89 F.

3d 135

Wayne Paul BURKETT, Appellant,

v.
William LOVE, Superintendent, et al., Answering Respondent
Blair County District Attorney, Appellees.
No. 95-3525.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.
Argued April 30, 1996.
Decided July 12, 1996.
Sur Petition for Rehearing Aug 16, 1996.

Shelley Stark (argued) Federal Public Defender, Karen Sirianni Gerlach,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellant.
David C. Gorman (argued) Office of District Attorney for Blair County,
Hollidaysburg, PA, for Appellees.
Before: STAPLETON, SCIRICA, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WEIS, Circuit Judge.

In this case, a state prisoner alleges that he was denied parole in retaliation for
the successful pursuit of relief in various federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The district court denied the petition on the merits and also found a failure to
exhaust "administrative" remedies.1 Because we conclude that petitioner has
failed to exhaust state remedies, and in addition, that some uncertainty exists as
to the proper state procedure to address the issue that the prisoner raises, we
remand with directions to dismiss.

Between February 1981 and April 1982, the district attorney of Blair County,
Pennsylvania, filed three sets of charges against petitioner Wayne Burkett. In
November 1981, he was convicted of burglary, theft, receiving stolen property,
and corruption of minors, docketed in 1981 at Nos. 140/141. On January 20,

1982, Burkett was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,

terroristic threats, unlawful restraint, indecent exposure, reckless endangerment,
indecent assault, and aggravated assault, docketed in 1981 at No. 161. A third
conviction, entered on January 28, 1983 for attempted rape, terroristic threats,
assault, and reckless endangerment was docketed in 1982 at No. 284.
3

In an earlier proceeding, we granted habeas corpus relief resulting in the

vacation of the convictions at Nos. 140/141 and 161 because of inordinate
delays in sentencing. See Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir.1987).
In Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431 (3d Cir.1991), we held that the sentence
imposed at No. 284 should be reduced because of delay.

After another round of orders from the district court and this Court, the state
judge denied Burkett's motion for recusal and reduced the sentence in
accordance with our earlier order. Petitioner is presently serving a term of 12
3/4 to 28 3/4 years. In February 1993, Burkett filed a Post Conviction Relief
Act petition in Blair County challenging the sentence as excessive.

In September 1994, the Pennsylvania Parole Board denied petitioner's request

for parole, citing, among other reasons, "very high assaultive behavior
potential" and "unfavorable recommendation from district attorney and
sentencing judge." The Board rejected petitioner's request for reconsideration,
stating: "Be advised that what the Board decides and why, with regard to
parole/reparole, is wholly within the Board's discretion and not subject to
judicial review. Reider v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 100
Pa.Cmwlth. 333, 514 A.2d 967 (1986) (en banc)."

On September 28, 1994, Burkett filed a pro se habeas corpus petition in the
Pennsylvania courts raising, among other claims, retaliatory denial of parole.
The state court dismissed the petition without prejudice and appointed new
counsel with instructions to file an amended petition.

In June 1995, Burkett initiated the present matter by filing a document in the
district court entitled "Motion to Enforce Order of the District Court Dated
December 4, 1992 and to Permit Discovery in Support of Burkett's Motion."
(The December 4, 1992 order had directed the imposition of a reduced
sentence, as discussed in our opinion at 951 F.2d at 1433.) In this "motion,"
Burkett alleged that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had denied him parole
in vindictive retaliation for his success in the earlier federal habeas corpus
actions he had pressed in the district court and our Court.

The district court denied the motion, finding inter alia that the decision to grant
parole was committed to the sound discretion of the Parole Board and that the
agency had cited at least five legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for its
action. Further, the court stated that the responses of the district attorney and
the sentencing judge were proper and non-vindictive. In addition, the court
concluded that Burkett had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Burkett has appealed, contending that no corrective state process exists and
therefore the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing and
allowed discovery.

I.
Appellate Jurisdiction
10

Burkett's motion in the district court was filed under the docket number of an
earlier case. It should have been filed under a separate docket number rather
than as a continuation of the previous action. However, because the district
court and the parties have treated this case as a new petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, we will do likewise. The district court's order disposing of the matter is
final as a practical matter and we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

II.
Exhaustion of State Remedies
11

State prisoners alleging a constitutional violation and improper incarceration

must present their arguments to the state courts before they will be addressed
by the federal courts. 28 U.S.C. 2254(b). At the time the "motion" was filed
in the district court, 28 U.S.C. 2254(c) read: "An applicant shall not be
deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the questions presented."

