Lawrence Tearl v. Sewall Smith, Warden Attorney General of The State of Maryland, 9 F.3d 1544, 4th Cir. (1993)
Lawrence Tearl v. Sewall Smith, Warden Attorney General of The State of Maryland, 9 F.3d 1544, 4th Cir. (1993)
3d 1544
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
at Baltimore.
Lawrence Tearl, Appellant Pro Se.
Tarra R. Minnis, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
D.Md.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE,
Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
OPINION
Lawrence A. Tearl, a Maryland inmate, appeals from the district court's order
refusing habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Tearl raised four claims
in his habeas petition: (1) he was denied effective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal; (2) his conviction was "obtained by use of evidence obtained
pursuant to an unlawful arrest" because he was detained, searched, and never
read his Miranda warnings; (3) his conviction was obtained by use of a
statement obtained in violation of Tearl's Miranda rights; and (4) there was
insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The Defendant filed an Answer
alleging that Tearl's claims were meritless. The district court then summarily
denied Tearl's petition. Tearl noted a timely appeal.
Although the district court possesses the inherent power to enter summary
judgment sua sponte, the exercise of this power is contingent on its giving the
losing party notice that it must come forward and defend its claim. United
States Dev. Corp. v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 873 F.2d 731 (4th Cir.
1989). The court must also alert a pro se litigant that failure to respond might
result in entry of summary judgment against him. Roseboro v. Garrison, 528
F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975). Because Tearl was not given any notice prior to the
district court's entry of summary judgment against him, we vacate the district
court's order and remand to allow Tearl the opportunity to file affidavits or
other appropriate materials in support of his claims.
We deny Tearl's motion for appointment of counsel and dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
VACATED AND REMANDED