Not Precedential
Not Precedential
standing, and because three of them were criminal in nature. The state law claims were
then dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. We affirmed. Bullock v. Klein, 341 F.
Appx 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2009).
Bullock then filed, on February 15, 2001, another action against forty-five of the
same defendants from his previous case. His complaint alleged substantially the same
facts and claims as before, along with a derivative claim on behalf of the Association.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Bullocks complaint should be
dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata. The District Court agreed. (Dkt. No. 45.)
Bullock timely appealed the dismissal of his complaint.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. We exercise plenary review
over a district courts application of res judicata to bar the appellants claims. Huck ex
rel. Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 48 (3d Cir. 1997).
Bullock argues that res judicata does not apply because [f]raud upon the court
allows any court to treat any previous case as a nullity. (Appellants Br. at 3.) All of the
appellees argue that the District Court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata. We
agree.
Three elements must be established to prevail on a motion seeking to invoke res
judicata: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties
or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action. Duhaney v.
Atty Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010). Res judicata bars not only claims that
4
were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought. In re
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008).
In the prior case, Bullock alleged that certain parties, who are attorneys,
committed a fraud upon the state court that prompted the Sheriffs sale of his home. The
District Court, while not specifically mentioning fraud upon the court, nonetheless
dismissed the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We then
affirmed the District Courts decision. In this case, Bullock alleged that the same parties
perpetrated the same fraud, based upon the same set of facts. The District Court, again
without specifically naming the claim, dismissed Bullocks complaint.
The District Court properly held that Bullocks claims are barred by the doctrine
of res judicata. The dismissal of Bullocks first complaint for failure to state a claim
constituted a final judgment on the merits. See Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). Next, the second case indisputably involved the same
parties as the first. Finally, the subsequent suit that generated this appeal was based on
the same cause of action, as the claims are virtually identical and arose out of the same
set of facts. 1
As his claims were already pursued in a prior suit, Bullock is precluded from
raising them again. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (Under res judicata, a
1
Though Bullock brought a derivative claim on behalf of the Association that was not
asserted in the first action, it does not undercut the application of res judicata, as it could
have been raised in the previous case. Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225.
5
final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.). Given the
identity of facts, claims and parties found between the first and second cases, the
District Court properly dismissed Bullocks complaint. Huck, 106 F.3d at 51.
Bullock argues that the claim of Fraud Upon the Court has never been
addressed. (Appellants Br. at 3.) We disagree. The claim was dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) in his first case, and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata in his
second. In any event, Bullock did not make any allegations that meet the demanding
standard for fraud upon the court, which is justified only by the most egregious
misconduct directed at the court itself, and must be supported by clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence. Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 387 (3d Cir. 2005).
III.
Appellees Atlantic Roofing Corporation and Christopher Conn request that we
impose sanctions on Bullock, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. That
rule permits an award of damages and single or double costs to an appellee if we
determine that the appeal is frivolous. Fed. R. App. P. 38. We employ an objective
standard in determining whether an appeal is frivolous, and only impose damages under
Rule 38 when an appeal is wholly without merit. Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union
Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs., 951 F.2d 1399, 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). Because the
issue of fraud upon the court was not specifically mentioned by the District Court,
Bullock had at least a colorable argument in favor of his appeal, and we will not
6
impose Rule 38 damages. Id. Though we will deny the motion for sanctions, we will tax
costs against Bullock under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39. See Fed. R. App. P.
39(a)(2).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court
dismissing Bullocks complaint. The motion for sanctions is denied.