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United States v. William Alston, 98 F.3d 1335, 4th Cir. (1996)
United States v. William Alston, 98 F.3d 1335, 4th Cir. (1996)
3d 1335
The defendant, William Alston, appeals his conviction for armed robbery of a
federal credit union in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d) on the grounds
of insufficient evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. He also claims the
district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. We affirm.
Alston's first trial resulted in a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a
unanimous verdict. Following a second trial the jury returned a verdict of
guilty.
Alston first claims that the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator was
insufficient to support the conviction and that he did not have time to commit
the robbery and reach his workplace at about 3:00 p.m. Along with other
evidence, the record shows that the police officer who first spotted the robbers'
getaway car picked Alston out of a police lineup the night of the robbery and
identified Alston at trial as the man who exited the back seat of the car and shot
at him (the officer). The officer testified that he returned fire and Alston fled.
The fugitive's weapon was later found in a yard about 50 yards down the street
in the path of Alston's flight. The other occupants of the Alston car,
codefendants William Johnson and Janeen Jackson, escaped and were arrested
shortly thereafter by other officers. A fingerprint on one of the credit union's
metal cash boxes found in the trunk of the car was positively identified as
belonging to Alston. The parties stipulated that it took 39 minutes to go from
the place Alston exited the getaway car and shot at the police officer to
Alston's workplace by Metrorail or by driving. The evidence showed that the
robbery occurred around 1:45 to 1:50 p.m. in Falls Church, Virginia. A credit
union employee followed the getaway car for about four or five minutes and
recorded the license number of the car before it turned to enter a shopping
center. The employee straightaway reported the license number to a police
officer a couple of blocks away. The Alston car was picked up on the
Fourteenth Street Bridge at around 2:08 p.m. by a police officer who followed
the car approximately five minutes before it stopped and the man whom the
officer identified as Alston exited the car, shot at him, and fled. Thus Alston
would have had at least 45 minutes to reach his workplace by car or by
Metrorail. Based on this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the
verdict of guilty. Glasser v. United States, 351 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Alston next claims that his right to present witnesses on his behalf was violated
because the prosecutor's threat of perjury charges intimidated a critical witness
from testifying. The record indicates that the prosecutor requested the court to
appoint counsel for codefendant Janeen Jackson because the government had
evidence that Jackson had perjured herself in Alston's previous trial when she
testified that she did not know Alston. The jail's visitor log showed that Miss
Jackson had visited Alston on two occasions, one time with codefendant
Johnson's girlfriend, Diane Cooper, and another time with Alston's sister,
Sabrina Alston. Miss Jackson's dilemma was that if she testified at Alston's
second trial that she did know Alston, she could be said to admit that she had
perjured herself at the earlier trial. If she testified a second time that she did not
know Alston, she could be subject to a second perjury count. On the advice of
her appointed counsel, Miss Jackson invoked the Fifth Amendment and did not
testify at Alston's trial. Her testimony at the prior trial was read into the record,
she being unavailable under Fed.R.Evid. 804(a)(1).
5
Alston depends on United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468 (4th Cir.1982),
and United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1984). The district court
held both of those cases to be distinguishable, and we agree. MacCloskey was a
case under circumstances remarkably similar to those present here, in which a
witness had declined to testify under at least an implied threat of perjury if she
lied, her sought for testimony being inconsistent with that at a previous voir
dire hearing in the case. The district court was reversed because it did not hold
the witness unavailable and permit the reading of the voir dire testimony on
behalf of the defendant. In the case at hand, the testimony of Miss Jackson at
the previous trial was read to the jury, so MacCloskey has no application.
Teague was a similar case in which the attorney for a witness was advised that
if the witness perjured himself he would be hearing from the U.S. Attorney's
office and his pretrial diversion agreement would be revoked. We held that the
action of the U.S. Attorney was harmless, and also reasoned that the district
court was satisfied that the witness had not been threatened by any federal
agent or attorney under a warning similar to that given here. Therefore, Teague
has no application.
We note in passing that it may be doubted that MacCloskey has survived Bank
of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), in which the Court held
We should also remark that the district court considered it quite proper to ask
for the appointment of an attorney instead of letting the witness unwarily walk
into a perjury trap, and we agree.
10
We disagree. The proffered evidence from these three witnesses was available
to Alston at the time of trial.
The judgment of conviction is accordingly
11
AFFIRMED.