12

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the claim must be presented to the state's
highest court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1201-02, 71
L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). "The exhaustion requirement does not foreclose, but only
postpones, federal relief." Toulson v. Beyer, 987 F.2d 984, 986 (3d Cir.1993).
Pursuing state remedies is not a mere formality, but serves the interests of
comity between the state and federal courts. Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d
135, 138 (3d Cir.1986).

13

14

After this appeal was taken, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24,
1996), which revises the procedures for habeas corpus proceedings. Section
104(1) of the Act states that applications by persons in state custody "shall not
be granted unless it appears that ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the court of the State" or there is no available state remedy or that
process would be ineffective. However, a federal court may deny an application
on the merits notwithstanding an applicant's failure to exhaust state remedies.
Id.
The 1996 statute also provides that if a state court has addressed the merits of a
petitioner's claim, the federal court shall not grant a writ of habeas corpus
unless the state decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the state proceeding. Section 104(3). Applicants
have the burden to rebut a state's factual determinations by clear and convincing
evidence. Section 104(4). Section 104(4) also specifies the limited
circumstances in which a federal court can hold an evidentiary hearing if the
applicant has failed to develop the factual basis for a claim in the state
proceeding.2 In the somewhat unusual circumstances here, we need not digress
to determine the effect of these provisions on this pending action, filed, as it
was, before the amendments were enacted.

III.
Does the State Lack Corrective Measures?
15
16

Burkett contends that retaliation for his exercise of access to the federal courts
violates his rights under the United States Constitution, but that the state courts
will not entertain his claim. He points to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court's in banc decision in Reider v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole,
100 Pa.Cmwlth. 333, 514 A.2d 967 (1986).

17

In that case, a state prisoner appealed to the Commonwealth Court alleging that
the Parole Board's decision to deny him parole was a denial of his constitutional
rights to equal protection as well as due process, and in addition constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. In an opinion dismissing the appeal, the Court
reviewed a number of its earlier rulings that had reached differing results on its
power to review Parole Board decisions asserted to have been in violation of
the Constitution.3

18

Because the Court's jurisdiction to review agency decisions rests on the

18

Because the Court's jurisdiction to review agency decisions rests on the

administrative agency law of Pennsylvania, 2 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 701-704,
which authorizes appeals from "adjudications," Reider looked to the statutory
definition of that word. The term "adjudication" excludes "any order based
upon a proceeding ... which involves ... paroles." 2 Pa.Con.Stat.Ann. 101. The
Commonwealth Court concluded that "[b]y definition, therefore, Board action
of denying parole is not an adjudication subject to judicial review." Reider, 514
A.2d. at 970.

19

The Reider opinion acknowledged that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in

Bronson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d
1021 (1980) had held that a prisoner could seek judicial review of a parole
revocation. In distinguishing Bronson, the Commonwealth Court cited
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1,
99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), which concluded that a parole
revocation affected a liberty interest because the ruling returned a parolee to
custody. In contrast, a prisoner denied parole is not at liberty but remains in
custody and thus his status remains unchanged.

20

Following that reasoning, Reider held that under Pennsylvania law, a prisoner
had "no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of being
[paroled]." 514 A.2d at 971. "The mere possibility of parole affords no
constitutional rights to prisoners." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court,
therefore, held that a denial of parole may not be judicially reviewed in
Pennsylvania. A dissenting Commonwealth Court judge pointed out that
carrying his Court's holding to its logical extreme would allow the Board to
refuse parole solely on the basis of a prisoner's race, religion, gender, or ethnic
background without any relief from the judiciary. Id. at 972.

21

Later panel opinions of the Commonwealth Court seem to indicate that it is

having second thoughts about the scope of the Reider holding. Thus, in
Murgerson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 135 Pa.Cmwlth. 10,
579 A.2d 1335, 1336 n. 2 (1990), the Court commented that because the
imposition of conditions is a part of the parole decision, "consistent with the
rationale in Reider we hold that the imposition of such conditions is not subject
to judicial review absent an allegation that the condition violates a prisoner's
constitutional rights." (emphasis added). See also McCaskill v. Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation and Parole, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 450, 631 A.2d 1092, 1094 n. 2
(1993) (judicial review of Parole Board's order includes determination of
whether constitutional rights were violated, citing 2 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 704).

