United States v. Omar Abdulla Ali, 110 F.3d 60, 4th Cir. (1997)
United States v. Omar Abdulla Ali, 110 F.3d 60, 4th Cir. (1997)
3d 60
Omar Ali appeals conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute. See 21 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) (West 1981 &
Supp.1996). He claims that the trial court erred in its finding that the search
which led to the discovery of the cocaine fell within the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule and therefore improperly admitted evidence resulting
from that search. He also contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 because there
was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for constructive possession
Ali also appeals his sentence. He contends that the trial court erred in
increasing his offense level by two for possession of a dangerous weapon
during a drug offense, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2D1.1 (1995).
He argues that he did not possess the gun and that no evidence was presented
suggesting that he knew of the gun or should have reasonably foreseen its
presence.
First, we already have determined in a prior opinion relating to one of Ali's codefendants that the search at issue was conducted in goodfaith and therefore
evidence resulting from it was admissible under United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 923 (1984). See United States v. David, No. 96-4204 (4th Cir. Feb.
10, 1997) (unpublished). Ali advances no new arguments regarding this claim
and, accordingly, we come to the same conclusion as before.
Second, we review the district court's denial of Ali's motion for acquittal under
a sufficiency of evidence standard. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 29; United States v.
Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir.1992). To sustain a conviction,
substantial evidence--when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government--must support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 860 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Constructive possession may be
established by circumstantial or direct evidence and exists when the
Government establishes the defendant's ownership, dominion, or control over
the drug (or the area in which the drug was concealed), and knowledge of its
presence. See United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir.1992). In light
of these standards, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ali constructively
possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court's denial of Ali's Rule 29 motion.
Finally, neither the absence of actual possession nor the lack of a conspiracy
conviction prohibits the application of a two-point enhancement for possession
of a gun during a drug trafficking crime. Rather, the decision to apply such an
enhancement is controlled by whether it is clearly improbable that the weapon
at issue was connected to the offense and whether a co-defendant's possession
of the weapon falls within the Sentencing Guidelines's definition of relevant
conduct. See U.S.S.G. 1B1.3; United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th
Cir.1989). We conclude that the district court did not err in assessing the twopoint enhancement.