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  • Ritchie v. Jackson, 4th Cir. (1996)

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    The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a Section 1983 civil rights case brought by William Ritchie and Frank Brown regarding their arrests. The court found that: (1) Ritchie's arrest was supported by probable cause based on the victim's identification; (2) the officer had qualified immunity for arresting Brown for disorderly conduct; (3) the force used during the arrests did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; and (4) without an underlying constitutional violation, the conspiracy claim failed as well. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish viable Section 1983 claims.

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    Filed: 1996-10-11 Precedential Status: Non-Precedential Docket: 95-3057

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    The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a Section 1983 civil rights case brought by William Ritchie and Frank Brown regarding their arrests. The court found that: (1) Ritchie's arrest was supported by probable cause based on the victim's identification; (2) the officer had qualified immunity for arresting Brown for disorderly conduct; (3) the force used during the arrests did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; and (4) without an underlying constitutional violation, the conspiracy claim failed as well. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish viable Section 1983 claims.

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    39 views4 pages

    Ritchie v. Jackson, 4th Cir. (1996)

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    Scribd Government Docs
    The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants in a Section 1983 civil rights case brought by William Ritchie and Frank Brown regarding their arrests. The court found that: (1) Ritchie's arrest was supported by probable cause based on the victim's identification; (2) the officer had qualified immunity for arresting Brown for disorderly conduct; (3) the force used during the arrests did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; and (4) without an underlying constitutional violation, the conspiracy claim failed as well. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not establish viable Section 1983 claims.

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    of 4

    UNPUBLISHED

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS


    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    WILLIAM W. RITCHIE, a minor, by
    and through his mother and next
    friend, Stacy L. Ritchie; FRANK
    BROWN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    No. 95-3057
    v.
    DANIEL JACKSON; AARON HARRIS;
    WILLIAM FARRAR,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge.
    (CA-95-428-S)
    Submitted: September 30, 1996
    Decided: October 11, 1996
    Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Allan Heneson, Stephen R. Robinson, GORDON & HENESON, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Paul D. Shelton, Jeffrey E. Gordon,
    Paula J. McGill, PIPER & MARBURY, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland,
    for Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________

    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See


    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    William W. Ritchie and Frank Brown appeal the district court's
    grant of Defendants' motions for summary judgment in their 42
    U.S.C. 1983 (1994) action, wherein they alleged false arrest, use of
    excessive force, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to violate their
    civil rights. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I.
    DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988).
    "[S]ummary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions,
    answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
    of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In determining whether this showing has been
    made, we review the factual evidence and all inferences to be drawn
    therefrom in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.
    Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir.
    1985).
    Ritchie and Brown filed this 1983 action after their arrests for
    armed assault and disorderly conduct, respectively. The facts surrounding their arrests are that while investigating a reported armed
    assault, the victim identified Ritchie as one of his attackers. As one
    of the investigating officers attempted to discuss the seriousness of
    the offense with Ritchie and several of his friends, Ritchie began to
    laugh. The officer grabbed Ritchie by the shirt and informed him that
    he was subject to arrest for violent assault.1 Brown approached this
    officer and inquired why he had grabbed Ritchie's shirt. The officer
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Ritchie left the scene but was later arrested and handcuffed by another
    officer.
    2

    repeatedly asked Brown to leave the area, but Brown refused. At that
    point, Brown was arrested and subsequently charged with disorderly
    conduct.2
    On appeal, Ritchie contends that his arrest lacked probable cause.
    Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within an
    officer's knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy
    information, are "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that
    the [individual] had committed or was committing an offense." Beck
    v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d
    360, 376 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985). Here,
    the victim identified Ritchie as one of his attackers. The officer, therefore, had probable cause to believe that Ritchie had committed a
    crime. See Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991).
    As such, Ritchie has failed to state a cognizable 1983 claim.
    Next, Brown asserts false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
    These claims too must fail. As the facts attest, the officer's actions
    were objectively reasonable; a reasonable officer could have believed
    that his conduct, in arresting Brown for obstructing or hindering a
    police officer, was lawful. Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960,
    965 (4th Cir. 1992 ) (en banc). Therefore, the officer is entitled to
    qualified immunity from Brown's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.
    Both Brown and Ritchie assert claims of excessive force during
    their arrest. These claims are based on the fact that one officer
    grabbed Ritchie by the shirt and lifted him off the ground and that
    they were handcuffed too tightly. Evaluating this claim under the
    Fourth Amendment, this court must consider all the circumstances to
    determine whether the force used in a particular instance was reasonable. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-96 (1989). Reasonableness must be judged objectively, from the perspective of a reasonable
    officer on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. We find that the
    force used pursuant to the arrest of Brown and Ritchie was, at most,
    minimal. Further, they allege no more than de minimis injury; therefore, their claims of excessive force are without merit. See Foster v.
    Metro. Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1082 (8th Cir. 1990) (plac_________________________________________________________________
    2 Brown was later acquitted of this charge.
    3

    ing handcuffs on too tightly does not constitute excessive force absent
    severe, permanent injury).
    Last, Brown and Ritchie assert that during their arrest the Defendants conspired to violate their civil rights. This claim also fails to
    state a cognizable 1983 claim. To prove a conspiracy under 1983,
    "it is necessary that there have been, besides the agreement, an actual
    deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws. `Mere
    proof of a conspiracy is insufficient to establish a section 1983
    claim.'" Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 742 (1st Cir.
    1980) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 622 (7th Cir.
    1979), rev'd in part, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). As we found earlier, both
    arrests were made on probable cause; therefore, no constitutional
    deprivation occurred.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court's grant of
    summary judgment in favor of the Defendants was proper, and we
    hereby affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4

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