22

Other cases, however, are consistent with Reider. See Shaw v. Pennsylvania

Bd. of Probation and Parole, 671 A.2d 290, 292 (1996) (allegations of due
process and equal protection violations do not establish "liberty interest" and
claims unreviewable); King v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 111
Pa.Cmwlth. 392, 534 A.2d 150, 151 (1987) (retaliatory denial not reviewable);
Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 142, 532
A.2d 50, 52 (1987) (due process contention not reviewable).
23

Reider was correct in its conclusion that no liberty interest is created by the
expectation of parole. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2105-06. But
Reider is seriously flawed because it fails to recognize that the curtailment of a
liberty interest is not the only way that the Constitution may be violated.

24

The Supreme Court held in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct.
2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), that although a person may have no "right"
to a valuable government benefit, and may be denied it for any number of
reasons, "there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely." We
applied that principle in Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir.1980),
where we explained "[a]lthough Greenholtz indicates that a state may ... deny it
completely, a state statute may not sanction totally arbitrary parole decisions
founded on impermissible criteria." Moreover, "[a] legislative grant of
discretion does not amount to a license for arbitrary behavior." Id.

25

In Block, the Parole Board used race as one of the bases for denying parole.
The panel majority concluded that in so doing, the agency violated substantive
due process in grounding its action on "constitutionally impermissible reasons."
Id. at 236. The panel also concluded that the denial of parole violated the
prisoner's right to equal protection. "The equal protection clause forbids
government bodies from making decisions on the basis of race, even if other
factors were also considered." Id. at 241.

26

The dissenting judge in Block disagreed with the majority's finding of a liberty
interest and declined to read Greenholtz as applicable to both substantive as
well as procedural due process. However, the dissent concurred with the
majority's position on equal protection and said that a discretionary parole
system "does not give the state the unfettered right to deny parole on arbitrary
and impermissible grounds." Id. at 244.

27

Cases in other Courts of Appeals have been in agreement with Block 's premise.
See Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 870 (10th Cir.1981) (denial of parole
because prisoner was Hispanic states claim for violation of equal protection);
Osborne v. Folmar, 735 F.2d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir.1984) (prisoner may

challenge parole decisions on equal protection grounds even though he fails to

establish due process claim).
28

Case law has also established that a state may not bar parole in retaliation for a
prisoner's exercise of his constitutional rights. See Shabazz v. Askins, 980 F.2d
1333 (10th Cir.1992) (retaliation for a prisoner's religious discrimination suits
against prison officials); Clark v. Georgia Pardons and Paroles Board, 915 F.2d
636, 639 (11th Cir.1990) (retaliation for filing suit against prison officials for
wrongful death of prisoner's brother). See also Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139,
1145 (7th Cir.1988) (retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights).

29

Several Courts of Appeals have addressed analogous retaliation claims in the

prison setting, although not involving parole decisions. Adams v. James, 784
F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1986), noted that the "unconstitutional conditions"
doctrine applies in prisoner section 1983 cases. Accord Woods v. Edwards, 51
F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir.1995) ("It is settled that prison officials cannot act
against a prisoner for availing himself of the courts and attempting to defend
his constitutional rights").

30

In Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir.1986), the complaint alleged

threats made by a prison guard in retaliation for testimony given by the inmate
in another case. These facts supported a section 1983 claim for violation of the
prisoner's "due-process and First Amendment right of access to the federal
courts." Id. at 100. Accord Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 375 (6th
Cir.1989).

31

Similarly, Burkett's claim that he was denied release on parole based on the
exercise of his right of access to the courts alleges an impermissible and
unconstitutional reason for the Board's action. That claim is not based on the
abrogation of a liberty interest, and consequently, is not within the ambit of the
reasoning underlying the decision in Reider. It is at least arguable, therefore,
that Burkett's claim is not controlled by Reider. However, the application of
that case to other instances of constitutional violations shows that the
Commonwealth Court has given the holding a broad sweep.

32

It is important, therefore, to assess the attitude of the state's highest court. In

discussing the right of appeal in parole cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Bronson explained that the state's constitution guarantees the right to an
appeal from an administrative agency (including the Pennsylvania Parole
Board) to a court. 421 A.2d at 1024-25. Implementing legislation designated
the Commonwealth Court as the appropriate court of record for agency review.

