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181 and 182 Vs Carmel Maynilad - Reply Opposition To MTD (02 June 2015)
181 and 182 Vs Carmel Maynilad - Reply Opposition To MTD (02 June 2015)
REPLY/OPPOSITION
1.
From Plaintiffs discussion on this issue, it is clear that
they fail to understand why they lack legal personality to institute
this action. In its defense the Plaintiffs merely stated that,
Furthermore, Barangays 181 and 182 are local government units,
juridical persons and entities authorized by law pursuant to the
Local Government Code of 1991 and their respective
representatives have been duly authorized. There is not doubt that
herein petitioners can be parties in this civil action. 1
2.
Plaintiffs have skirted the key issue hovering on legal
personality to institute action as evident and readily shown in their
Barangay Resolutions attached to their Complaint.
3.
Herein respondents do not contest that the Barangays are
local government units that can file legal actions in general. The crux
of why Plaintiffs have no legal personality to institute the present
action is because the Barangays have not authorized the filing of a
case against Carmel.
4.
When the Motion with Leave of Court to Admit the Amended
Complaint to Implead Carmel Development Inc. as Party-Defendant was
filed on 30 September 2014, Plaintiffs included a new Verification and
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping dated 29 September 2014.
However, a perusal of the amended complaint shows that the
Plaintiffs authority to file case is still anchored on their May 2014
Barangay Resolutions which authorized them only to file cases
against Maynilad Water Services, Inc. The lack of authority to file an
Amended Complaint against Carmel is readily seen in Plaintiffs
own Annexes A and B Barangay Resolutions which makes no
mention whatsoever of a complaint to be filed against Carmel but
only of Maynilad.
5.
It must be remembered that the Barangay Captains
Fabular and Brin (hereinafter referred to as Fabular and Brin)
allegedly filed this case on behalf of the Barangays and not in their
own personal capacities. Thus, when Fabular and Brin signed the
verification amending the case, they merely signed it on behalf of the
Barangay. Accordingly, they must be properly authorized to do so by
the Barangay. However, as shown earlier, the Fabular and Brin have
not proffered any Barangay Resolution authorizing them to amend
the complaint to include Carmel and neither are there any valid
and existing resolutions on the authority of Fabular and Brin to
sign a complaint against Carmel.
1
6.
The Barangays have not proffered any Barangay
Resolution authorizing them to amend the complaint to include
Carmel. In the absence of any such Resolution or authority, the
Amended Complaint must necessarily be dismissed.
While
the
IBP-OCA
Memorandum
on
Policy
Guidelines dated March 12, 2002
caution defendants/respondents
to exercise caution when filing
Motions
to
Dismiss,
this
guideline does not serve as a bar
for filing these types of motions.
--------------------------------------------7.
It is a legal precept too obvious and plain to be repeated
that IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated 12 March
2002 merely cautions litigants to exercise restraint when filing
Motions to Dismiss. It is clear and patently apparent that that the
Policy Guidelines mean no more than that. It is beyond cavil that this
does not eliminate the right of a defendant to file a motion to dismiss
provided that the grounds therefor exist.
8.
A Motion to dismiss is a procedural remedy afforded to
litigants under the law and are specifically provided for under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court when the grounds therefor exist, to wit:
Section 1. Rule 16. Grounds. Within the time for but before the
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to
dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a)
That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party;
(b)
That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the claim;
(c)
That the venue was improperly laid;
(d)
That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e)
That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same case;
(f)
That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by
the statute of limitations;
(g)
That the pleading asserting the claim sets no cause of
action;
(h)
That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished;
(i)
That the claim on which the action is founded in
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j)
That a condition precedents for filing the claim has not been
complied with.
9.
According to the arguments proffered in their
Comment/Opposition, counsel for the plaintiffs would have this
Court believe that with a mere stroke of its pen, the IBP-OCA
overruled rules of procedure that have been laid down by the
Supreme Court itself.
10. In the hierarchy of rules on procedure, it is beyond
dispute that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure have preference over
IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated 12 March 2002.
By its very definition, these are mere guidelines and cannot be said
to remove vested remedies available to litigants under the Rules.
