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United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
2d 1254
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, at Columbia. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-4903-0)
ARGUED: Arlin M. Adams, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Paul R. Hibbard, Johnson, Smith, Hibbard & Wildman, Spartanburg,
South Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Richard B. Watson, M. Clifton Scott, Nelson, Mullins, Riley
The Complaint in this case took the form of a complaint for a declaratory
judgment under South Carolina law and was filed in the Court of Common
Pleas of Richland County.* In the complaint, Diamond State Insurance
Company, the defendant, alleged that it was incorporated under the laws of the
State of Delaware and that its principal place of business was in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The defendant, Homestead Industries, Inc.,
was alleged to be incorporated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with its
principal place of business also in Pennsylvania. The defendant, Peggy A. Via,
Administratrix of the Estate of Timothy L. Via, was alleged to be a citizen and
resident of the State of South Carolina.
Thus it was apparent from the face of the complaint that, under 28 U.S.C.
1332(c)(1), both the plaintiff corporation and the defendant Homestead
Industries were deemed to be citizens of Pennsylvania, and the case could not
have been maintained under diversity jurisdiction under the rule of Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
3
In its brief in this court, appellant, Diamond State, by way of footnote, now
suggests that Homestead be dismissed because it has assigned to Mrs. Via its
interest in the Diamond State Insurance Policy, which is the subject of this suit.
Homestead, the argument goes, was an unnecessary party, and a dispensable
party even if necessary. The brief of Homestead and Mrs. Via does not mention
the jurisdictional question.
Even if the district court had considered the matter and had decided that
Homestead was either an unnecessary or a dispensable party, the question
would be at least arguable as to each of those propositions because the claim of
Diamond State is that it owes nothing to Mrs. Via because it has paid out
everything the terms of the policy require it to pay for all claims, including that
of Mrs. Via. Mrs. Via's claim is no different than any other meritorious claim
which is similarly situated and may now be made against the policy. So the
extent of the coverage of the policy involved in this case might effect not only
Mrs. Via's claim, but other claims as well. That fact would have to be taken into
account in deciding whether or not Homestead was either a necessary or
dispensable party. Also not considered by the district court, nor briefed, nor
argued, nor mentioned here, is whether a future rule of issue preclusion might
apply consistently with the Restatement rule of non-application of res judicata,
to the effect that an assignor is not bound by a suit for or against his assignee in
a partial assignment. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 37, comment c.
(1982).
the district court, McGowan v. Gillenwater, 429 F.2d 587, (4th Cir. 1970), and
we follow that rule in this case, although we do have the authority to dismiss
Homestead. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonso-Lorrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832
(1989). We think the interest of all the parties is better served by a definitive
decision in the state courts of South Carolina where the case was originally
commenced.
7
The judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded to the
district court with instructions to remand the same to the Court of Common
Pleas of Richland County, South Carolina on account of lack of complete
diversity between the plaintiff and the defendants in this case.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS