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United States v. Shahram Shirkhani, 989 F.2d 496, 4th Cir. (1993)
United States v. Shahram Shirkhani, 989 F.2d 496, 4th Cir. (1993)
2d 496
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CR-91-133-R)
Anthony R. Gallagher, Acting Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Farber,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Richard Cullen, United States Attorney, N. George Metcalf, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
E.D.Va.
AFFIRMED.
Before WILKINSON and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE,
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
OPINION
1
Shahram Shirkhani appeals the district court's order denying his Fed. R. Crim.
Shahram Shirkhani appeals the district court's order denying his Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea to money laundering, in violation of
18 U.S.C. 1957 (1988), and the judgment subsequently entered thereon. He
contends that the district court erred by denying his Rule 32(d) motion without
first inquiring into the grounds supporting the motion. Shirkhani also contests
the sufficiency of the government's evidence to support hiss 1957 conviction.
Based on the facts presented in this case, we find no error and, therefore, affirm
Shirkhani's conviction. We also deny Shirkhani's motion for a stay of forfeiture
proceedings pending this appeal.
I.
2
5
MR.
COLLINS: Judge, if I may first, we would have a preliminary motion. On
behalf of Mr. Shirkhani I would move the Court to continue sentencing and permit
him to retain other counsel. He has spoken with David Whaley, who is present in
Court, and is prepared to take over as his counsel. I would ask the Court to grant the
motion to continue the sentencing.
6THE COURT: The motion will be denied.
7
MR.
COLLINS: I would ask the Court then to allow Mr. Shirkhani to withdraw his
guilty plea.
8THE COURT: Motion will be denied.
9
J.A. at 92. No further mention was made of Shirkhani's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Neither the defense counsel in his presentation or arguments nor
Shirkhani in his testimony proffered any reason for the requested plea
withdrawal. Although it never stated the grounds for denying Shirkhani's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court did state that the requested
continuance was denied because Shirkhani had already used the ploy of hiring
and firing four to six attorneys for the purpose of securing continuances.
10
After finding that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, and that
Shirkhani had indeed committed the acts alleged in Count Forty, the court
imposed a two level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 3B1.3 (Nov. 1991). Shirkhani
was sentenced to seventyeight months imprisonment, three years supervised
release, and $743,744.17 in restitution.
II.
11
12
12
13
III.
14
15
Shirkhani contends that the government's evidence did not support the essential
element for conviction under 1957 that he obtained the monies by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. Thus, he maintains
that his guilty plea was entered in violation of his due process rights. Shirkhani
seeks remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether he had the actual authority to issue cashier's checks from Markel's
special tax account at Signet. Shirkhani contends that, if he indeed had such
authority, no misrepresentations were made and no bank fraud was committed.
Section 1957 requires that the monetary transactions involve property derived
15
16
17
18
If this was indeed the extent of the government's evidence, then Shirkhani
would be correct in considering the issue of lack of misrepresentation evidence
to be a question of law. However, Shirkhani fails to recognize the facts
presented at the plea hearing which show that Shirkhani did more than simply
divert Markel's funds. J.A. at 47-48. As such, the Court is no longer presented
with a question of law but, rather, a question of the validity of the district court's
factual determination that the government's evidence presented facts sufficient
to support accepting Shirkhani's guilty plea. This second issue must therefore be
subjected to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v.
Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Guichard, 779
F.2d 1139, 1146 & n.11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1127 (1986).
19
20
Shirkhani did not object to the presentation of any of these facts at the plea
hearing. Instead, Shirkhani admitted his commission of the illegal acts outlined
by the government and summarized by the court. 3 J.A. at 55-57. Shirkhani's
present argument based upon the scope of his authority from Markel is without
merit for, even if Shirkhani had the actual authority to issue cashier's checks
from Markel's tax account, that authority could not have possibly extended so
far as to permit him to instruct Signet employees to issue cashier's checks to
these unauthorized payees. Shirkhani's implicit misrepresentation that he was
acting within his authority caused Signet, without Markel's authorization, to
relinquish custody of funds held on behalf of Markel, thereby exposing Signet
to potential civil liability for unauthorized transfers of monies. United States v.
Morgenstern, 933 F.2d 1108, 1114 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W.
3579 (U.S. 1992); see also United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 315-16 (5th
Cir. 1991) (bank is victimized when fraudulent conduct places it at risk of loss).
22
The facts presented by the government at the plea hearing constitute the
"further showing of the circumstances" which the Briggs I court held could,
when combined with the mere fact of a wire transfer or a check presentation,
constitute an unlawful misrepresentation. Briggs I, 939 F.2d at 227. As in
United States v. Briggs, 965 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Briggs II "), the
government's additional showing that Shirkhani implicitly misrepresented to
Signet that his illicit activities were within the authority granted him by Markel
satisfied the misrepresentation element required for conviction under 1957.
Briggs II, 965 F.2d at 12. Based upon the evidence presented at the plea
hearing, we find that the district court's acceptance of Shirkhani's plea was not
clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm Shirkhani's conviction.4
23
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
The six factors enunciated by this Court in Moore lend further support to the
district court's denial of Shirkhani's Rule 32(d) motion. Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.
First, Shirkhani has offered no credible evidence that his plea was neither
knowing nor voluntary. Given the comprehensive plea hearing conducted by
the court and Shirkhani's level of education, which includes some law school
course work, J.A. at 73-74, it seems unlikely that Shirkhani could disavow the
knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. Second, Shirkhani has never made a
credible assertion of his innocence; instead, as in Moore, he disputes some of
the details of the government's version of the case and their characterization.
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Third, Shirkhani delayed nearly three months before
requesting leave to withdraw his guilty plea. Fourth, Shirkhani had the benefit
of close and competent assistance from at least five attorneys throughout the
proceedings below and suffered no prejudice therefrom. Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52 (1985). Fifth, although there is little evidence that withdrawal would
prejudice the government, "these factors are only balancing considerations, and
so the lack of prejudice to the government, in and of itself, is not dispositive."
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Finally, withdrawal of the plea would be an exercise in
futility because, as demonstrated infra, Shirkhani's claims have no merit
#. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in
open court carry a strong presumption of veracity. The subsequent presentation
of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary
dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly
incredible.").