11. At this juncture, it would be beneficial to analyze the
reason for the IBP-OCA Memorandum on Policy Guidelines. The
rationale and purpose to caution restraint when filing motions to
dismiss is to forestall the filing of dilatory motions that only serve to
prolong and delay the proceedings. However, this rationale is not
present and met in the case at bar. Here, there are valid grounds for
the cases outright dismissal, such as plaintiffs the lack of authority
to file the present case. Accordingly, it is needless to further prolong
the proceedings in the case as it is dismissible outright and this is
why the herein respondents opted to file a Motion to Dismiss.
12. Unless there is another rule of procedure or piece of
legislation which removes Motions to Dismiss as a remedy available
to litigants, the Policy Guidelines cited by the plaintiffs cannot be
said to supersede the specific provisions of the Rules of Court.
13. The Rules of Court specifically allow and authorize the
filing of a Motion to Dismiss, the IBP-OCA Guidelines are merely a
reminder that parties should observe restraint in filing Motions to
Dismiss and does not serve as an absolute prohibition to filing such a
motion.
14. Accordingly, the plaintiffs bald, unsupported and
unsubstantiated assertion that Motions to Dismiss are prohibited
under the Rules of Court is absolutely ridiculous and deserves scant
consideration from this Honorable Court. The plaintiffs argument
that the instant, Motion to Dismiss violates procedures2 is completely
unfounded in both fact and law.
2
procedure that does not really exist under this jurisdiction. Thus, this
argument by the defendant is easily dispensed with.
The filing of the Motion to
Dismiss was duly authorized by
Carmel.
--------------------------------------------20. For its third argument, the plaintiffs claim that the Motion
to Dismiss was not authorized by the respondent Corporation
Carmel.
21. Respectfully, this argument clearly shows the plaintiffs
penchant for fiction and propensity to conjure legal principles out
of thin air.
22. Plaintiffs state that, it is elementary under this jurisdiction
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of real party
in interest 3. Plaintiffs use of this principle of procedure is
unavailing and inapplicable. In the case of a Motion to Dismiss, the
rules are bereft of any provision which mandates that a Motion to
Dismiss must be accompanied by a Secretarys Certificate or Board
Resolution authorizing an officer to file or institute a Motion.
23. As counsels for Carmel, counsels warrant the authority
given by the Board, and such authority, if and when expressly
needed to be shown or substantiated, may be produced in court at
any given time when so requested by this Honorable Court.
24. The only instance where a corporations Secretarys
Certificate or Board Resolution is necessary in pleading is in cases
where the pleading must be accompanied by a verification and such
Secretarys Certificate would appoint someone to represent it and
sign a verification in its behalf.
25. Carmel obtained the services of the undersigned to
represent it as its legal counsel. As counsel for the respondent
Carmel, the undersigned are authorized to represent Carmel and file
pleadings and motions on its behalf. Accordingly, the plaintiffs
argument should not be given any credence and weight.
The
Amended
Complaint
violates the settled principles of
3
(a)
(b)
(c)
Ibid.
9
Special Civil Action Case No. C-1185(2014). The Complaint in the captioned case is attached hereto as
ANNEX 14
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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court summarily GRANT the Motion to Dismiss for all
the grounds prayed for therein.
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Caloocan City, 08 June 2015.
RHOAN L. PURUGGANAN
Counsel for the Respondent
IBP NO. 983680 / 01 06 15 / ISABELA
PTR NO. 4750674 / 01 05 15 / MAKATI CITY
MCLE Certificate of Compliance IV- 0011088/1-3-2013
Roll of Attorneys No. 44473
Address:
Copy furnished:
ATTY. MA. FILIPINAS M. AGUILAR
Counsel for Plaintiff
27 M. Francisco Street
Caloocan City
ATTY. RESTITUTO M. ANCHETA, JR.
Collaborating Counsel for the Petitioners
Room 304, CCI Building
Natividad St. Ermita, Manila
Manila, NCR 1011
ATTY. MARIANA CLAUDETTE D. GUILBERT
Counsel for defendant Maynilad
Maynilad Water Services, Inc.
MWSS Compound, Katipunan Avenue
Balara, Quezon City
NOTICE
Docket Clerk
Regional Trial Court Branch 125
Caloocan City
Greetings:
The undersigned hereby requests and gives notice that the
foregoing Reply/Opposition be submitted for the consideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court.
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