42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 763. Bronson concluded that the Commonwealth Court

had jurisdiction over the appeal from a parole revocation decision made by the
Board. 421 A.2d at 1025-26. In its opinion, the state Supreme Court did not
indicate in any way that Commonwealth Court would lack jurisdiction if the
controversy had centered on denial, rather than revocation, of parole.
33

As we read Bronson, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the

Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction over appeals from a denial of parole
based on constitutional grounds other than an alleged abrogation of a liberty
interest. To that extent, we conclude that Reider does not state the law in
Pennsylvania and that Burkett was entitled to appeal to the Commonwealth
Court.4

34

One other procedural avenue appears open to Burkett. Reider itself

acknowledged that "mandamus is available to compel the Board to conduct a
hearing or correct a mistake in applying the law." 514 A.2d at 972 n.4. In
Commonwealth ex rel. Saltzburg v. Fulcomer, 382 Pa.Super. 422, 555 A.2d
912 (1989), the Superior Court noted a distinction between an appeal from a
"discretionary decision" of the Board and an action that seeks to compel the
Board to act in accordance with its own regulations. In the latter circumstance,
the Superior Court held that mandamus was the appropriate remedy and
transferred an appeal from a Board ruling to the Commonwealth Court. Id. 555
A.2d at 914.

35

We also consider whether Burkett may be able to proceed in the state courts
under the Post Conviction Relief Act or by requesting a writ of habeas corpus.
In 1988, Pennsylvania enacted the Post Conviction Relief Act. It provides "the
sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
and statutory remedies for the same purpose ... including habeas corpus and
coram nobis." 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 9542.

36

In Commonwealth v. Hayes, 408 Pa.Super. 68, 596 A.2d 195 (1991), the
Superior Court held that the language of the Post Conviction Relief Act
precluded resort to the writ of coram nobis. No appellate court in Pennsylvania,
to our knowledge, has considered the question of whether the Act has totally
replaced the writ of habeas corpus. We note, however, that the Pennsylvania
Constitution art. I, 14 provides that the writ of habeas corpus may not be
suspended unless rebellion or public safety may require it.

37

The Post Conviction Relief Act, moreover, is limited to persons who assert they
were convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons who are serving

illegal sentences. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 9542. Petitioner here does not fall into
either of those categories. Instead, he alleges that he is unjustly incarcerated
because of an unconstitutional denial of parole. He does not deny commission
of the crime, nor in this petition does he contend that the sentence is illegal.
38

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not yet addressed the effect of the Act on
habeas corpus, and so we are required to predict what its ruling would be.
Because of the state constitutional provisions prohibiting impairment of the
right to a writ of habeas corpus, we would expect that in the event that the
Commonwealth Court cannot adjudicate this matter, the state's highest court
would permit a habeas corpus action in the circumstances present here.
Alternatively, we predict that the state's highest court would conclude that the
petition here is outside the scope of the Post Conviction Relief Act.

39

In Commonwealth v. Isabell, 503 Pa. 2, 467 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1983)

(challenging Bureau of Corrections' interpretation of term of incarceration), the
state Supreme Court held that where a prisoner did not mount a "direct or
collateral attack on the conviction or sentence imposed by the trial court," the
proper remedy was not under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (the predecessor
statute), and "[c]onsequently, appellant may resort to the writ of habeas corpus
ad subjiciendum." Id. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Maute, 263 Pa.Super.
220, 397 A.2d 826, 829 (1979), the Superior Court held that "[a] claim for
'cruel and unusual punishment' is more properly cognizable in a petition for
habeas corpus" than under the Post Conviction Hearing Act.

40

Those two cases were decided before the Post Conviction Relief Act was
enacted, but we believe the reasoning in those opinions is sound and applicable
to the current statute. It follows that claims of unconstitutional violations not
seeking to set aside a sentence or a conviction are outside the Post Conviction
Relief Act.

41

We read Isabell, 467 A.2d at 1291, as permitting a petition for habeas corpus
relief in the circumstances here because Burkett is not making a direct or
collateral attack on his conviction or sentence. We recognize that in 1944, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a parole denial could not be
challenged by using a petition for habeas corpus to allege that the Board had
been neither fair nor impartial. See Commonwealth ex rel. Biglow v. Ashe, 348
Pa. 409, 35 A.2d 340 (1944). There was no charge of unconstitutional action in
that case and we need not resolve the conflict (if any) between it and Isabell.
Fundamentally, it is the role of the Pennsylvania courts to clarify the law of that
state. It is enough for our purposes to note that, should the Commonwealth
Court not have jurisdiction, either by appeal or mandamus, relief by habeas

corpus has not been foreclosed by holdings of the state Supreme Court.
42

It appears to us, therefore, that Burkett has available three potential ways of
attacking the denial of parole in Pennsylvania courts--appeal, mandamus, or
habeas corpus. The somewhat unsettled state law in this area is a factor to
consider in deciding whether we should proceed to the merits, rather than
requiring Burkett to exhaust state remedies. Obviously, a ruling by the state
Supreme Court or Commonwealth Court discussing the scope of the Reider
opinion and the proper channels for bringing such claims would be helpful in
this frequently litigated area of state law.

