prospective effect).
Nonetheless, nothing in the APA prohibits an agency from adopting or revising
an interpretation of a regulation that has been properly promulgated in an
adjudication and applying that interpretation retroactively. Bowen, 109 S.Ct. at
476; SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed. 1995
(1947).4 If the agency affords the party a "full opportunity to be heard before
the [agency] makes its determination" Bell Aerospace, 94 S.Ct. at 1772, we
cannot second-guess the agency decision whether to interpret a standard by
Beazer contends the EPA never gave it adequate notice because the EPA never
gave meaning to the clause "provide structural support" in 260.10. Unlike its
challenge to the EPA's use of the term "to contain," Beazer does not contend
that the EPA has inconsistently interpreted what level of structural support is
necessary for a basin to be considered a tank. Instead, Beazer contends that it
was wronged when the EPA imposed a completely new standard. We disagree.
This is not a situation where the agency inconsistently interpreted a standard
over time or changed its interpretation. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 105 S.Ct. at
1112. Rather, the EPA is making a reasonable attempt to fill the interstices of a
complex regulatory scheme by giving meaning to regulatory language entirely
within its authority to define. See, for example, Vineland Chemical Co., 810
F.2d at 409; Modine Mfg. Corp., 791 F.2d at 273-74. It is of little consequence
that the EPA's interpretation is new.5 Indeed, even if the EPA's interpretation of
the "provide structural support" language of 260.10 was developed for the
first time in an agency adjudication, we would give the agency no less
deference than if it had promulgated an interpretive rule.6 See Martin, 111 S.Ct.
at 1179-80.
37
In conclusion, we will not question the EPA's choice to give meaning to the
"structural support" language of 260.10 through adjudication rather than
rulemaking. As Justice Scalia has recently said, "where legal consequences
hinge upon the interpretation of statutory requirements, and where no
preexisting interpretive rule construing those requirements is in effect, nothing
prevents the agency from acting retroactively through adjudication." Bowen,
109 S.Ct. at 480 (Scalia, concurring). That is precisely the case here. Rather
than amending a preexisting interpretation of 260.10, the EPA is developing
its interpretation through adjudication. Beazer contends the EPA must comply
with the notice and comment procedures applicable to agency rulemaking, i.e.,
advance notice published in the Federal Register. But no such notice is required
where the agency proceeds by adjudication. Therefore, Beazer's contention that
it was not given adequate notice of the EPA's interpretation fails.
38
Last, the ALJ found that Beazer presented sufficient evidence to establish that
its aeration basins are of rigid construction, but agreed with the EPA that if
removed from the ground the basins would collapse. The ALJ also found that
Beazer's basins rely in large part upon the surrounding soil (earthen, rather than
non-earthen material) for structural support, and therefore were properly
characterized as surface impoundments rather than tanks. These findings were
supported by substantial evidence and cannot be disturbed. Consequently, the
EPA's interpretation of the "structural support" language in 260.10 is neither
plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, and its finding that
Beazer violated RCRA groundwater monitoring requirements was supported by
substantial evidence.
B.
39
Beazer next argues that the EPA erroneously interprets the term "to contain" in
260.10, to mean that tanks must be designed to be watertight. Beazer points
out that the EPA has inconsistently used the terms "to contain" and "to hold"
over the course of its enforcement of RCRA; at times synonymously, and at
other times requiring greater liquid containment under "to contain" than under
"to hold." As a result of this alleged inconsistent enforcement history, Beazer
contends that it did not have fair notice of what conduct is actually prohibited
under 260.10. We do not reach this issue because Beazer's basins do not meet
the structural support requirement under 260.10, a necessary predicate for a
basin to be considered a tank.7
VI.
40
The term "basin" is a generic term which may be applied to either a "tank" or a
"surface impoundment."
The "Weddle memorandum" was an internal EPA memo from the acting
director of the agency's Washington, D.C., Office of Solid Waste to the
Director of EPA Region IV. The memorandum distinguished a tank from a
surface impoundment by "structural support." That is to say, if it were free
standing, and filled to its design capacity with the material it was intended to
hold, would the walls or shell of the unit alone provide sufficient support to
maintain the structural integrity. If so, it can be considered a tank. If not, it is a
surface impoundment
3
The EPA has previously considered its interpretation of the "provide structural
support" language found in 260.10 in a recent adjudication, but there the
agency was presented with a different factual setting. See In the Matter of
Brown Wood Preserving Co., No. RCRA-84-16-R, Final Decision of the EPA
Administrator (May 3, 1989)
We note that there is little guidance in the regulations or in the Federal Register
that points to a clear distinction between "to hold" and "to contain" as used in
RCRA. While it may be true that the EPA's interpretation of these terms
accords with the overall regulatory goals of RCRA, if such a distinction
effectively imposes additional substantive requirements on the regulated
community, it should be placed directly in the regulations. The regulations
would then be subject to notice and comment, with appropriate participation by
the regulated community
We caution that we will not defer to an interpretation that implies language that
simply cannot be found in the regulation. Director, OWCP v. Mangifest, 826
F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir.1987); Marshall v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 621
F.2d 1246, 1252-54 (3d Cir.1980). As we stated in Mangifest, "[h]aving written
the regulations, the Director is responsible for their text. If the meaning is not
clear on a reasonably objective basis, then the regulations should be changed so