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Not Precedential
Not Precedential
See Hankins v. Beard, No. 09182, 2010 WL 3522095 (W.D. Pa. July 29, 2010), report
and recommendation adopted in part by 2010 WL 3522094 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2010).
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dismissed several defendants because Hankins failed to serve them with process.2
Following discovery, the District Court granted portions of the remaining defendants
summary judgment motions, leaving only 1) excessive force claims related to an incident
in which defendants Barker and Brownfield discharged a stun belt and 2) various
retaliation claims against defendant McKnight.3 Barker and Brownfield entered into a
settlement with Hankins and were dismissed from the case, while a jury entered a verdict
in McKnights favor after trial. Hankins filed a timely notice of appeal directly from the
District Courts entry of judgment, attacking both the orders rejecting his claims as well
as the orders that denied him the services of counsel, declined to re-open discovery, and
rejected his request to take judicial notice as to the code of silence in the [Pennsylvania]
prison system. Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 247.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. [W]e are free to affirm a
result reached by the district court for any reason supported by the record. Alexander
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Govt of V.I., 757 F.2d 534, 54748 (3d Cir. 1985).
Exercising plenary review, see Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Trust v. John
Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 677 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 2012), we agree with the
District Court that partial dismissal was proper, for substantially the same reasons
discussed in the report and recommendation and order. For instance, some defendants
See Hankins v. Pennsylvania, No. 09-182, 2011 WL 6739289 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30,
2011), report and recommendation adopted in part by 2011 WL 6739288 (W.D. Pa. Dec.
22, 2011).
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were not identified as having the requisite personal involvement in the complained-of
conduct, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); others were
outside of 1983s reach. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also
Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1982). Several claims clearly fell short of the
standard required to survive a motion to dismiss; for example, although Hankins
discussed difficulties relating to the law library at the Fayette County prison, he did not
properly state an access-to-the-courts claim. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 20506
(3d Cir. 2008) (setting forth the elements of such a claim). Furthermore, claims against
the Commonwealth defendants in their official capacities were barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.
2009) (per curiam). Further amendment of the complaint would not have yielded a
different outcome. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010).4
After ruling on the defendants motions to dismiss, but before reaching their
motions for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed several defendants because
Hankins had not properly served them. While an indigent prisoner representing himself
is entitled to rely on the Marshal to achieve service of process, Sellers v. United States,
902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1990), we have emphasized that a prisoner must still assist
the Marshals Service when he is informed of service problems. Young v. Quinlan, 960
F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Nyhuis
v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 71 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). As Hankins failed to rectify the service
problems despite being granted additional time to do so, and in light of the District
Courts analysis of the relevant factors from Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984), we conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion
by dismissing the un-served defendants from the suit. See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of
Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 260 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011).5
We review the District Court order granting summary judgment de novo, and
apply the same standard it used. Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012).
For substantially the same reasons cited in the District Courts opinion, we agree that the
defendants met their burden under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and that Hankins failed, with the
two exceptions identified by the District Court, to go beyond the pleadings and by [his]
own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
And, in any event, we fail to see how those three defendants could have been personally
involved in any constitutional violation. Moreover, nothing alleged in the amended
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designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted). For instance,
Hankins did not show that his placement in disciplinary housing implicated due process,
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); that he was incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);
or that prison officials demonstrated a deliberate indifference to his health or safety, id.
at 840. His food claims did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See
LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993); Hamm v. De Kalb Cnty., 774
F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (The fact that [prison] food occasionally contains
foreign objects or sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a
constitutional deprivation.).6 In sum, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in
Hankinss favor on the bulk of the remaining claims. Knopick v. Connelly, 639 F.3d
600, 606 (3d Cir. 2011).
After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of defendant McKnight on all
counts. Hankins filed no post-trial motions, and instead directly appealed the District
Courts entry of judgment. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting further discovery and in making its pretrial evidentiary rulings. See
Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch. Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002); see also R.R.
Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Where no post-
complaint would appear to abrogate the judicial defendants absolute immunity. See
Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184.
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trial motions . . . were filed, and the appeal is directly from the judgment entered on the
jurys verdict, review for sufficiency of evidence is extremely limited or non-existent,
prejudicial legal error must be shown to have occurred in the conduct of the trial, and the
action of an appellate court is limited to affirmance or remand for new trial.). Hankins
has not otherwise indicated a reason to disturb the judgment in favor of McKnight.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court correctly resolved Hankinss claims
and did not abuse its discretion by allowing Hankins to proceed without appointing
counsel. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). We will affirm its
judgment in favor of the defendants. Appellee Brownfields motion to supplement the
appendix is granted, but to the extent that any of Hankinss additional filings before this
Court request independent relief, they are denied.