43

Clarification is highly desirable and counsels in favor of exhaustion of state

remedies rather than resolution on the merits in the first instance by the district
court. Failure to require resort to the state courts in these circumstances would
not be consistent with a sound exercise of discretion. Moreover, we find some
gaps in the record, such as the absence of the letters written to the Parole Board
by the sentencing judge and the district attorney, that make us hesitant to
address the merits of Burkett's petition at this stage.

44

We emphasize that our holding does not express any view as to the validity of
Burkett's claim. We merely recognize that an allegation that parole was denied
in retaliation for the successful exercise of the right of access to the courts
states a cognizable claim for relief.

45

Pennsylvania law provides that the Parole Board "shall, in all cases, consider"
recommendations from district attorneys and sentencing judges, 61
Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 331.19, while retaining "exclusive power to parole." 61
Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. 331.17. The mere fact that recommendations were
submitted to the Board is not enough, in itself, to establish Burkett's claim. He
must show more. The determination of whether there was any retaliation, and
whether that retaliation influenced the decision of the Parole Board, is a matter
that must be addressed by the state courts.

46

Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss the petition so that Burkett may proceed in the state court.
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

47

I concur in the judgment of the court. For the reasons stated by the court and
the dissent in Reider, I predict that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would
hold that the Commonwealth Court has jurisdiction to entertain Burkett's claim.

I am unable to join the opinion of the court, however, because I think any other
avenue to relief for Burkett is barred by authoritative precedent. As the court
properly concludes, the Post Conviction Relief Act is not applicable. In
addition, under current Pennsylvania law, Burkett cannot seek review of a
parole denial in a state habeas corpus1 or mandamus proceeding.2
48

BEFORE: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, BECKER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN,

GREENBERG, SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, LEWIS,
McKEE, and WEIS,* Circuit Judges.

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

49

The petition for rehearing filed by appellant in the above-entitled case having
been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this Court and
to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service,
and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a
majority of the circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service not having
voted for rehearing by the court in banc, the petition for rehearing is denied.

50

Judge Mansmann would have granted rehearing.

Although the district court order uses the term exhaustion of "administrative
remedies," it is clear on examination of the record and in context that this was
an inadvertent misnomer and that what was intended was "exhaustion of state
remedies."

Section 106 of the Act provides that a second or successive application for
habeas corpus shall be dismissed unless, inter alia, a factual predicate exists that
could not have been discovered earlier. In the case at hand, that circumstance
exists. Section 106 also provides that a second petition must first be presented
to the Court of Appeals before it may be filed in the district court. The present
petition had been filed before that amendment to 2254 was enacted, and
consequently, it does not apply here

Compare Barnhouse v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 89

Pa.Cmwlth. 512, 492 A.2d 1182 (1985); Counts v. Pennsylvania Bd. of
Probation and Parole, 87 Pa.Cmwlth. 277, 487 A.2d 450 (1985); Kastner v.
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 78 Pa.Cmwlth. 157, 467 A.2d 89
(1983); Banks v. Board of Probation and Parole, 4 Pa.Cmwlth. 197, 1971 WL
13031 (1971) (in banc) (review permitted); with LaCamera v. Pennsylvania Bd.
of Probation and Parole, 13 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 317 A.2d 925 (1974) (no judicial

review)
4

Whether the Parole Board would be estopped from pleading a time bar because
of its erroneous representation to Burkett about appealability, we leave to the
Commonwealth Court

In Commonwealth ex rel. Biglow v. Ashe, 348 Pa. 409, 35 A.2d 340 (1944),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a parole denial could not be
challenged using a writ of habeas corpus. "[T]his court cannot review the
actions of the Parole Board in denying him parole ...; neither can we pass on the
fairness and impartiality of the hearing he had before the Parole Board." Id. 35
A.2d at 341. This holding has not been overruled, limited, or weakened in the
half-century since it was handed down

Mandamus will not lie to compel discretionary acts, see Bronson v. Board of
Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021, 1023 (1980), and a parole
decision is characterized as a discretionary act by statute, see 61 Pa.C.S.
331.19, and by courts, see, e.g., Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 10, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)

Judge Weis's vote is limited to panel rehearing only